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Abstract 
The aim of the current thesis was to extend research on alibi provision by exploring 
how this process may be improved for innocent suspects, to whom the provision of 
inaccurate and incomplete alibis may be detrimental. Across three experimental studies 
and one exploratory survey, I examined (i) whether memory-based reporting 
instructions enhanced innocent mock suspects’ memory output when reporting about 
past actions (Experiment 1) and evidence that may corroborate their alibi (Experiment 
2); (ii) whether a presumption of guilt communicated to innocent mock suspects by an 
interviewer prior to providing their alibi affected their memory output (Experiment 3), 
and, (iii) the beliefs and knowledge of lay people about factors concerning the 
processes of alibi generation and provision (Survey). In Experiment 1, innocent and 
guilty mock suspects provided an alibi, reporting about recently-completed tasks. Prior 
to alibi provision, participants were asked to ensure that their alibi was either accurate 
or informative, or both; control participants received no accuracy or informativeness 
instructions. Innocent mock suspects who were instructed to provide an accurate and 
informative alibi provided the largest number of correct details compared with control 
participants. In contrast, for guilty mock suspects, neither the number of correct details 
provided nor the accuracy of alibis differed as a result of the pre-alibi instructions. In 
Experiment 2, prior to providing an alibi, innocent mock suspects were asked to report 
accurately and informatively about past actions during task completion or about past 
actions and corroborating evidence. Control participants were only asked to report 
about their time while away from the lab. Results indicated that participants who were 
asked to report accurately and informatively about past actions or about past actions 
and corroborating evidence provided a larger number of correct details than did control 
participants. However, the instructions focused on accurate and informative reporting 
about past actions and corroborating evidence did not result in the largest number of 
 
correct details. In Experiment 3, innocent mock suspects provided an alibi to an 
interviewer who communicated to them that she believed that they were guilty or 
innocent, or had no belief about their involvement in a crime. Participants perceived the 
innocent and guilt presumptive approach of the interviewer, but the number of correct 
details provided in alibis did not differ across interviewer-belief conditions. Finally, in 
the survey, lay people from the United Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden responded to 
questions concerning the generation and provision of alibis, indicating their beliefs 
regarding impaired memory processes as possibly underpinning inaccurate alibis by 
innocent suspects and the issue of interviewers’ presumption of guilt. Participants 
tended to believe that innocent suspects may not provide inaccurate alibis, but that 
should this happen, memory processes may be the primary reason. Participants also 
tended to believe that interviewers usually begin to form an opinion regarding the 
guilt/innocence of suspects prior to or while hearing the suspects’ alibi for the first 
time, and that guilt presumption can affect how interviewers conduct interviews. The 
findings reported in the present thesis suggest that innocent suspects’ memory output 
may be increased using specific memory-based pre-alibi instructions. Guiding suspect 
to provide more correct information may result with innocent suspects providing more 
forensically valuable information that may promote their exoneration. The finding that 
participants perceived the innocent and guilt presumptive approach of the interviewer 
suggests that the effect of guilt presumption on innocent suspects’ alibis should be 
examined during longer interviewer-interviewee interactions. Lastly, the findings of the 
survey demonstrate that lay people hold some mistaken beliefs regarding innocent 
suspects’ ability to provide accurate alibis. Throughout this thesis, I discuss the 
importance of examining innocent suspects’ memory output as a unique group of 
rememberers and emphasise that such examination should be based on memory theory. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
In July 1984, 22-year-old Jennifer Thompson-Cannino was sexually assaulted 
by a man who broke into her apartment. Eleven days later, in a physical lineup, Ms. 
Thompson-Cannino identified Ronald Cotton as the man who attacked her after 
already picking his picture during a photo identification. Cotton claimed that he could 
not have attacked Ms. Thompson-Cannino: On the night of the assault, he was with 
several people including his brother and friends, finishing the night at a club. But 
unfortunately, Cotton had the dates confused, as his mother reminded him that he was 
at home at the time in question, sleeping on the couch. Although there were people 
who could verify that Cotton was at home, he realised that the police would find out 
that his original statement was mistaken. When explaining this mistake to his attorney, 
he replied to Cotton that “the inconsistent alibi would only give the D. A. the 
opportunity to brand [him] as a liar” (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 2009, p. 
92). Despite believing that the police officers who interviewed him “already decided 
[he] was guilty” (ibid, p. 84), Cotton was confident in his innocence and refused to 
sign a plea bargain. On January 1985, he was sentenced to life in prison plus fifty 
years. However, in 1995, evidence from the case which were submitted for DNA 
testing showed no match to Cotton but rather to a convict who had already confessed 
to committing the crime to a fellow inmate. Eventually, in June 1995, after serving 
over 10 years for a crime he did not commit, Cotton was released from prison and was 
cleared of all charges. On the whole ordeal, which started from the day police first 
arrived at his home, Cotton noted: “From that day forward, I would always pay 
attention to the date and the time, memorizing details of what happened and when. My 
life might just depend on it” (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 2009, p. 75). 
 When innocent suspects provide a statement in their attempt to convince police 
interviewers of their innocence of a crime, namely an alibi, they must rely on their 
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memory, particularly when they do not have the opportunity to consult others or use 
memory aids such as calendars or diaries. Consequently, the fallibility of human 
memory puts innocent suspects at risk of providing an inaccurate and/or incomplete 
alibi, which can be detrimental for the innocent suspect. To date, most research on the 
provision of statements by people who might have been involved in a crime has 
concerned eyewitnesses and victims (e.g., Fisher, 1995; Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; 
Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009). Research that has concerned suspect statements has 
focused mostly on innocent suspects’ (in)ability to provide corroborating evidence 
(e.g., Nieuwkamp, Horselenberg, & van Koppen, 2017; Olson & Charman 2012; 
Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2014) and alibi believability as a function of different 
factors, such as corroborating evidence (e.g., Olson & Wells, 2004; Strange et al., 
2014) or salaciousness (Nieuwkamp, Horselenberg, & van Koppen, 2016). However, 
research on alibi provision is lacking, particularly with respect to the factor of 
interview techniques that may enhance innocent suspects’ memory output during alibi 
provision. A second factor of interest in alibi generation pertains to the presumption of 
guilt with which interviewers may approach interviews with suspects and may 
consequently affect the quality of alibis. Mr. Cotton noted that the police officer who 
interviewed him had already decided that he was guilty, but it is unknown whether 
and how this presumption of guilt affects innocent suspects’ memory output when 
providing an alibi. 
 The aim of the present thesis is to address the gap in literature pertaining to 
alibi generation. To this end, three experimental studies and one survey were 
conducted. Specifically, the present thesis examined whether memory-based reporting 
instructions provided to suspects prior to alibi provision increased their memory 
output for their past actions (Chapter 2: Experiment 1), or, additionally, for evidence 
that could support their alibi (Chapter 3: Experiment 2). Then, the effects of an 
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interviewer displaying behaviour consistent with presuming guilt on innocent 
suspects’ memory output during alibi provision were examined (Chapter 4: 
Experiment 3). Finally, the beliefs of members of the general public about alibi 
generation by innocent suspects and the issue of interviewers’ presumption of guilt 
were examined (Chapter 5: Survey). With the data obtained from these four studies, 
the present thesis strives to contribute to the growing body of research on alibi 
generation. From an applied perspective, by developing theoretically-informed 
interview techniques, this thesis aspires to maximize innocent suspects’ memory 
output on the one hand and interviewers’ time and resources on the other by eliciting 
as much information as possible during suspect interviews. 
 In the General Introduction chapter, I first discuss the importance of studying 
alibi generation by innocent suspects. Then, I describe findings concerning how 
innocent suspects usually behave during interviews and present a number of factors 
that may jeopardise their success in providing complete and accurate alibis. Finally, I 
discuss how such risk factors may be challenged and present an overview of the 
research I conducted within this thesis in attempts to assist innocent suspects to 
provide complete and accurate alibis.  
What Is an Alibi? 
An alibi is a statement that suspects of a crime provide to police interviewers to 
convince them that they could not have committed the crime for which they are being 
held suspects. This process has been identified as the generation domain of alibis 
(Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Olson & Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004). 
According to Burke et al. (2007), the generation domain comprises two phases—the 
story phase and the validation phase. In the story phase, suspects provide the alibi, 
reporting from memory about their actions and whereabouts during the time of the 
crime (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson, 2013). In the validation 
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phase, suspects attempt to corroborate their alibi by offering one of two (or both) 
types of evidence—physical and person. Physical evidence refers to any object that 
can indicate that the suspect was at a certain place at a certain time during the time 
frame of the crime (e.g. a security-camera recording or a shopping receipt). Person 
evidence refers to anyone who can support the suspect’s alibi, confirming that s/he 
was at a certain place at a certain time. Such a person may be familiar to the suspect 
(e.g., parent, friend) or unfamiliar (e.g., a store clerk, a passer-by; Burke et al., 2007).  
The generation domain is followed by the believability domain, which comprises 
the evaluation phase and the ultimate evaluation phase (Burke et al., 2007; Olson & 
Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004). During the evaluation phase, the credibility of 
suspects’ alibi is evaluated, usually initially by the police. Finally, in the ultimate 
evaluation phase, the credibility of the alibi is determined in court by different 
evaluators who are exposed to all the facts of the case to determine whether the 
suspect has committed the crime or not (Burke et al., 2007). While there is a 
considerable body of literature examining the believability domain of alibis (e.g., 
Culhane & Hosch 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004), hardly any research has been 
conducted on the generation domain of alibis (Olson & Charman, 2012).  
Why Is It Important to Study Alibi Generation? 
Alibi evaluators (e.g., police officers) tend to overestimate the ability of innocent 
suspects to provide accurate alibis (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson 
& Wells, 2012). In the course of a crime investigation, erroneous or incomplete alibis 
may be perceived as indicative of deception (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 
2012; Olson & Charman, 2012). Innocent suspects’ inability to provide a convincing 
alibi may then result in a false conviction (Crozier, Strange, & Loftus, 2017; Wells et 
al., 1998). Understanding the reporting behaviour of innocent suspects during alibi 
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provision, as well as the factors that may affect this behaviour and improve it, may 
contribute to the prevention of miscarriages of justice.  
Innocent Suspects’ Behaviour During Police Interviews 
To discuss the potential ways to affect innocent suspects’ alibi generation, it is 
important first to understand how innocent suspects usually behave during police 
interviews. Two main types of behaviour of suspects during interviews can be 
outlined: nonverbal and verbal. Nonverbal behaviour relates to the overt behaviour of 
suspects, such as vocal cues (e.g., pause durations, stutter) and visual behaviour (e.g., 
head or/and hand movement, blinking) (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007; Vrij, 2008a, 
2008b). In contrast, verbal behaviour is covert, concerning speech content in terms of 
its, for example, length, structure of provided statements, and plausibility (DePaulo et 
al., 2003; Vrij, 2008a). Traditionally, suspects’ behaviours during interviews have 
been studied and discussed in terms of the extent to which these behaviours serve as 
cues to deception, namely signs that may help interviewers discern a deceptive suspect 
from a truthful one (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008b; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). 
While the differentiation of truth tellers from liars (and hence, deception detection) is 
not in the scope of the present thesis, findings pertaining to innocent suspects’ 
behaviour as discussed in the deception detection literature are relevant also to the 
context of the present thesis.  
In 2003, DePaulo and her colleagues (2003; for a review, see Vrij, 2008a) 
published their comprehensive meta-analysis on results from 120 independent 
samples, examining 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception. DePaulo et al.’s (2003) 
aim was to determine whether cues differentiating liars from truth tellers do exist 
based on the examined samples. Regardless of the importance of this meta-analysis to 
deception detection research, this work provides a curated account of the behaviour of 
suspects during interviews. Of most relevance to the current thesis are behaviours of 
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innocent suspects during interviews, and specifically verbal ones. The meta-analysis 
showed that truth tellers provide a larger number of details in their statements than 
liars, thus making them appear more forthcoming during interviews. With respect to 
the nature of the information provided, truth-tellers’ statements were found to be 
relatively more plausible and believable, and their account of sequence of events is 
more coherent and logically structured. Additionally, it was found that when truth 
tellers provide information, they do so in a relatively more engaging manner, meaning 
that they tend more to describe experiences of personal relevance. In this vein, the 
meta-analysis showed that truth tellers are less likely to distance themselves from the 
content of the information they provide (e.g., more use of active than passive voice). 
More generally, DePaulo et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis suggested that truth tellers tend 
more to cooperate with the interviewer and they appear more helpful. Additionally, 
they are more likely to spontaneously correct their statement while providing it, and 
they willingly admit if they lack memory for some information. In the present thesis, 
when designing the interview techniques intended to be examined during interviews 
with innocent mock suspects, it was essential to consider how innocent suspects 
usually behave when interviewed to potentially trigger desired behaviours (e.g., 
provision of detailed statements and cooperation). 
Innocent Suspects’ Self-Regulatory Strategies During Police Interviews 
The behaviours of suspects during interviews reflect, and are even are a result of, 
their self-regulatory strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). Essentially, self-
regulatory processes concern the manner by which people control and direct their 
actions (Markus & Wurf, 1987; see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Markus and Wurf 
(1987) noted that self-regulatory processes involve three components: goal setting, 
cognitive preparation for action, and a cybernetic cycle of behaviour. First, an 
individual engages in self-regulation to achieve a certain goal. A goal may be specific 
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and explicit, such as the decision to finish a marathon on a specific date, or more 
implicit and general, such as one’s desire to be perceived as a nice person (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991). Next, during the step (which may or may not occur) of cognitive 
preparation for action, the individual plans and selects a strategy or several strategies 
for achieving the goal. The cognitive aspect plays a role here in that the planning is 
based on the knowledge that one already owns regarding what strategies are useful to 
achieve which certain goals. Finally, during the cybernetic cycle, the individual 
attempts to execute her/his plans and strategies while monitoring and assessing the 
quality of the behaviour. 
The need for using self-regulatory strategies is likely to rise when a threatening 
situation is approaching, during which the person’s goal would be to restore control 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Fiske and Taylor (1991) presented methods that people may 
use to regain such sense of control. For example, with behaviour control, the person 
actively behaves to influence an occurring situation. Another example is decision 
control, pertaining to decision making regarding the course of action during an 
upcoming stressful situation. An upcoming interview may be perceived by innocent 
suspects as a threating situation in light of the risk of incorrectly being judged as 
guilty, which may lead them to engage in self-regulatory behaviour (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008). In this case, the method of decision control (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) 
may be used to reduce the threat of the upcoming interview by planning the types of 
behaviour and to-be-provided information during the upcoming interview (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008). The need for using self-regulatory strategies may also rise to control 
the impression that the interviewer forms of the suspect. In accordance with this self-
presentational perspective (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al., 2003), innocent suspects—
much like guilty ones—are concerned with creating the impression that they are 
honest and credible (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010). 
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Research has shown that innocent suspects use several self-regulatory 
strategies during interviews (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Hartwig et al., 
2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). In studies such as those included in this 
previous research, participants act as either innocent or guilty mock suspects who, 
after being accused of committing a crime, provide an alibi to convince an interviewer 
of their innocence. After providing their alibi, participants complete a post-alibi 
questionnaire in which they describe what (if any) strategies they used during the 
interview to succeed in the task of convincing the interviewer of their innocence. The 
categorization and analyses of these strategies has shown that innocent mock suspects 
are less likely to plan the verbal content of their alibi compared with guilty mock 
suspects. It has been found that when innocent mock suspects did plan the verbal 
content of their alibi, the strategies they used were more forthcoming than those of 
guilty mock suspects. Specifically, innocent mock suspects were occupied with 
“telling the truth like it happened”, cooperating, and providing a detailed statement. 
Suspects’ self-regulatory strategies reflect their mental state and reasoning 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). The reasoning underlying the self-regulatory strategies of 
innocent suspects is their belief that their innocence bears the power to exonerate them 
(Kassin & Norwick, 2004; Vrij et al., 2010). This trust of innocent suspects in their 
own innocence may be due to a more general belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), in 
which, eventually, people get what they deserve (Kassin & Norwick, 2004; see also 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Also, they may be under the “illusion of transparency”, 
meaning that they overestimate others’ ability to read their internal states, such as their 
feelings and thoughts (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). Due to such reasoning, 
innocent suspects are typically forthcoming and informative during interviews, and 
waive their right to remain silent to begin with (Kassin & Norwick, 2004). In fact, 
these types of reasoning were also found to embody innocent mock suspects’ 
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explanations for not having a strategy before providing an alibi (Hartwig et al., 2007): 
innocent mock suspects noted the fact that they were innocent as a rationale for not 
having the need to plan how to make their statement appear credible to the 
interviewer. For the memory-based instructions developed in the present thesis to 
potentially affect innocent suspects’ behaviour during alibi provision, it was important 
to also consider innocent suspects’ self-regulatory strategies, given that such strategies 
lead to their behaviours during interviews. 
Factors That May Challenge Innocent Suspects During Alibi Provision 
Despite their willingness to be informative, research has demonstrated that 
providing accurate and complete alibis can be challenging for innocent suspects. Two 
main factors may hamper innocent suspects’ ability to provide accurate and complete 
alibis. One factor is impaired memory processes; the second factor is interviewers’ 
presumption of guilt, about which less is known with respect to its effects on innocent 
suspects’ alibis compared with the factor of impaired memory processes. 
Impaired memory processes. When providing truthful information, suspects rely 
on their episodic and autobiographical memory (Burke et al., 2007; Olson & Wells, 
2012; Strange et al., 2014). However, due to limitations in human memory, the 
information innocent suspects provide is prone to errors, inconsistencies, and 
suggestibility (Schacter, 1999; Tourangeau, 2000). These limitations may concern all 
stages of information processing: encoding, storage, and retrieval and reporting. In the 
encoding phase, it is likely that event details are only encoded superficially if the 
person is engaging in a routine task, as opposed to an out-of-the-ordinary activity or 
one which is of significance to her/him (Burke et al., 2007; Crozier et al., 2017; 
Tourangeau, 2000). Event details which have been encoded and are stored in memory 
may nevertheless become less accessible with the passage of time (Pertzov, Manohar, 
& Husain, 2017; Tourangeau, 2000). Additionally, encoded event details are likely to 
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be forgotten if not retrieved often (Schacter, 1999). Innocent suspects may be 
unmotivated to retrieve any critical details until they are interviewed by the police. 
Consequently, and because they may not be asked for their alibi until days, months, or 
even years after the time of the alleged crime (Olson & Charman, 2012), they may 
forget relevant information by the time they are interviewed.  
If not forgotten, retrieved memory details may be distorted if the rememberer is 
exposed to misinformation suggested by others, and this information is then integrated 
with the original memory (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; see Frenda, Nichols & 
Loftus, 2011 for a review). In other cases, by trying to create an account of their 
actions and whereabouts with respect to the time of the alleged crime, innocent 
suspects may wrongly combine information from different memory traces into one 
erroneous report about an event that did not occur, in what is known as a “memory-
conjunction error” (Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992; see also Devitt, Monk-
Fromont, Schacter & Addis, 2016). Alternatively, in their attempt to provide a 
coherent alibi by accounting for missing information, innocent suspects may rely on 
existing knowledge and beliefs in the form of scripts and schemas, especially those 
that pertain to what they usually do at a certain time (Crozier et al., 2017; Leins & 
Charman, 2016). However, relying on a schema that does not match the real event 
may result in a mistaken report (Leins & Charman, 2016).  
Existing research on alibi generation has shown that, indeed, innocent suspects 
struggle to provide accurate and complete alibis due to impaired memory processes. 
For example, Olson and Charman (2012) asked participants to provide four initial 
alibis: for two time periods on a specific date six to 14 weeks prior to the study 
session (i.e., distant-past alibis) and for two time periods on a date three days prior to 
the session (i.e., near-past alibis). Participants were instructed to rely solely on their 
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memory for what they were doing in those time periods. Then, participants were given 
48 hours to locate the corroborating physical and person evidence they had initially 
mentioned to have to support their initial alibis. Olson and Charman (2012) found that 
participants generated fewer initial distant-past alibis than near-past alibis. Moreover, 
371 (36%) out of the total 1020 initial alibis provided turned out to be mistaken, with 
117 out of those mistaken alibis requiring a narrative change (with more distant-past 
than near-past alibis requiring this change).  
Another demonstration of innocent suspects’ difficulty to report accurately 
from memory due to its limitations comes from research by Strange et al., (2014). 
Participants provided an alibi for a timeframe three weeks prior to the study session 
and were then given one week to find evidence to corroborate their alibi. When 
providing their alibi for the same time frame again after a week, it was found that the 
two alibis were consistent on only 53% of the details. According to Strange et al. 
(2014), this finding suggested that the initial alibis comprised a significant amount of 
inaccurate information. Culhane, Hosch, and Kehn (2008) found that even when 
participants were asked to report what they were doing on a specific time frame only 
two days prior to the study, 61 (10.9%) out of 543 participants stated that they had no 
memory for their actions during that specific time (or had no witness that could 
corroborate their alibi). In sum, the deterioration and distortion of innocent suspects’ 
memory for past events create a fertile ground for them to provide inaccurate, 
incomplete, and ultimately, unconvincing alibis. 
Interviewers’ presumption of guilt. In its nature, an interview is a social 
interaction between the interviewer/s and the interviewee (i.e., the suspect). At times, 
although a suspect is innocent of the crime, the interviewer may approach suspect 
interview already believing that this suspect is guilty (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 
2003). Although a guilt presumption may be erroneous, it may still be held 
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confidently. For example, when Moston, Stephenson, and Williamson (1992) 
investigated 1,067 cases of suspects interviewed by UK police detectives, they found 
that in 73% (780) of cases the interviewers were sure of the suspect’s guilt before the 
interview took place. With respect to the factors that may initiate a guilt presumption, 
these include insufficient or even lack of evidence, pressure on the interviewer (from 
the public or within the police) to find the culprit, or the need for appreciation 
(Mortimer & Shepherd, 1999). Yet, this guilt presumption may also be based on 
nothing more than a hunch that the interviewer forms during earlier interactions with 
the suspect (Kassin, 2006).  
While an interviewer’s presumption of guilt may be formed only due to internal 
factors (e.g., the need for appreciation or a hunch), some interview techniques 
encourage interviewers to form this belief and even maintain it. One such technique is 
the Reid technique used during American police interviews (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & 
Jayne, 2001). In this technique, the interviewer first evaluates whether the suspect is 
lying or telling the truth. Then, if considered lying by the interviewer, the suspect is 
interviewed across nine steps of the technique (Inbau et al., 2001). While suggesting 
approaching suspect interviews with assumption of innocence or assuming a neutral 
position, the Reid guide also suggests interviewers to adopt a guilt-presuming 
approach. Moreover, the guide explicitly explains to interviewers that they should 
approach the nine-step interview with a suspect “whose guilt, in the opinion of the 
investigator, seems definite or reasonably certain” (Inbau et al., 2001, p. 68). It is not 
surprising then that the Reid technique has been described as a guilt-presumptive 
technique dedicated to eliciting confessions from suspects (Gudjonsson & Pearse, 
2011; Kassin, 2005). 
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In contrast to the confrontational Reid technique used in the American police 
system, the UK police system uses a more information-gathering approach, namely 
the PEACE interview model (Central Planning and Training Unit, 1992a, 1992b). The 
demand for this first national training programme for interviewing witnesses and 
suspects grew following a number of miscarriages of justice which occurred partly 
due to biased and unethical interview techniques. Five stages comprise the PEACE 
model and also stand for its acronym: Planning and preparation; Engage and explain; 
Account; Closure; Evaluation. The principles underlying the PEACE model are open 
mindedness and fairness, and the model is more interviewee-led, allowing suspects the 
opportunity to present their version of events. Importantly, the PEACE model aims to 
eliminate false confessions, and interviewers are encouraged to avoid guilt 
assumptions (e.g., Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Shawyer, Milne, & Bull, 2009). The 
PEACE model has been adopted by several other police organizations, such as those 
of Norway (i.e., the KREATIV model; Fahsing & Rachlew, 2009) and New Zealand 
(Bull & Soukara, 2010). Despite the PEACE recommendation to keep an open mind 
and avoid presumptions of guilt, interviewers nevertheless continue to approach 
interviews with suspects while holding biased beliefs about their guilt (Shawyer & 
Milne, 2015).  
Can merely believing that suspects are guilty prior to interviewing them affect the 
interview process? In their effort to answer this question, Kassin and colleagues 
(2003) led their interviewer-participants to expect that the suspect-participants they 
were about to interview were either guilty or innocent of a mock theft. As a 
preparation for the interview, the mock interviewers were asked to choose six 
questions they would ask the suspects; they had to choose these questions from a list 
comprising guilt-presumptive and neutral questions. Mock interviewers primed with 
guilt expectations chose more guilt-presumptive questions compared with those 
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primed with innocence expectations. Following the interview, 42% of the guilt-
presumptive interviewers judged the suspects guilty compared with only 19% of the 
innocence-presumptive interviewers, irrespective of the suspects’ actual veracity. 
Then, neutral participants listened to parts of the taped interviews while being “blind” 
to the interviewers’ presumptions and the suspects’ veracity. These listeners tended to 
judge more suspects interviewed by guilt-presumptive interviewers as guilty than 
those interviewed by innocence-presumptive interviewers. Moreover, the former 
suspects were perceived by these listeners as more defensive compared with the latter 
suspects.  
Hill, Memon, and McGeorge (2008) extended Kassin et al.’s (2003) study by 
showing that mock suspects (who chose whether to cheat or not on a test) interviewed 
with guilt-presumptive questions reported feeling more pressure during the interview 
to confess than did mock suspects interviewed with neutral questions. Hill et al. 
(2008) additionally found that neutral participants who listened to recordings of the 
interviewed suspects rated innocent suspects who were asked guilt-presumptive 
questions as more guilty than guilty suspects who replied to such questions.   
The studies of Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008) demonstrate how 
merely believing that suspects are guilty prior to interviewing them affects the entire 
interview process, eventually affecting how neutral observers judge the interviewed 
suspects. What are the theoretical processes underpinning the effects of a presumption 
of guilt? In the context of suspect interview, when an interviewer approaches an 
interview when already believing that the suspect is guilty, a confirmation bias is 
especially likely to be evident (Findley & Scott, 2006). Confirmation biases pertain to 
the unintentionally selective gathering and use of information to increase the validity 
of the belief held by perceivers (Nickerson, 1998), such as interviewers. Accordingly, 
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interviewer-participants in Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008) who were led to 
believe that their interviewee were guilty chose/formulated (respectively) questions 
that were coloured by this belief. Due to the top-down nature of the perceiver’s 
perception of the target (i.e., the suspect), this perception is also based on qualities of 
this perceiver, and not only on characteristics of the target (i.e., bottom-up processing; 
Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013). A key feature of a confirmation bias is that it is 
likely to develop without the perceiver’s awareness or intention (Nickerson, 1998).  
After the perceiver forms a belief about the target and behaves towards the 
target in accordance with this belief, this may change the target’s behaviour such that 
it conforms with the perceiver’s belief, allegedly providing evidence for the 
perceiver’s belief (i.e., self-fulfilling prophecy interaction sequence; Merton, 1948; see 
also Darley & Fazio, 1980; Mortimer & Shepherd, 1999; Nickerson, 1998). In Kassin 
et al.’s (2003) and Hill et al.’s (2008) studies, participant-suspects who were asked 
guilt-presumptive questions (vs. innocence-presumptive or neutral questions) were 
judged by neutral participants as more guilty, defensive, and nervous. With respect to 
the interviewer, s/he may fail to recognize that her/his guilt presumption initiated this 
chain of events, and alternatively may mistakenly conclude that the suspect is 
behaving the way s/he is because s/he is, in fact, guilty (see Darley & Fazio, 1980). 
While the perceiver’s belief is required to affect her/his behaviour towards the target, 
the target’s perception of the perceiver’s behaviour is essential to determine the 
target’s behaviour in response to the perceiver’s behaviour. The target may, for 
example, attribute the (biased) behaviour of the perceiver to dispositional 
characteristics of the perceiver. Alternatively, the target may attribute the perceiver’s 
behaviour to the target’s own characteristics (Darley & Fazio, 1980).  
To conclude, being motivated to convince police interviewers of their innocence 
may not be enough for innocent suspects to succeed in this goal, as factors out of their 
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control may affect their ability to provide a convincing alibi. While memory-related 
factors have been found to hamper innocent suspects’ ability to provide accurate 
alibis, the effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt on innocent suspects’ memory 
output have been examined for the first time in the current thesis.  
Improving the Process of Alibi Provision by Innocent suspects 
 Existing findings on factors that affect innocent suspects’ ability to provide a 
convincing alibi call for further research on other such factors, as well as on means to 
counter their effects. Such an examination may enhance innocent suspects’ verbal 
output and help them provide convincing alibis.  
Dealing with impaired memory processes. Memory-based interview techniques 
may assist innocent suspects with providing complete and accurate, and ultimately, 
convincing alibis. However, studies to date devoted to developing such interview 
techniques are lacking (see Burke et al., 2007; Crozier et al., 2017; Leins & Charman, 
2016). A notable exception is Leins and Charman’s (2016) study, in which they 
demonstrated the effects of recall cuing on alibi accuracy. In the first stage of the 
study participants completed a number of tasks. Between five and nine days later, 
participants provided an alibi regarding crimes that were allegedly committed in the 
previous stage of the study. The alibi was provided across three conditions of recall 
cue, informing participants prior to alibi provision about the time in which the alleged 
crimes happened (time-only cue), the location of alleged crimes (location-only cue), 
or both the timing and location of the crimes (time-and-location cue). It was found 
that participants cued by a location-only interview prompt provided more accurate 
alibis than did participants cued by a time-only and time-and-location interview 
prompts. The researchers suggested that in the paired cue condition, the less effective 
time cue became dominant, resulting in similar findings to what was obtained with the 
presentation of the time cue alone. Alternatively, they suggested that the paired cue 
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promoted a narrower memory search than did the location-only cue, consequently 
decreasing the efficiency of the paired cue in finding accurate matches in memory. 
Despite a lack of understanding of the findings, Leins and Charman’s (2016) findings 
demonstrate that memory-based interview prompts may affect and even enhance alibi 
accuracy. In the current thesis, we also drew on memory theory to develop alibi 
instructions to present to innocent mock suspects prior to alibi prevision to increase 
their memory output. 
Enhancing innocent suspects’ memory output during alibi provision. In the 
present thesis, we sought to enhance innocent mock suspects’ memory output in terms 
of the completeness and accuracy of their alibis in terms of two measures presented in 
Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) model of strategic regulation of memory accuracy. 
Specifically, the model distinguished between quantity measures which pertain to the 
number of (only) correct details that can be remembered, and accuracy measures 
which are used to assess the probability of each reported detail’s correctness (i.e., the 
number of correct details provided [quantity] out of the total number of details 
provided—correct and incorrect). According to Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996; see 
also Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994) model, people can enhance the accuracy of the 
information they report from memory if allowed to freely decide what and how much 
information to report or withhold. Presenting innocent suspects with pre-alibi 
instructions that differ in their emphasis on the informativeness and accuracy of 
information may reveal whether a certain type of such reporting instructions can 
increase innocent suspects’ memory output in terms of the quantity and accuracy rates 
of their alibis. In the current thesis, we developed such pre-alibi instructions and 
examined their effects on innocent mock suspects’ memory output during alibi 
provision. 
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Dealing with interviewers’ presumption of guilt. In light of previous findings 
(Kassin et al., 2003; Hill et al., 2008) on the effects of interviewers’ presumption of 
guilt on innocent suspects non-verbal behaviour, it is possible that this belief also 
affects the quantity and accuracy of their alibis. If this is the case, further research 
should be devoted to reducing instances of guilt presumption. However, to develop 
effective means to reduce such instances, it is first necessary to examine whether 
interviewers’ guilt presumption affects innocent suspects verbal behaviour during alibi 
provision. In the current thesis, we examined the effect of an interviewer displaying 
behaviour consistent with presuming guilt on innocent mock-suspects’ alibis in terms 
of the completeness and accuracy of the information provided.  
Thesis Overview  
 The present thesis comprises four studies: three experiments and one survey. 
Below is a summary of the thesis chapters. Each study chapter was written 
independently for submission to a peer-reviewed journal. Thus, some repetitions exist 
between chapters.  
Chapter 2: Using pre-alibi instructions to increase innocent suspects’ 
memory output (Experiment 1). Innocent suspects may fail to provide alibis that 
would convince interviewers of their innocence due to the reporting of inaccurate and 
complete information from memory. This chapter presents a study in which we 
examined whether memory-based reporting instructions presented to innocent mock 
suspects prior to providing an alibi increased their memory output when reporting 
about past actions. Specifically, we were interested in the effects of these pre-alibi 
instructions on the quantity (of correct details) and accuracy rates of the alibis. The 
participants of particular interest in this study were innocent mock suspects who, 
following the completion of a number of non-criminal tasks, provided an alibi to 
convince an interviewer of their innocence of a theft allegedly committed in the task 
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room. Critically, prior to providing their alibi, participants were provided with one of 
three types of pre-alibi instructions that emphasised the informativeness of 
information, its accuracy, or both its informativeness and accuracy. Participants in a 
control condition received no special reporting instructions. To better establish that 
any effects of the pre-alibi instructions on the innocent mock suspects’ alibis would be 
due to effects on reporting behaviour (cf. information-disclosure strategy), this study 
also included a sample of participants in the role of guilty mock suspects; such 
suspects were previously found not to rely on their memory to provide their alibi 
(Hartwig et al., 2010; Strömwall et al., 2006). We predicted that the pre-alibi 
instructions would only affect the quantity and accuracy rates of alibis of innocent 
mock suspects.  
Chapter 3: Examining the effects of pre-alibi instructions on innocent 
suspects’ memory output for past actions and corroborating evidence 
(Experiment 2). To support their alibi, suspects might provide details about evidence 
that would corroborate their alibi. However, the same memory processes that may fail 
innocent suspects to report accurately about their past actions and whereabouts may 
also fail them to report accurately about corroborating evidence. The study presented 
in this chapter sought to extend the findings of Experiment 1 by examining whether 
pre-alibi instructions enhanced innocent mock suspects’ memory output not only for 
their alibi (i.e., past actions and whereabouts) but also for alibi-corroborating 
evidence. Participants were innocent mock suspects who completed several tasks 
outside the lab, with each task ending with participants generating evidence that 
accounted for their whereabouts. Upon returning to the lab and after being accused of 
committing a theft that occurred while they were away, participants were asked to 
provide an alibi across three pre-alibi instructions conditions. These pre-alibi 
instructions instructed them to report accurately and informatively about what they 
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had done during the critical time period of their alibi or about what they had done 
during the critical time period of their alibi and the evidence that could corroborate 
their alibi. Control participants were only asked to report about their time while away 
from the lab, without being instructed regarding they type of information they should 
report about nor how accurate and informative their alibi should be. As in Experiment 
1, we examined participants’ performance in terms of the quantity of correct details 
and accuracy rates of their alibis. However, this time, we examined these two 
measures also specifically with respect to details concerning the evidence generated 
by participants. We expected that the number of correct details provided in the entire 
alibi and that pertaining specifically to evidence details would be larger in both 
manipulation conditions than in control condition, but highest in the pre-alibi 
instructions that emphasized accurate and informative reporting about both 
participants’ actions and corroborating evidence.  
Chapter 4: Examining the effect of presuming guilt on the verbal output 
of innocent suspects during brief interviews (Experiment 3). Research has shown 
that interviewers who approach interviews with suspects while already believing they 
are guilty of a crime ask more guilt-presumptive questions and conduct more 
aggressive interviews than when believing that the suspects are innocent (Kassin et al., 
2003; Hill et al., 2008). This research has also shown that when innocent suspects are 
interviewed by a guilt-presumptive interviewer (vs. innocence-presumptive or neutral 
interviewer), they appear more nervous and defensive, ultimately perceived as guilty 
by neutral judges. In the study presented in this chapter, we explored how an 
interviewer’s presumption of guilt communicated to innocent mock suspects via the 
interviewer’s words and behaviour affected such participants’ memory output in terms 
of the quantity and accuracy of their alibis. Participants were innocent mock suspects 
who, following the completion of a number of tasks, provided an alibi to convince an 
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interviewer of their innocence of a theft. Critically, before providing their alibi, the 
interviewer implied to participants that she believed that they were guilty or innocent 
of the theft, or that she had no belief about their responsibility for the theft. We 
identified and tested two possible predictions pertaining to the number of correct 
details and accuracy rates of participants’ alibis. On the one hand, research (Granhag, 
Clemens, & Strömwall, 2009) has demonstrated that high (vs. low) levels of suspicion 
caused guilty-mock suspects to provide more informative statements, presumably 
because participants felt more responsible to convince the interviewer of their 
innocence. Accordingly, we predicted that after perceiving the treatment of the guilt-
presumptive interviewer as a result of a self-fulfilling prophecy sequence, the alibis of 
participants in the guilty-belief condition would include the largest number of correct 
details with highest accuracy rates. The alibis of participants in the innocent-belief 
condition, in contrast, would include the smallest number of correct details with 
lowest accuracy rates. However, research (Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007) has 
also shown that accusatory interview styles caused guilty suspects to provide the 
shortest statements, perhaps because accusatory interviews cause suspects to be less 
forthcoming. Thus, it was also considered possible that presumed-guilt participants 
would provide the smallest number of correct details with poorer accuracy rates while 
alibis of participants in the innocent-belief condition would include the largest number 
of correct details and be the most accurate. 
Chapter 5: Beliefs about innocent suspects’ alibis: A survey of lay people 
in the United Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden. This chapter presents a survey 
disseminated among lay people in the UK, Israel, and Sweden. Participants completed 
a survey comprising eight questions which asked them for their beliefs about the 
verbal behaviour of innocent suspects during alibi provision and the issue of 
interviewer’s presumption of guilt. These participants represent members of the public 
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who may (i.e., UK participants) serve jury duty and be asked to judge the believability 
of alibis of innocent suspects in court. Thus, it is important to discover what beliefs 
lay people hold regarding innocent suspects’ alibis generation, whether they 
acknowledge that innocent suspects may provide incorrect information and the 
reasons for that, and whether they acknowledge that alibis may be provided to a guilt-
presumptive interviewer.  
Chapter 6: General Discussion. In the final chapter of the present doctoral 
thesis, the key findings are summarised and discussed in terms of theoretical and 
practical implications. In addition, the contributions of the findings are examined with 
respect to the wider literature. Finally, limitations of the current thesis are outlined and 
routes for further research are suggested.  
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Chapter 2: Using pre-alibi instructions to increase innocent suspects’ memory 
output 
 
Abstract 
Innocent suspects often provide unconvincing alibis due to memory fallibility. In this 
research, we examined whether memory-based pre-alibi instructions enhanced the 
quantity (of correct details) and accuracy of alibis of innocent mock suspects. 
Innocent and guilty mock suspects provided an alibi across three conditions of pre-
alibi instructions emphasizing the informativeness of information provided, its 
accuracy, or both its informativeness and accuracy. Control participants received no 
special instructions. The quantity measure differed by pre-alibi instructions conditions 
only for innocent mock suspects. Specifically, the number of correct details provided 
by the innocent mock suspects was larger when pre-alibi instructions focused on both 
the informativeness and accuracy of information (cf. control condition), without 
compromising accuracy. We discuss the potential of pre-alibi instructions to enhance 
innocent suspects’ memory output during alibi provision while stressing the need to 
further research innocent suspects’ alibi generation and provision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been submitted as a manuscript for publication as:  
Portnoy, S., Hope, L., Vrij, A., Ask, K., Granhag, P. A., & Landström, S. (2018). 
Using pre-alibi instructions to increase innocent suspects’ memory output.  
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Introduction 
When suspects report about their activities and whereabouts for the timeframe 
of an alleged crime to convince an interviewer of their innocence, this statement 
becomes their alibi (Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Olson, 2013). However, innocent 
suspects may fail to provide a convincing alibi due to the reporting of mistaken and/or 
partial details (Olson & Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004, 2012). In this research, 
we explored whether memory-based pre-alibi instructions increased memory output of 
innocent mock suspects during alibi provision. 
 Research has shown that providing an accurate alibi can be challenging for 
truthful suspects. For example, Olson and Charman (2012) asked participants to 
provide four initial alibis: for two time periods on a date six to 14 weeks earlier (i.e., 
distant-past alibis) and for two time periods on a date three days earlier (i.e., near-past 
alibis). Participants generated fewer distant-past alibis than near-past alibis. Critically, 
36% of the initial alibis provided turned out to be mistaken following a 48-hour period 
during which participants reviewed their initial alibi. Similarly, participants in 
Strange, Dysart, and Loftus (2014) provided an initial alibi for a time period three 
weeks prior to the test session. Then, after one week during which participants 
attempted to corroborate their alibi, they provided their alibi again for the same time 
frame. Strange et al. (2014) found that both alibis were only consistent for 53% of the 
details, suggesting that many of the details provided in the initial alibis were incorrect.  
Despite being motivated to be accurate and facing serious consequences for 
not being believed, innocent people may provide incomplete and/or incorrect alibis 
due to the limitations of human memory (Schacter, 1999; Tourangeau, 2000). For 
example, unless the person was taking part in an unusual activity during the time of 
the alleged crime, it is most likely that s/he had encoded any (subsequently) relevant 
details superficially (Crozier, Strange, & Loftus, 2017; Tourangeau, 2000). As time 
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goes by, details of experiences that were encoded are forgotten (Pertzov, Manohar, & 
Husain, 2017; Tourangeau, 2000) and/or may be distorted if, following the to-be-
remembered event, the rememberer is exposed to misinformation which is then 
integrated with the original memory (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; see Frenda, 
Nichols & Loftus, 2011, for a review). Despite these common memory problems, alibi 
evaluators (e.g., police interviewers) overestimate truthful suspects’ ability to provide 
accurate alibis (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2012). 
For example, in a survey conducted among law enforcement personnel (Dysart & 
Strange, 2012), not one respondent (out of 35) provided memory-related factors as a 
potential reason for erroneous alibis when asked “why a suspect might be mistaken 
about their alibi after a 10-minute delay between the time in question and the 
interview?” (p. 19). In fact, when respondents were asked whether a suspect could be 
wrong about where s/he were when interviewed 10 minutes after the critical time 
frame, 93% of them (out of 63) reported that “it was very or extremely unlikely that 
the suspect could be wrong” (p. 19). Nevertheless, findings show that memory traces 
may be forgotten in a short matter of seconds (see Pertzov et al., 2017; 
Ricker & Cowan, 2010).  
Critically, alibi evaluators may perceive erroneous or incomplete alibis as 
indicative of deception (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & 
Charman, 2012), ultimately contributing to the wrongful conviction of innocent 
people (Crozier et al., 2017; Wells et al., 1998). However, to date, no other research 
(to our knowledge) has focused on developing techniques to explicitly support the 
provision of accurate and complete alibis by innocent suspects. In a notable exception, 
Leins and Charman (2016) demonstrated the effects of recall cuing on alibi accuracy, 
demonstrating that alibis of participants who were cued by a location-only interview 
prompt were more accurate than alibis of participants cued by a time-only or time-
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and-location interview prompt. As such, their research has provided support for the 
effectiveness of interview prompts in increasing alibi accuracy, encouraging further 
research on the enhancement of truthful suspects’ memory output during interviews.   
In this vein, the current research explored whether the memory output of 
innocent mock suspects during alibi provision could be enhanced by presenting them 
with specific reporting instructions before alibi provision. According to Koriat and 
Goldsmith’s (1996; see also Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994) model of strategic regulation 
of memory accuracy, people can enhance the accuracy of the information they report 
from memory if allowed to freely decide what and how much information to report or 
withhold. The pre-alibi instructions developed and tested in the present research 
differed in their emphasis on the informativeness and accuracy of information to 
differently affect truthful rememberers’ decision regarding the informativeness and 
accuracy of the details provided in their alibi. Presenting participants with different 
types of pre-alibi instructions that differed in their emphasis on the informativeness 
and accuracy of information allowed to examine whether a certain type of such 
reporting instructions can increase innocent suspects’ memory output during alibi 
provision. We examined the effects of the pre-alibi instructions on participants’ 
memory output in terms of two measures presented in Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) 
model. Specifically, the model distinguished between quantity measures which pertain 
to the number of (only) correct details that can be remembered, and accuracy 
measures which are used to assess the probability of each reported detail’s correctness 
(i.e., the number of correct details provided [quantity] out of the total number of 
details provided—correct and incorrect). Thus, the present research is the first to 
examine the effects of memory-enhancing interview techniques on truthful suspects’ 
memory reporting in terms of these two measures (cf. gross accuracy estimations as in 
Leins & Charman, 2016, and Olson & Charman, 2012). 
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Previous research has already attempted to increase the quantity and accuracy 
of rememberers’ memory output in the context of mock eyewitnesses (e.g., Hope, 
Mullis, & Gabbert, 2013; Pansky & Nemets, 2012). However, several differences 
exist between suspect alibis and eyewitness testimony. Most notably, while an 
unintentionally inaccurate eyewitness statement may harm another person (e.g., the 
suspect), a mistaken alibi may harm the rememberer her/himself. This suggests that 
when reporting from memory, eyewitnesses and suspects may undergo different 
motivational and memorial processes which may inherently differently affect their 
reporting behaviour. Thus, the reporting behaviour of suspects should be examined 
separately from that of eyewitnesses. 
In the present research, the participants of particular interest were innocent 
mock suspects who completed a number of non-criminal tasks, after which they were 
accused of committing a theft in the task room. Then, to convince an interviewer of 
their innocence, they provided an alibi under pre-alibi instructions that emphasised the 
informativeness of information, its accuracy, or both its informativeness and accuracy. 
Participants in a control instructions condition received no special reporting 
instructions. We included the individual accuracy and informativeness instructions 
conditions in addition to the combined instructions condition to enable us (in case of 
obtaining effects of the instructions) to conclude more precisely whether it was the 
combination of the accuracy and informativeness components that was more effective 
or only their individual presentation (see Leins & Charman, 2016, for similar use of 
individual and combined interview prompts). We also included a sample of lying 
participants in the role of guilty mock suspects. Previous research has shown that, 
compared with innocent suspects, guilty suspects tend not to rely on their memory to 
provide their alibi, but rather on pre-planned verbal strategies of how much and what 
information to report (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Strömwall, 
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Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). This deceptive condition was included for comparison 
purposes to better establish that any effects of the pre-alibi instructions on truth-
tellers’ alibis would be due to effects on memory (cf. information-disclosure strategy). 
As innocent suspects tend to cooperate with interviewers (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007) and to rely solely on their memory 
(more so than guilty suspects) to provide their alibi (e.g., Culhane, Hosch, & Kehn, 
2008; Olson & Charman, 2012), they were more likely to report differently based on 
reporting instructions. Thus, we predicted that the performance of the innocent mock 
suspects would reflect effects of the different pre-alibi instructions in terms of the 
quantity (of correct details) and accuracy rates of the details provided. Since liars tend 
during interviews to adhere to a pre-planned verbal strategy (Hartwig et al., 2010; 
Strömwall et al., 2006), we predicted that the reporting behaviour of the guilty mock 
suspects would not express effects of the pre-alibi instructions. In sum, Hypothesis 1 
predicted an interaction effect between participants’ veracity and the pre-alibi 
instructions on both quantity of correct details and accuracy rates of participants’ 
alibis.  
One prominent prediction of Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) model is that of a 
quantity-accuracy tradeoff, whereby an account comprising fewer correct details is 
likely to be comprised of a high accuracy rate, whereas a memory report comprised of 
a large number of correct details is likely to include a lower percentage of accurate 
details overall. Thus, we expected that among truth tellers, effects of the accuracy 
instructions on accuracy rates would be accompanied by a decrease in quantity of 
correct details provided because of the emphasis of these instructions on the accuracy 
of information. In contrast, we expected that effects of the informativeness 
instructions on the quantity measure would be accompanied by a decrease in accuracy 
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rates because of the emphasis of these instructions on the amount of information 
provided. However, we did not expect a quantity-accuracy tradeoff to accompany 
effects of the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions because these 
instructions emphasized both the amount of information provided and its accuracy 
(Hypothesis 2).  
Method 
Design  
A 2 (veracity: truth tellers, liars) × 4 (pre-alibi instructions: accuracy, 
informativeness, accuracy and informativeness, control) between-subjects design was 
used. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions (n 
= 24 per condition). The dependent variables were the quantity measure and accuracy 
rates of alibis. 
Participants 
Two-hundred and ten native English-speaking students and employees at a 
university in the United Kingdom participated in the study for course credit or £5. 
Additionally, participants had a chance to enter a raffle for £10 (see Procedure). 
Eighteen participants did not follow the tasks instructions correctly and their data were 
not used, resulting in a final sample of 192 participants (43 males,149 females, aged 
18-40 years [M = 20.24, SD = 3.71 years]). We performed a post-hoc sensitivity 
analysis (using G*Power 3.1.9.2; see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to 
determine the effect size we might detect with reasonable power given our sample 
size. With an alpha of .05, a power of .80, and a total sample size of N = 192, we 
could expect to detect a small effect size, f = 0.24 (η2 = .05), for a two-way ANOVA 
with eight conditions.  
Materials 
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Non-criminal tasks. Six non-criminal tasks, requiring participants to perform 
various actions involving different objects around the task room, were used. The tasks 
were selected following a pilot study in which nine participants completed 10 such 
tasks created for the study, and then freely wrote down all the details that they 
remembered about each task. The six tasks with the highest average of information 
provided across all pilot participants were selected for inclusion in the study: finding 
course information online (M = 77.78, range: 32-119); matching name tags with 
people’s photos according to a written description (M = 90.67, range: 22-239); sorting 
cards according to colour and size (M = 72.44, range: 31-147); selecting birthday 
dates and marking them on a calendar (M = 68.89, range: 27-143); assembling shelves 
(M = 68.89, range: 34-112); and, locating hidden headphones and speakers and testing 
them on a laptop (M = 86.33, range: 30-207).  
Mock crime.  Liars were instructed to search the room for a memory stick and 
copy onto it one of six “confidential” files from a laptop and then delete all these files 
from the laptop. They were asked to keep the memory stick with them and hide it 
from the experimenter when leaving the task room.  
Task booklet. Instructions for each task were provided to participants on a 
separate page in a booklet. For all participants, the first page provided general task-
completion instructions (e.g., to complete each task one at a time). Truth tellers were 
then provided with instructions for the six non-criminal tasks. Liars, in contrast, were 
then provided with instructions for three non-criminal tasks, followed by the 
instructions for the mock crime. The order of the non-criminal tasks was 
counterbalanced between participants. Additionally, truth tellers and liars were 
matched such that the three non-criminal tasks completed by each liar were the same 
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first three tasks (and in the same order) that were completed by a truth teller in the 
same pre-alibi instructions condition. 
Pre-alibi instructions. Two pre-alibi instructions were prepared: instructions 
emphasising accuracy (accuracy pre-alibi instructions) and instructions emphasising 
informativeness (informativeness pre-alibi instructions). Participants in the accuracy 
instructions condition were instructed as follows: 
It is very important that the information in your alibi is as accurate as possible. 
Avoid guessing about details you cannot remember. To achieve an accurate 
alibi, make sure that every piece of information you report in your alibi about 
each task is as accurate as possible. 
Participants in the informativeness instructions condition were presented with 
the following instructions:  
It is very important that the information in your alibi is as informative as 
possible. 
To achieve an informative alibi, make sure that every piece of information you 
report in your alibi about each task is as informative as possible, such that a 
person who has not completed those tasks will be able to complete them 
perfectly just by reading your alibi.  
Participants in the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions 
condition received both of these sets of instructions, first receiving the accuracy 
instructions followed immediately by the informativeness instructions.  
Post-alibi questionnaire. The post-alibi questionnaire contained 14 open-
/close-ended questions. Of relevance to the present study are the following five 
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questions1. Participants were asked to indicate their level of motivation to appear 
convincing while providing their alibi (1 = Not motivated at all, 7 = Extremely 
motivated; adapted from Jundi et al., 2013). As a veracity-manipulation check, 
participants rated on a scale of 0%-100% the truthfulness of their alibi (0 = Everything 
I wrote was false, 100 = Everything I wrote was true; adapted from Clemens, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013). Also, using two separate questions, participants rated 
their perception of the likelihood that they would enter a draw of winning £10 and be 
asked to provide a second, hand-written alibi (for both questions: 1 = Not likely at all, 
7 = Most likely). Additionally, participants freely described the strategies they had 
used to appear truthful and convincing while providing their alibi (adapted from 
Clemens et al., 2013). 
Procedure 
Task completion and accusation. When invited to participate in the study, 
participants were not informed of the mock accusation to ensure that they would not 
plan any alibi in advance. On arrival at the lab, the participants—who completed the 
session individually—first gave their informed consent to participate in the study, 
followed by completing a questionnaire about their age, gender, and occupation. The 
experimenter then asked the participants to complete several tasks in a room following 
specific task instructions provided to them in the task booklet, with no time limit. In 
the task room, truth tellers completed six non-criminal tasks. Liars completed three 
non-criminal tasks and then committed the mock crime. Liars were aware that they 
were committing a “crime” because the instructions asked them to “steal the memory 
                                                          
1 The remaining nine questions were exploratory and asked participants to rate how important it was for 
them to provide an accurate and informative alibi; their level of preparation for their alibi; their belief 
regarding how convincing their alibi was; indicate which aspects of their alibi would convince the 
interviewer of their guilt and innocence; and, indicate their perception of the verifiability of their alibi. 
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stick without acting suspiciously”. Truth tellers were also exposed to the memory 
stick as they had to move it to access an object needed for a certain task. All 
participants were surreptitiously filmed during tasks completion to provide ground 
truth for later calculation of quantity and accuracy measures. On completion of the 
tasks (time to complete all six tasks based on a random sample of 10 video clips: 
Mminutes = 42.48, SD = 8.58), the participants left the task room to meet the 
experimenter.  
En route to another room, the participants were left alone for approximately 
one minute while the experimenter went “to check something”. When the 
experimenter returned, the participants were informed that a memory stick was 
missing from the task room, and that as the individuals who had been in the room 
most recently, they were suspected of stealing it. The Participants were told that they 
would soon be asked to provide an alibi to convince an interviewer that they had not 
stolen the memory stick. Following standard procedures used to encourage 
participants to provide a convincing alibi (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2007; Vrij et al., 2009), 
the experimenter informed participants that if they succeeded in convincing the 
interviewer of their innocence, they would enter a prize draw for £10. If they failed to 
convince the interviewer, they would be required to provide a second, hand-written 
alibi.  
Alibi provision. In the interview room, all participants were informed that 
their task was to provide a written (typed) description of what they did while in the 
task room and that the interviewer would later evaluate the veracity of their alibi. 
They were told that this interviewer did not know whether they were guilty 
or innocent of the theft and would determine this on the basis of their alibi. 
Participants were then reminded of the potential monetary incentive for convincing 
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the interviewer of their innocence and the potential sanction for failing to do so. Next, 
all participants were told that they should report in their alibi all the details that they 
could remember about each task: the sequence of actions, objects they had used, and 
anything else that had happened during tasks completion. Truth tellers were asked to 
be truthful in their alibi, whereas liars were told that they must lie about stealing the 
memory stick. All participants were told that they would shortly be given 10 minutes 
to prepare their alibi. Liars were informed that truth tellers completed three additional 
tasks and that to cover up the theft of the memory stick, they should lie about the 
completion of these additional tasks. To create their cover story, liars were told that 
during preparation time, they would be provided with the full instructions for those 
additional tasks (thus potentially enabling liars to report correct details in their alibi 
even about tasks that they had not completed). To avoid providing liars with certain 
materials only for preparation for the completed tasks, they were informed that they 
would also be provided with a list of the task names and a brief description of 
instructions of the tasks that they had completed. For the same reason, truth tellers 
were also told that they would have access to this list of task names and brief 
description of task instructions. This brief description of instructions comprised 
between one and three short sentences (which were also presented during alibi 
provision to all participants), e.g., “Assemble shelves according to instructions”. 
Importantly, this brief description of instructions was remotely as detailed as were the 
instructions provided to participants during task completion. The experimenter then 
delivered the pre-alibi instructions, depending on the pre-alibi instructions condition. 
Participants in the control condition received no further instructions following the 
general instructions just described. After 10-minutes preparation, the experimenter re-
entered the room and asked the participants to read from the computer screen the full 
(alibi task) instructions she gave them before preparation time. The participants then 
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typed their alibi using the computer. All participants reported about the completed 
tasks in the same order in which those were completed, and liars lied about the 
completion of the three additional tasks in the same order in which their matched truth 
tellers completed and then truthfully reported about them (meaning that the order in 
which liars lied about completing the three final tasks was also counterbalanced). 
Finally, the participants completed the post-alibi questionnaire, were debriefed, and 
compensated for their participation.  
Alibi Coding 
The first author, blind to the veracity and pre-alibi instructions conditions to 
which participants were assigned, coded each alibi into Action, Object, and Settings 
categories (see Wright & Holliday, 2007) to be able to determine the correctness of 
the individual details provided (see Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). Next, to determine the 
correctness of the categorised details for the tasks completed by all participants, each 
alibi was compared against the video clips of participants performing the tasks. A 
categorised detail was deemed “correct” if it was described in the alibi in the same 
way as it appeared in the video clip. If described incorrectly, or if it did not appear in 
the video clip but was described in the alibi, the categorised detail was marked 
“incorrect”. The correctness of the details comprising liars’ reports about the three 
tasks that they had not completed was determined by comparing the categorised 
details of those reports against the full task instructions provided to them during alibi 
preparation. Finally, a quantity measure and an accuracy rate were calculated for the 
entire alibi of each participant: the quantity measure was calculated by totalling the 
number of correct details provided across all tasks per each participant, and an 
accuracy rate was calculated by dividing the total number of correct details provided 
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across all six tasks in an alibi by the total number of details provided overall (i.e., 
correct and incorrect) in that alibi.  
Twenty alibis (10.42%) were coded by a second, independent coder blind to 
participants’ veracity, pre-alibi instructions conditions, and the aims of the research. 
Inter-coder reliability, computed using intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), were 
.96, p < .001 for the quantity measure and .78, p < .001 for the accuracy rate.  
Results 
Motivation and Veracity-Manipulation Checks 
A substantial percentage (91%) of participants were motivated to appear 
convincing while providing their alibi (i.e., marked 5 or higher on the response scale; 
M = 6.19, SD = 0.98, range: 2-7). A two-way ANOVA with veracity and pre-alibi 
instructions as the independent variables showed no differences between conditions in 
participants’ motivation to appear convincing, Fveracity (1, 180) = 1.95, p = .164, f = 
0.10; Fpre-alibi instructions (3, 180) = 0.13, p = .944, f = 0.05; Finteraction (3, 180) = 0.35, p = 
.790, f = 0.08. Next, we compared truth tellers’ and liars’ perception of the 
truthfulness of their alibi. Truth tellers’ (M = 98.06, SD = 4.49) ratings of the 
truthfulness of their alibis were significantly higher than liars’ (M = 61.47, SD = 
18.10) ratings of the truthfulness of their alibis, t(105.74) = 19.11, p < .001, d = 2.76, 
95% CI [2.36, 3.15]. Lastly, we conducted two ANOVAs to examine participants’ 
estimations of the likelihood that they would (i) enter the prize draw and (ii) be asked 
to hand-write a second alibi. Only the main effect for veracity was statistically 
significant for both the prize-draw likelihood, F(1, 180) = 23.82, p < .001,  f = 0.36, 
and the alibi-writing requirement, F(1, 180) = 40.98, p < .001,  f = 0.47. Specifically, 
truth tellers’ (M = 4.48, SD = 1.32) estimations of the likelihood that they would enter 
the prize draw were higher than those of liars (M = 3.58, SD = 1.19), d = 0.72, 95% CI 
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[0.42, 1.01]. In contrast, liars’ (M = 3.97, SD = 1.28) estimations of the likelihood that 
they would have to write a second alibi were higher than those of truth tellers (M = 
2.82, SD = 1.19), d = 0.93, 95% CI [0.63, 1.23]. Thus, participants complied with our 
instructions to report truthful versus deceptive alibis and were very motivated to 
convince in their alibi.  
Effects of Pre-Alibi Instructions and Veracity on Quantity and Accuracy Rates 
To examine the effects of the pre-alibi instructions and veracity on 
participants’ memory output, two 2 × 4 (Veracity [truth tellers, liars] × Pre-Alibi 
Instructions [accuracy, informativeness, accuracy and informativeness, control]) 
ANOVAs were conducted with quantity of correct details and accuracy rates as 
dependent variables. Means and standard deviations are presented in the upper section 
of Table 2.1.  
Effects on quantity of correct details. There was a significant main effect of 
veracity for the number of correct details provided, F(1, 184) = 20.86, p < .001, f = 
0.32. Specifically, truth tellers provided significantly more correct details than did 
liars, d = 0.64, 95% CI [0.35, 0.93]. There was also a significant main effect of the 
pre-alibi instructions for the number of correct details provided, F(3, 184) = 4.50, p = 
.004,  f = 0.25. Tukey post-hoc comparisons indicated that participants in the 
combined accuracy and informativeness instructions condition provided significantly 
more correct details than did control participants, p = .003, d = 0.72, 95% CI [0.31, 
1.13]. There were no significant differences in the number of correct details provided 
by participants in the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions condition 
and those in the accuracy instructions condition, p = .197, d = 0.35, 95% CI [-0.05, 
0.76] nor between the combined instructions condition and the informativeness 
instructions condition, p = .657, d = 0.20, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.60]. Additionally, no 
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significant differences in the number of correct details provided were found between 
the accuracy instructions condition and the informativeness instructions condition, p = 
.839, d = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.25, 0.55], nor between the control condition and either the 
instructions condition, p = .391, d = 0.36, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.76], or the informativeness 
instructions condition, p = .078, d = 0.52, 95% CI [0.11, 0.92]. In contrast to our 
prediction, the interaction between veracity and pre-alibi instructions for the number 
of correct details provided was not significant, F(3, 184) = 1.77, p = .155,  f = 0.16. 
Effects on accuracy rates. For accuracy rates, there was a significant main 
effect of veracity, F(1, 184) = 33.08, p < .001,  f = 0.42. As shown in Table 2.1, truth 
tellers were significantly more accurate than liars were, d = 0.89, 95% CI [0.60, 1.19]. 
However, the accuracy rates of the details provided did not differ between the 
different pre-alibi instructions conditions, F(3, 184) = 1.64, p = .182,  f = 0.15. Also, 
in contrast to our prediction, the interaction between veracity and pre-alibi instructions 
was not significant, F(3, 184) = 0.08, p = .971,  f = 0.03.  
Effects of Pre-Alibi Instructions Within Veracity Conditions 
Findings demonstrating that liars base their alibis or cover stories mostly on a 
pre-planned reporting strategy while truth tellers rely on their memory to provide their 
alibis (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2010; Olson & Charman, 2012; for a meta-analysis, see 
DePaulo et al., 2003) suggest that we should observe differences in the memory 
output of truth tellers between the different pre-alibi instructions conditions. In light of 
these previous findings, we conducted one-way ANOVAs with pre-alibi instructions 
as the independent variable and quantity of correct details and accuracy rates as the 
dependent variable each time within truth tellers and liars separately (for previous 
research using a similar analysis strategy despite a null interaction, see Nahari & Ben-
Shakhar, 2011; Porter et al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2015). 
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Table 2.1  
Means of Quantity of Correct Details and Accuracy Rates (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)  
         Note. Means that do not share a common subscript within column are statistically different at p < .05.
Pre-Alibi Instructions 
Quantity  Accuracy Rates 
Truth Tellers 
M (SD) 
Liars 
M (SD) 
Total 
M (SD) 
 Truth Tellers 
M (SD) 
Liars 
M (SD) 
Total 
M (SD) 
Full alibi (six tasks)  
   Accuracy 
 
287.38 (103.43)ab 
 
201.50 (76.15)a 
 
244.44 (99.78) 
  
.98 (0.01)ab 
 
.95 (0.07)a 
 
.96 (0.05) 
   Informativeness 291.00 (106.54)ab 230.04 (104.01)a 260.52 (108.62)  .97 (0.03)a .93 (0.07)a .95 (0.06) 
   Accuracy and Informativeness 328.50 (136.49)a 237.17 (72.35)a 282.83 (117.51)  .98 (0.01)b .96 (0.02)a .97 (0.02) 
   Control 219.67 (74.05)b 208.00 (61.65)a 213.83 (67.66)  .98 (0.01)ab .94 (0.05)a .96 (0.04) 
   Total 281.64 (112.83) 219.18 (80.20) 250.41 (102.53)  .98 (0.02) .94 (0.06) .96 (0.04) 
First three reports         
   Accuracy 150.25 (54.40)abc 106.25 (49.23)a 128.25 (55.94)  .99 (0.01)a .97 (0.05)a .98 (0.04) 
   Informatvieness 160.75 (54.69)ab 133.75 (67.33)a 147.25 (62.19)  .98 (0.02)a .97 (0.02)a .98 (0.02) 
   Accuracy and Informativeness 179.92 (66.34)ab  135.46 (46.84)a 157.69 (61.09)  .99 (0.01)a .98 (0.02)a .98 (0.02) 
   Control 118.75 (40.72)c 111.33 (36.09)a 115.04 (38.24)  .98 (0.02)a .98 (0.02)a .98 (0.02) 
   Total 152.42 (58.34) 121.70 (51.99) 137.06 (57.22)  .98 (0.02) .98 (0.03) .98 (0.03) 
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There was a significant main effect of the pre-alibi instructions on the number 
of correct details provided by truth tellers, F(3, 92) = 4.27, p = .007,  f = 0.37. Post-
hoc Tukey tests showed that truth tellers in the combined accuracy and 
informativeness instructions condition provided significantly more correct details than 
did truth tellers in the control condition (see Table 2.1), p = .004, d = 0.99, 95% CI 
[0.39, 1.59]. No significant differences in the number of correct details provided by 
truth tellers were found between the combined accuracy and informativeness 
instructions condition and the accuracy instructions condition, p = .549, d = 0.34, 95% 
CI [-0.23, 0.91], nor between the combined instructions condition and the 
informativeness instructions condition, p = .623, d = 0.31, 95% CI [-0.26, 0.88]. Also, 
no significant differences in this quantity measure were obtained between truth tellers 
in the accuracy instructions condition and those in the informativeness instructions 
condition, p = .999, d = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.53, 0.60], nor between truth tellers in the 
control condition and those in the accuracy instructions condition, p = .136, d = 0.75, 
95% CI [0.17, 1.34], or between control condition and the informativeness 
instructions condition, p = .105, d = 0.78, 95% CI [0.19, 1.36]. In contrast to truth 
tellers, among liars, the number of correct details provided did not differ significantly 
between the pre-alibi instructions conditions, F(3, 92) = 1.10, p = .355,  f = 0.19.  
Furthermore, we also found a significant main effect for the pre-alibi 
instructions on the accuracy rates of truth tellers’ alibis, F(3, 92) = 3.18, p = .028,  f = 
0.31. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that truth tellers in the combined accuracy and 
informativeness instructions condition were significantly more accurate than were 
truth tellers in the informativeness instructions condition, p = .028, d = 0.67, 95% CI 
[0.09, 1.25]. No significant differences in the accuracy rates of the details provided by 
truth tellers were found between the combined accuracy and informativeness 
instructions condition and the control condition, p = .630, d = 0.54, 95% CI [-0.04, 
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1.11], nor between the combined instructions condition and the accuracy instructions 
condition, p = .983, d = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.41, 0.73]. Also, the accuracy rates of truth-
tellers’ alibis did not differ significantly between the accuracy instructions condition 
and the informativeness instructions condition, p = .071, d = 0.57, 95% CI [-0.01, 
1.15], nor between the control condition and the accuracy instructions condition, p = 
.838, d = 0.34, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.91], or between the control condition and the 
informativeness instructions condition, p = .363, d = 0.38, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.95]. Once 
again, in contrast to truth tellers, the accuracy rates of liars’ alibis did not differ 
significantly between the pre-alibi instructions conditions, F(3, 92) = 0.60, p = .614,  f 
= 0.15; see Table 2.1.  
In light of the medium-to-large effect size (Cohen, 1988) of the effect of the 
pre-alibi instructions on the quantity of correct details among truth tellers, these 
analyses provide partial support to the enhancing effects of the pre-alibi instructions 
on the memory output of the truth tellers. Additionally, these findings support 
Hypothesis 2, in which we predicted that no quantity-accuracy tradeoff would 
accompany effects of the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions on the 
quantity and accuracy rates among truth tellers. That is, these instructions were 
superior to other instructions in affecting the quantity of correct details provided by 
truth tellers without compromising its accuracy. 
The self-reported strategies used by participants to provide a convincing alibi 
were categorised in a data-driven manner, such that the categories were derived from 
the strategies themselves. These strategies are available in Supplemental Materials, 
focusing only on those strategies pertaining to the informativeness and accuracy of 
participants’ alibis.  
Quantity and Accuracy Rates in Reports for Completed Tasks Only 
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It could be argued that our method for calculating the quantity measure and 
accuracy rates for the full alibi (i.e., all six tasks) for both truth tellers and liars may 
mean examining two different memory structures, as truth tellers reported about six 
tasks that they had completed while liars reported only about three tasks that they had 
completed (followed by reporting about three tasks that they had not completed). 
Thus, perhaps such calculation does not represent the examination of liars’ memory as 
it does of truth tellers’. Still, in real-life interviews, liars necessarily fabricate some—
if not all—of their alibi without relying on their memory (see Hartwig et al., 2010; 
Strömwall et al., 2006), which is why they are deemed “liars”—a reality that underlies 
the rationale for our above analyses.  
To address this potential critique, we examined again the effects of the pre-
alibi instructions on the quantity and accuracy rates of the alibis separately among 
liars and truth tellers, but this time only for the reports concerning those three tasks 
that both truth tellers and liars had completed, namely the first three tasks comprising 
each alibi. Specifically, we conducted separate one-way ANOVAs within each 
veracity condition with pre-alibi instructions as the independent variable and quantity 
of correct details and accuracy rates as the dependent variable each time. Means and 
standard deviations are presented in the lower section of Table 2.1. 
As in the overall results for truth tellers, there was a significant main effect for 
the pre-alibi instructions on the number of correct details provided in the reports 
concerning the first three tasks that they had completed, F(3, 92) = 5.23, p = .002, f = 
0.41. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that truth tellers in both the combined accuracy and 
informativeness instructions condition and the informativeness instructions condition 
provided significantly more correct details than did truth tellers in the control 
condition, p = . 100 , d = 1.11, 95% CI [0.50, 1.72] and p = .045, d = 0.87, 95% CI 
[0.28, 1.46], respectively. No significant differences in the number of correct details 
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provided by truth tellers for the first three tasks that they had completed were found 
between the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions condition and the 
accuracy instructions condition, p = .246, d = 0.49, 95% CI [-0.09, 1.06], nor between 
the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions condition and the 
informativeness instructions condition, p = .621, d = 0.32, 95% CI [-0.25, 0.88]. Also, 
the number of correct details provided by truth tellers in the reports concerning the 
first three tasks that they had completed did not differ significantly between the 
accuracy instructions condition and the control condition, p = .199, d = 0.66, 95% CI 
[0.07, 1.24], nor between the accuracy instructions condition and the informativeness 
instructions condition, p = .910, d = 0.19, 95% CI [-0.37, 0.76]. In contrast, among 
liars, as for the full alibi, the effect of the pre-alibi instructions on the number of 
correct details they provided only in the reports concerning the three tasks that they 
had completed was not significant, F(3, 92) = 2.08, p = .108,  f = 0.26.  
Turning to the accuracy rates of the reports of truth tellers for the first three 
tasks that they had completed, these did not differ significantly between the different 
pre-alibi instructions conditions, F(3, 92) = 1.32, p = .274,  f = 0.18. Also, the 
accuracy rates of the details provided by liars in the reports for the three tasks that 
they had completed did not differ significantly between the different pre-alibi 
instructions conditions, F(3, 92) = 0.44, p = .723,  f = 0.11, as for the full alibi.  
These results suggest that even when examining only those reports that both 
truth tellers and (allegedly) liars relied only on their memory to provide, the pre-alibi 
instructions may still enhance the number of correct details provided only by truth 
tellers, without compromising accuracy. 
Discussion 
Drawing on memory theory, we examined whether pre-alibi instructions 
improved the completeness and quality of alibis of truthful suspects forced to rely on 
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their memory to provide their alibi. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
develop memory-based instructions (cf. retrieval cues as in Leins & Charman, 2016 or 
incentives to be informative or convincing as in Leins, 2010) designed to maximize 
truthful suspects’ memory output during alibi provision. In summary, we found that 
the number of correct details (quantity) provided by truth tellers differed as a result of 
the pre-alibi instructions, such that truth tellers in the combined accuracy and 
informativeness instructions condition reported significantly more correct details than 
did truth tellers in the control condition, without compromising accuracy. In contrast, 
for liars, neither the number of correct details provided nor the accuracy rates of their 
alibis differed across pre-alibi instructions conditions.  
We did not obtain the predicted significant interaction effects between pre-
alibi instructions and veracity for either of the dependent measures. This is likely due 
to a power issue in our sample, given that the actual effect sizes observed for the 
quantity measure (f = 0.16) and accuracy rates (f = 0.03) are both lower than the effect 
size we could expect to detect according to the post-hoc sensitivity analysis (f = 0.24). 
Nevertheless, the effect sizes of the main effect of the pre-alibi instructions among 
innocent mock suspects was medium-to-large (f = 0.37; Cohen, 1988), and the effect 
size for the difference in quantity measure between the accuracy and informativeness 
instructions condition and control condition was large (d = 0.99; Cohen, 1969). 
Although the findings concerning the lack of effects of the pre-alibi instructions on the 
dependent measures among the guilty participants were based on analyses conducted 
following a non-significant interaction, the current findings allow us to tentatively 
suggest that the pre-alibi instructions may enhance innocent suspects’ memory output. 
Nevertheless, further research on the effects of such instructions should be conducted 
using larger sample sizes to ensure that the relatively large effect sizes obtained here 
are replicated.  
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The effect of the pre-alibi instructions on the memory quantity of the innocent 
mock suspects and the magnitude of these effects, combined with the likely lack of 
systematic effects on the reporting behaviour of the guilty mock suspects, suggests 
that the influence of the pre-alibi instructions was on truth-tellers’ memory reporting 
behaviour. This conclusion gains further support from the finding that the quantity 
measure differed between the pre-alibi instructions conditions only among truth tellers 
even for the reports that allegedly allowed liars to rely only on their memory (i.e., 
reports for the three tasks completed by all participants). Presumably, the pre-alibi 
instructions did not affect guilty mock suspects’ memory output for these specific 
reports because, throughout their entire report, they adhered to a pre-planned strategy 
concerning the provision of their alibi. Interestingly, for the full alibis, quantity 
measure of truth tellers was higher in the combined accuracy and informativeness 
instructions condition compared with control condition, but when examining the first 
half of their alibis, the quantity measure was additionally higher in the 
informativeness instructions condition compared with control condition. This may be 
because reporting about more tasks “averaged” participants’ reporting behaviour such 
that, ultimately, the instructions that affected their reporting behaviour the most were 
the combined pre-alibi instructions. Nevertheless, the most notable part of the findings 
concerning the first half of participants’ alibis was that they replicated the finding that 
innocent suspects’ quantity measure differed as a result of the pre-alibi instructions 
whereas that of guilty mock suspects did not (although, as mentioned, the findings 
about this lack of effects among the guilty participants were based on analyses 
conducted following an interaction that nonetheless did not reach statistical 
significance). 
In the present research we focused on examining the effects of the pre-alibi 
instructions on the memory performance of participants. However, we cannot 
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conclude for certain regarding the underlying mechanisms that yielded the obtained 
findings, and several explanations may be appropriate. For example, it may be that the 
difference between the innocent mock suspects in the number of correct details 
provided as a result of the pre-alibi instructions reflects differences in how these 
participants placed their report criterion before providing information (see Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996; for a review see Goldsmith, 2017). Because innocent suspects are 
usually forthcoming during interviews (DePaulo et al., 2003), it may be that truth 
tellers in all pre-alibi instructions conditions were already focused on providing a 
large number of correct details before hearing the pre-alibi instructions (see, e.g., 
Strömwall et al., 2006), suggesting that they applied a lax report criterion. However, 
explaining to truth tellers in the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions 
condition how to provide a correctly informative alibi might have led them to use a 
relatively lax report criterion (compared with control participants), resulting in them 
reporting more correct details (see Olson & Charman, 2012, for a similar explanation).  
Alternatively, it may be that the pre-alibi instructions affected truth-tellers’ 
reporting behaviour by affecting their perception of the level of detail that the 
interviewer expected them to provide. Specifically, it is likely that participants in the 
combined accuracy and informativeness instructions condition perceived that the 
interviewer expected them to provide a detailed alibi. In contrast, participants in the 
control condition assumed that the interviewer only expected from them to provide a 
basic description of their actions in the task room. Another possible explanation is that 
although the instructions were designed to affect participants’ reporting behaviour, the 
combined accuracy and informativeness instructions caused participants to conduct a 
more thorough memory search than participants in other instruction conditions. 
Although the current data do not allow us to determine the exact processes that led to 
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increased output in the combined instructions condition among truth tellers, these 
findings demonstrate the importance of the nuances of pre-alibi instructions. 
High accuracy rates were observed for truth-tellers’ reports. This is not entirely 
surprising, as free reporting usually results in accurate information (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1994, 1996). The high accuracy rates may also account for the lack of 
quantity-accuracy trade-off among truth tellers in the accuracy and informativeness 
instructions condition, although this lack of trade-off may also be due to the fact that 
these instructions emphasised both accuracy and informativeness of information. 
However, we acknowledge that the short time interval between the completion of the 
tasks and the provision of alibis may also account for these high accuracy rates. Our 
aim in the present research was to examine the effect of the pre-alibi instructions on 
the memory output of truthful suspects. Applying a longer time delay between task 
completion and alibi provision would increase the likelihood of potential memory 
contamination which might increase error variance, consequently potentially limiting 
the ability to statistically detect effects of pre-alibi instructions (see, e.g., Frenda et al., 
2011; Loftus et al., 1978; Tourangeau, 2000). Liars’ high accuracy rates may be 
explained by the fact that they had completed half of the tasks they reported about, 
allowing them to simulate almost perfectly the tasks they described deceptively by 
also relying on the instructions for the uncompleted tasks they received during 
preparation period. Future research should examine the effects of pre-alibi instructions 
on innocent suspects’ memory output incorporating a longer delay between the critical 
event and alibi provision. Nevertheless, the accuracy rates obtained in the present 
research do not undermine the findings concerning quantity of correct details provided 
and the ability of pre-alibi instructions to increase innocent suspects’ memory output.  
The present design, which included a combined accuracy and informativeness 
instructions condition but also individual pre-alibi instructions conditions allowed us 
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to determine which component of the pre-alibi instructions was more effective in 
enhancing truth-tellers’ memory output. Individually, the informativeness instructions 
and the accuracy instructions did not affect truth-tellers’ reporting behaviour. As 
outlined, it may be that truth tellers in all conditions were already occupied with 
providing a large number of correct details before hearing the pre-alibi instructions. 
Consequently, asking truth tellers in the informativeness instructions condition to be 
only informative added nothing to their inherent tendency to be informative, and 
asking truth tellers in the accuracy instructions condition to be only accurate was not 
strong enough to compete with their intention to be informative. In contrast, 
instructing truth tellers in the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions 
condition to be simultaneously informative and accurate may have clarified (cf. truth 
tellers in the individual instructions conditions) what the completeness and quality of 
their alibi overall should be. Our findings suggest that even when truthful suspects 
already intend to provide an informative alibi (DePaulo et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 
2006), memory-based pre-alibi instructions may guide them how to be correctly 
informative.  
While the sample size of the present study may have been sufficient for 
conducting a one-way ANOVA to examine the effects of the pre-alibi instructions on 
the dependent measures among each veracity condition, the present research may have 
not been adequately powered to detect further differences between individual pairs of 
pre-alibi instructions conditions (see Brooks & Johanson, 2011). For example, while 
the difference in the quantity measure between innocent participants in the control 
condition and those in the accuracy instructions condition was not significant (p = 
.136), the difference between the group means was nonetheless rather sizeable (with a 
medium-to-large effect size of d = 0.75; Cohen, 1969). Similarly, the difference in the 
accuracy measure between innocent participants in the combined accuracy and 
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informativeness instructions condition and in the control condition was of a medium 
size (d = 0.54; Cohen, 1969), although non-significant (p = .630). Future research on 
the effects of several types of such pre-alibi instructions should ensure a sample size 
adequate for both the ANOVA test and any possible subsequent post-hoc 
comparisons.  
A number of other limitations are associated with the present research. We did 
not ask participants to report (i) their confidence in the correctness of the details they 
reported; (ii) the details they retrieved but withheld (i.e., chose not to report), and; (iii) 
their confidence in the correctness of these withheld details—all of which are 
necessary to estimate rememberers’ report criterion (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
Future research should develop a paradigm that would allow the calculation of truth-
tellers’ (and liars’) report criterion to further examine the metacognitive monitoring 
and control processes underlying alibi provision. Additionally, further research should 
examine the effects of the pre-alibi instructions on memory output for a more 
naturalistic event (e.g., completing self-generated actions), with more severe 
consequences such as paying a monetary penalty (cf. providing a second alibi).  
Despite the limitations of the present research, the findings demonstrate the 
potential effects of memory-based interview techniques particularly in the context of 
innocent suspects’ alibi provision. These findings also illustrate the merit of 
continuing the research on such interview techniques and may assist other researchers 
when planning studies in the domain of alibi generation and provision. Although it is 
premature to suggest that interviewers use the pre-alibi instructions tested in the 
current research, the increased performance in terms of quantity of correct details in 
the combined accuracy and informativeness instructions condition among the innocent 
mock suspects is relevant for both real-life suspects and interviewers. For innocent 
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suspects, the provision of more correct information may result with the provision of 
more forensically valuable information that may be used to exonerate innocent 
suspect, and may decrease the provision of inaccurate information that may be 
perceived by interviewers as indicating guilt. With respect to interviewers, more 
correct information provided by suspects may be crucial for making more quick and 
efficient decisions regarding forward investigative strategies. Developing interviewing 
techniques that promote complete and accurate alibis of innocent suspects may thus 
prevent miscarriages of justice, and our findings are a first step in the development of 
effective pre-alibi instructions to increase memory reports of innocent suspects. 
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Chapter 3: Examining the effects of pre-alibi instructions on innocent suspects’ 
memory output for past actions and corroborating evidence 
Abstract 
When providing an alibi to convince an interviewer of their innocence of a crime, 
innocent suspects should aim to provide verifiable alibi-corroborating evidence. 
However, due to impaired memory processes, the information innocent suspects report 
about such evidence may be prone to inaccuracies, which threaten the credibility of 
their alibi. We examined the effects of memory-based pre-alibi instruction on innocent 
mock suspects’ memory output for their alibi and alibi-corroborating evidence. 
Participants (N = 78) completed a number of tasks and then provided an alibi to 
convince the alibi evaluator of their innocence of a theft. Before providing their alibi, 
participants were instructed to report accurately and informatively about the 
completed tasks (task-instructions condition) or about the completed tasks and 
corroborating evidence (enhanced-instructions condition). Control participants did not 
receive these additional alibi instructions. Results indicated that the number of correct 
details provided in alibis was greater in both experimental conditions than in the 
control condition, as predicted. However, in contrast to our prediction, the number of 
correct details provided did not differ between the enhanced and task pre-alibi 
instructions conditions. We offer possible explanations for the obtained findings. 
 
 
This chapter has been submitted as a manuscript for publication as:  
Portnoy, S., Hope, L., Vrij, A., Ask, K., & Landström, S. (2018). Examining the 
effects of pre-alibi instructions on innocent suspects’ memory output for past 
actions and corroborating evidence.  
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Introduction 
To convince an interviewer of their innocence, suspects usually provide an 
alibi, describing their actions and whereabouts during the critical time of the crime. To 
support this alibi, suspects might mention potential evidence that would corroborate 
their alibi (Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Olson, 2013; Olson & Wells, 2004). 
However, if the information they report about such evidence is incomplete or 
inaccurate, the credibility of their entire alibi may be in jeopardy. In the present 
research, we examined whether providing innocent mock suspects with memory-based 
reporting instructions prior to providing an alibi improved their memory output for 
reports about alibi-corroborating evidence.  
Research has shown that when providing an alibi, innocent suspects struggle to 
report accurately about their past actions. For example, Olson and Charman (2012) 
asked participants to provide two initial alibis for a date six to 14 weeks prior (i.e., 
distant-past alibis) and two initial alibis for a date three days prior (i.e., near-past 
alibis) to the test session. Participants provided fewer distant-past alibis than near-past 
alibis. Further, when participants were given 48 hours to confirm the veracity of their 
alibis, it transpired that 36% of the initial alibis provided were inaccurate. Similarly, 
Strange, Dysart, and Loftus (2014) asked participants to provide an alibi for a 
timeframe three weeks prior to the test session, and then gave them one week to 
search for alibi-corroborating evidence. After returning to the lab to provide their alibi 
again for the same time frame, Strange et al. (2014) noted that alibis were consistent 
for only 53% of the details, suggesting that the initial alibis provided contained a 
significant amount of inaccurate information. 
The difficulties experienced by innocent suspects when attempting to report 
accurately about past events are a feature of relying on episodic and autobiographical 
memory to provide information (Burke et al., 2007; Olson & Wells, 2012; Strange et 
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al., 2014). Due to the limitations of human memory, information recalled by innocent 
suspects which may exonerate them is likely to be prone to errors and suggestibility 
(Schacter, 1999; Tourangeau, 2000). For example, people are less likely to thoroughly 
encode details of events they tend to experience every day and actions they repeat 
daily (Burke et al., 2007; Tourangeau, 2000). Moreover, with the passage of time, 
they may find it more difficult to access event details (Pertzov, Manohar, & Husain, 
2017; Tourangeau, 2000), especially if these have not been retrieved previously 
(Schacter, 1999). Additionally, if people are exposed to misinformation following the 
critical event, it may be integrated with the original memory, eventually distorting it 
(Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; see Frenda, Nichols & Loftus, 2011 for a review). 
Alternatively, people may make a “memory-conjunction error” in which they integrate 
details from memory for several different events into an erroneous report about an 
event that did not occur (Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992; see also Devitt, Monk-
Fromont, Schacter & Addis, 2016).  
With respect to the evidence that suspects might report to support their alibi, two 
main types of such evidence can be outlined. This evidence may be physical (i.e., 
object evidence), such as a timed and dated receipt from a shop or a security-camera 
recording. Alternatively, the evidence may be in the form of information from another 
person (such as family, friends, or strangers) that corroborates the suspect’s version of 
events (i.e., person evidence). Critically, the evidence must account for the presence 
of the suspect at a certain place at a certain time (Burke et al., 2007; Olson & Wells, 
2004). Research has shown that, indeed, innocent suspects tend to provide verifiable 
details that can be used by the interviewer to check and ultimately support their alibi 
(i.e., the verifiability approach; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a, 2014b).  
Although innocent suspects are inclined to report details about evidence that can 
corroborate their alibi, the same memory processes that make it difficult for them to 
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report accurately and completely about their past actions may also make it difficult for 
them to report about evidence. For example, innocent suspects may make an evidence-
related memory-conjunction error (Reinitz et al., 1992; see also Odegard & Lampinen, 
2004) by claiming to have a bank receipt from a Monday two weeks prior to the 
interview, when in fact this receipt was provided to them on a Tuesday one week 
earlier. Findings from Olson and Charman (2012) indicated that, out of the initial 
alibis that were revised, 68% included mistakes pertaining to the corroborating 
evidence that participants initially reported to have.  
When innocent suspects provide mistaken details in their alibi, alibi evaluators 
(e.g., police interviewers) tend to fail to attribute such mistakes to memory failures, 
and instead perceive these mistakes as indicative of lying (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart 
& Strange, 2012; Olson & Charman, 2012). Providing mistaken details about alibi-
corroborating evidence may also result in the suspect being disbelieved (Burke et al., 
2007; Culhane & Hosch, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004). Consequently, innocent 
suspects’ failure to provide accurate and complete details in their alibi or about alibi-
corroborating evidence due to memory failures may result in a wrongful conviction 
(Crozier, Strange, & Loftus, 2017; Wells et al. 1998).  
To minimize the reporting of inaccurate and incomplete information by innocent 
suspects, interviewers should be able to assist innocent suspects to provide more 
complete and accurate information in their alibis through the use of memory-
supporting interviewing techniques. Portnoy et al. (see Experiment 1) developed 
memory-based reporting instructions to examine whether these would facilitate 
innocent mock suspects’ memory output for activities completed during a target time 
period. Development of these instructions drew on the strategic regulation of memory 
model (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996), according to which people can enhance the 
accuracy of their memory reports if allowed to freely decide what and how much 
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information to report or withhold. Specifically, Portnoy et al. (see Experiment 1) 
examined whether alibi instructions that differed in their emphasis on the 
informativeness and accuracy of information affected participants’ decision regarding 
the informativeness and accuracy of their alibis. Prior to providing an alibi, 
participants were presented with one of three types of experimental pre-alibi 
instructions that emphasized the accuracy of information, informativeness of 
information, or both its accuracy and informativeness. Participants’ memory output 
was examined in terms of two measures presented in Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) 
model, namely quantity and accuracy measures. Quantity measures pertain to the 
number of correct details reported, and accuracy measures pertain to the number of 
correct details reported out of the total number of both correct and incorrect details 
reported. Portnoy et al. (see Experiment 1) found that, compared to control 
participants who only received general alibi-provision instructions, innocent mock 
suspects in the combined accuracy and informativeness pre-alibi instructions 
condition reported the largest number of correct details (i.e., quantity), without 
compromising accuracy rates.  
Instructing innocent suspects to report about corroborating evidence in addition to 
their past actions should clarify that the interviewer expects them to report about such 
information (see Porter et al., 2018; Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015; 
Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). However, previous research (e.g. Portnoy et al., see 
Experiment 1) has only guided participants to focus on the accuracy and 
informativeness of details without specifying corroborating evidence that could have 
been potentially presented by them to support their alibi. As such, neither the 
procedure nor the pre-alibi instructions used were designed specifically to facilitate 
the reporting of physical and/or person evidence. This limits the ability to conclude 
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that pre-alibi instructions can also enhance innocent suspects’ memory output for 
alibi-corroborating evidence.  
The Present Research 
In the present research we tested the effect of administering memory-based 
retrieval instructions that cued accurate and informative reporting about innocent 
mock suspects’ whereabouts and activities during the critical time period of their alibi, 
as well as tangible evidence that could support that alibi.  
Participants were innocent mock suspects who completed several tasks outside 
the lab (i.e., main tasks), with each task ending with participants generating evidence 
that corroborated their whereabouts (i.e., evidence tasks). On their return to the lab, 
participants were accused of a theft that occurred while they were away and were then 
asked to provide an alibi across three pre-alibi instructions conditions. In the task 
instructions condition, participants were asked to report accurately and informatively 
about what they had done during the critical time period for their alibi. In the 
enhanced instructions condition, participants were asked to report accurately and 
informatively about what they had done during the critical time period for their alibi 
(as in the task instructions condition) and the evidence that could corroborate their 
alibi. Participants in the control instructions condition were only asked to report about 
their time away from the lab, without receiving further instructions regarding the type 
of information they should report about nor how accurate and informative their alibi 
should be. We examined the effects of the pre-alibi instructions on participants’ entire 
alibis (i.e., reports about tasks completed and evidence generated combined) and also 
specifically on evidence details (i.e., details concerning the generated evidence only). 
Both the entire alibis and evidence details provided by participants were examined in 
terms of the quantity of correct details provided and accuracy rates, which are the 
appropriate measures to inspect when examining memory reports in general and 
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freely-recalled information in particular (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; See also 
Goldsmith, 2017).  
We predicted that the number of correct details provided for the entire alibis 
would be greater in both the enhanced and task instructions conditions than in the 
control condition. This is because the two experimental conditions instructed 
participants what type of information to report about and guided them on how to 
provide accurate and informative information (Hypothesis 1). Additionally, we 
predicted that compared with the task instructions condition, the enhanced instructions 
would yield a higher number of correct details for the entire alibis (Hypothesis 2a) as 
well as for evidence details (Hypothesis 2b). This is because the addition of the 
evidence instructions in the enhanced instructions were predicted to cue the reporting 
of evidence details (See Porter et al., 2018) alongside the instructions predicted to cue 
the reporting of tasks completed, whereas the task instructions were predicted to cue 
the reporting of task details only.  
With respect to accuracy rates, we predicted that these would be higher in both 
the enhanced and task instructions conditions than in control condition for entire alibis 
(Hypothesis 3a) and evidence details (Hypothesis 3b) as a result of the accuracy 
instructions provided in both of the experimental conditions. 
Method 
Design 
We used a between-subjects design comprising three different pre-alibi 
instructions conditions: enhanced instructions, task instructions, and control 
instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to each experimental condition (n = 
26 per condition). The dependent variables were the quantity of correct details 
reported and accuracy rates.  
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Participants 
Ninety-two native English-speaking students and employees at a university in 
the United Kingdom took part in the study for course credit or £7. All participants also 
had an opportunity to enter a raffle for £50 (see Procedure). Data for 14 participants 
who did not follow the task instructions correctly were removed, resulting in a final 
sample of 78 participants (26 males and 52 females aged 18-36 years [M = 20.65, SD 
= 3.50 years]). To establish what effect size we might detect with reasonable power 
given our sample size, we conducted a post-hoc sensitivity analysis (using G*Power 
3.1.9.2; see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). With an alpha of .05, a power of 
.80, and a total sample size of N = 78, we could expect to detect a medium-to-large 
effect size, f = 0.36 (η2 = .11), for a one-way ANOVA with three conditions.  
Materials 
Main tasks. Four tasks, based on tasks used in Portnoy et al. (see Experiment 
1), were created for the study. The tasks were piloted to ensure understanding of task 
instructions prior to data collection. The four tasks were: finding university course 
information online; sorting leaflets according to colour, size, and pictures on the 
leaflets; writing down room numbers in a booklet; and, organizing pictures of items on 
an image of a display cabinet in accordance with the items’ location in a real-life 
cabinet. The materials for the main tasks were provided to participants in an A4 
package. 
Evidence tasks. Four items of evidence could be generated by participants—
two items of object evidence and two of person evidence. Participants were asked to 
generate two items of each type of evidence so that when providing their alibi, they 
could manipulate the accuracy and completeness of their reports about corroborating 
evidence. Specifically, the items of object evidence were designed to prove that 
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participants occupied a specific location at specific time and date when completing the 
relevant main task. These items were paper slips that presented the following 
information (depending on the date in which participants took part in the study): “You 
are the 11th person to have visited room 2.37 on the 2nd floor in X Building on Friday 
23/02/2018 between 9:00 and 17:00”. One slip did not specify the time frame and 
instead included a blank space for participants to write the current time, and both slips 
included a blank space for participants to sign their name so that the slips could 
potentially be used to identify the participants. Each slip could be found on a pre-
determined location, depending on the main task that preceded the completion of the 
slip. The items of person evidence were generated by tasking participants following 
two different main tasks with approaching a passer-by around them to ask direction to 
the restrooms or the departmental office; this allowed participants to describe 
strangers that could be approached to support the participants’ presence at the location 
where the preceding main tasks were completed (see Burke et al., 2007; Olson & 
Wells, 2004). Each (object and person) evidence task always followed the same main 
task.   
Task booklet. The first page of the booklet provided general instructions 
regarding tasks completion (e.g., to complete the tasks individually). Then, the 
instructions for each of the four main tasks appeared on a separate page, followed by 
the evidence task instructions on the same page. The order of the tasks was 
counterbalanced between participants.  
Pre-alibi instructions. The instructions in both the task and enhanced 
instructions conditions were based on the accuracy and informativeness pre-alibi 
instructions used in Portnoy et al. (see Experiment 1). Specifically, participants in the 
task instructions condition were instructed to report accurately and informatively all 
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the details that they could remember about each task separately, including the 
sequence of actions, objects they used, and anything that happened as part of 
completing each task. Participants in the enhanced instructions condition were 
provided with the same instructions as participants in the task instructions condition, 
with the addition to also report accurately and informatively any evidence details that 
supported their alibi. They were informed that this evidence could be any object or 
person that could confirm that they were in a specific place at a specific time while 
completing the tasks. Participants in the control condition were only instructed to 
provide all the details that they could remember about their time away (see Appendix 
F for details of all pre-alibi instructions).  
Post-alibi questionnaire. The post-alibi questionnaire comprised 13 open- and 
close- ended questions. Of most relevance are the following nine questions2. 
Participants indicated how motivated they were to provide a convincing alibi 
regarding the crime (1=Not motivated at all, 7=Extremely motivated) and how 
convincing they thought their alibi was (1=Not convincing at all, 7=Extremely 
convincing). Using two separate scales, participants were asked to rate how likely they 
thought it was that they would enter the draw for winning £50 as a result of being 
judged as innocent and be asked to write a second alibi as a result of being judged as 
guilty based their alibi (1=Not likely at all that I will enter the draw/be asked to write 
another alibi, 7=Most likely that I will enter the draw/be asked to write another alibi).  
To gain insight into participants’ strategies regarding the inclusion of evidence 
details in their alibi, we asked them to indicate how important it was to them to 
                                                          
2 The remaining four questions were exploratory, asking participants to rate their level of motivation to 
complete the tasks in accordance with the instructions; rate the extent to which their alibis could be 
checked; indicate how much they had prepared for providing their alibi; and, indicate whether or not 
they thought during task completion that they would later be interviewed regarding their actions and 
whereabouts while away from the experimenter.  
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include in their alibi details that could be checked by the interviewer by choosing one 
of five response options (It was important to me to provide: only details that can be 
checked; some details that can be checked; only details that cannot be checked; some 
details that cannot be checked, and; I did not give any thought to whether the details I 
have provided can be checked or not). We additionally asked participants to freely 
describe the details in their alibi that could be checked. For a more general inspection 
of participants’ thought process during alibi provision, participants were asked to 
freely describe the strategies they had used in order to provide their most truthful and 
convincing alibi regarding the crime.  
Finally, we asked participants to rate on a scale of 0%-100% the truthfulness of 
their alibi (0=Everything I wrote was false, 100=Everything I wrote was true) and 
indicate what type of information they understood that we asked them to report about 
based on the pre-alibi instructions provided to them. Participants were asked to choose 
one of five response options, indicating that they understood that they were asked to 
report only about the (main) tasks they had completed; only the corroborating 
evidence; both main tasks and corroborating evidence; did not understand what 
information they were supposed to report about; or, “Other”, with a blank space to 
freely explain.  
Procedure 
Participants were not informed of the real aim of the study nor the fact that 
they would be asked to provide an alibi following a mock accusation to prevent them 
from planning an alibi in advance. Participants completed the study individually. The 
experimenter explained to the participant that they would be asked to complete four 
separate tasks in the building where the study was taking place while wearing a body-
worn camera on their chest and carrying the study package. The camera was used to 
62 
 
video record participants’ actions and surroundings to establish the ground truth for 
the coding and calculation of alibi quantity and accuracy. However, to prevent 
exposing participants to the real aims of the study, they were explained that recording 
their actions was important to later ask for their personal experience during task 
completion. The participant then completed the four tasks (main and evidence tasks). 
Upon task completion, the participant returned to the lab to meet the experimenter 
again (time to complete all tasks based on a random sample of 10 recordings: M = 
24.37, SD = 3.09 minutes). 
En route to another room, the experimenter asked the participant to wait while 
she was “going to download the recording”. On her return two minutes later, she 
informed the participants that the building manager had informed her that a wallet had 
been stolen from one of the rooms in the building, and that he had asked all 
experimenters to account for the whereabouts of their participants in the last hour. The 
participants were told that since they have been away from the lab during this time 
they were suspected of this theft, and that they would need to provide an alibi, 
describing what they were doing while completing the tasks. As a rationale for 
participants to rely on their alibi to convince the building manager of their innocence 
and not on the fact that they were wearing a camera during task completion, the 
experimenter told the participants that the camera failed to save the recording of them 
completing the tasks. 
The experimenter and participants returned to the lab, where participants in all 
conditions were given the same general alibi instructions instructing them to provide 
an alibi in which they described what they were doing while completing the tasks 
(with no information about what specific details to report about). The experimenter 
informed participants that they would be typing their alibi, which would be passed on 
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to the building manager who would decide whether to pursue the matter further and 
whom they had to convince that they were innocent. Following standard procedures 
used to encourage participants to provide a truthful and convincing alibi (e.g., 
Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Vrij et al., 2009), the experimenter informed 
participants that if they convinced the building manager that they were innocent, their 
details would be entered into a prize draw for £50. However, if they failed to convince 
him of their innocence, they would have to provide a hand-written statement detailing 
their alibi instead. Finally, the experimenter explained the pre-alibi instructions, 
depending on the condition to which participants were allocated. Participants were 
then left alone for 10-minutes preparation with access to a list of the names of the 
tasks they had completed. Then, prior to typing their alibi for the critical time period, 
participants read the relevant pre-alibi instructions again. After providing their alibi, 
the participants completed the post-alibi questionnaire on the laptop and were 
debriefed and compensated for their participation in the study.  
Alibi Coding 
Participants’ alibis were coded into Action, Object, and Settings categories 
(see Wright & Holliday, 2007) by the first author, who was blind to the pre-alibi 
instructions conditions to which the participants had been allocated. We coded only 
details that pertained to objects of the main and evidence tasks, as well as features of 
people (person evidence) that could be coded for all participants (e.g., eye colour); 
details such as people’s jewellery (which not all people have worn) or that were not 
intended to be video recorded because they did not concern the tasks were not coded3. 
To determine the correctness of the details provided by participants, the first author 
                                                          
3 There was not a limited number of details that could and could not be coded; the only restriction to 
code details was that these existed during the critical time for all participants and could be noticed and 
potentially reported by all participants.  
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compared each alibi against the recording of the participants completing the tasks and 
generating the evidence. If a categorised detail was described in the alibi as it 
appeared in the recording, it was deemed “correct”. However, a categorised detail was 
marked “incorrect” if it was described incorrectly in the alibi or if it was described in 
the alibi but did not appear in the recording. Finally, four measures were calculated for 
each participant: quantity of correct details for the entire alibi and quantity of correct 
evidence details, as well as an accuracy rate for the entire alibi and an accuracy rate 
for evidence details. Specifically, the quantity measure for the entire alibi was 
calculated by totalling the number of correct details provided across all tasks (main 
and evidence) per each participant. The quantity measure for evidence details was 
calculated by totalling the number of correct details provided across all four evidence 
tasks per each participant. Then, the two accuracy rates for each participant were 
calculated by dividing the total number of correct details provided for each detail type 
by the total number of details provided overall (i.e., correct and incorrect) for the same 
detail type in that alibi.  
Eight alibis (10.26%) were coded by a second coder blind to the pre-alibi 
instructions conditions and aims of the research. Inter-coder reliability, computed 
using intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), were .96, p < .001 for the number of 
total correct details provided and .87, p = .001 for number of total incorrect details 
provided. Disagreements were discussed and resolved.  
Results 
Motivation Checks 
Table 3.1 presents means and standard deviations of participants’ responses to 
the motivation questions asked in the post-alibi questionnaire. Most participants were 
motivated to provide a convincing alibi regarding the disappearance of the wallet 
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(92.3%; marked 5 or higher on the 7-point response scale; M = 6.14, SD = 1.10, range: 
3-7) and believed that their alibi was convincing (85.90%; marked 5 or higher on the 
7-point response scale; M = 5.67, SD = 1.09, range: 2-7). One-way ANOVAs with 
pre-alibi instructions as the independent variable revealed no significant differences 
between conditions in participants’ motivation to provide a convincing alibi, F(2, 75) 
= 1.29, p = .282, f = 0.19, nor in their perceptions of how convincing their alibi was, 
F(2, 75) = 1.66, p = .197, f = 0.21. Additionally, there were no significant differences 
between the pre-alibi conditions in participants’ perceptions of the likelihood that they 
would enter the monetary draw, F(2, 75) = 1.41, p = .251, f = 0.19, nor in their 
perceptions of the likelihood that they would be asked to write a second alibi, F(2, 75) 
= 0.26, p = .775, f = 0.08.  
Effects of Pre-Alibi Instructions on Dependent Variables 
We examined the differences between the pre-alibi instructions conditions (the 
independent variable) in the quantity of correct details provided and accuracy rates 
(the dependent variables) of the information by running separate one-way ANOVAs 
for details pertaining to the entire alibis and evidence details separately. Means and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 3.2. Supplemental Materials include 
analyses of the number of incorrect details provided for the entire alibis as well as 
evidence details. 
Quantity and accuracy rates of entire alibis. There was a significant 
difference between the pre-alibi instructions conditions for the quantity of correct 
details provided overall, F(2, 75) = 4.00, p = .022, f = 0.33. Tukey post-hoc 
comparisons revealed that, as predicted, participants in both the enhanced instructions 
condition and task instructions condition provided significantly more correct details 
for the entire alibis than did participants in the control condition, p = .047, d = 0.72,  
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Table 3.1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Manipulation Checks  
 
 
95% CI [0.16, 1.28], and, p = .040, d = 0.67, 95% CI [0.11, 1.22], respectively. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 was supported. However, in contrast to our prediction, the amount of 
overall correct details reported in the enhanced instructions condition did not differ 
significantly from that reported in the task instructions condition, p = .998, d = 0.02, 
95% CI [-0.53, 0.56], failing to support Hypothesis 2a. We conducted a Bayes Factor 
analysis with default prior scales comparing quantity of correct details of the entire 
alibis between the pre-alibi instructions conditions (Wagenmakers et al., 2018). The 
JZS BF10 = 2.36 indicated that the obtained data were approximately 2.36 times more 
likely under the alternative hypothesis compared with the null hypothesis, providing 
anecdotal evidence (see Wagenmakers et al., 2018) in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis for quantity of correct details of the entire alibis. 
Accuracy rates of the entire alibis did not differ significantly between the pre-
alibi instructions conditions, F(2, 75) = 0.07, p = .932, f = 0.04. Thus, Hypothesis 3a 
was not supported.  
 Alibi Instructions 
Measure Enhanced Task Control 
Motivation to convince 
interviewer of innocence 
6.00 (1.17) 6.42 (0.81) 6.00 (1.27) 
Convincing alibi 5.42 (1.17) 5.96 (0.82) 5.62 (1.20) 
Perceived likelihood to:    
Enter prize draw 4.54 (1.48) 4.85 (1.26) 5.15 (1.22) 
Provide second alibi 3.04 (1.40) 2.81 (1.30) 2.81 (1.33) 
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Quantity and accuracy rates of evidence details. In contrast to our 
prediction (Hypothesis 2b), the number of correct evidence details provided did not 
differ significantly between the pre-alibi instructions conditions, F(2, 75) = 1.94, p = 
.151, f = 0.23. Given that this finding contrasts with our hypothesis, we ran a Bayes 
Factor analysis with default prior scales comparing quantity of correct evidence 
details between the pre-alibi instructions conditions (Wagenmakers et al., 2018). The 
JZS BF01 = 2.02 indicated that the obtained data were approximately 2.02 times more 
likely under the null hypothesis compared with the alternative hypothesis, providing 
anecdotal evidence (see Wagenmakers et al., 2018) in favor of the null hypotheses for 
quantity of correct evidence details. 
The accuracy rates of details pertaining to evidence also did not differ 
significantly between the pre-alibi instructions conditions, F(2, 75) = 0.14, p = .871, f 
= 0.06, failing to support Hypothesis 3b.  
In light of the null findings concerning accuracy rates, we ran two Bayes 
Factor analyses with default prior scales comparing accuracy rates of entire alibis and 
evidence details between the pre-alibi instructions conditions. The JZS BF01 = 8.53 for 
accuracy rates of entire alibis and BF01 = 8.10 for those of evidence details indicated 
that the obtained data were approximately 8.53 and 8.10 times (respectively) more 
likely under the null hypothesis compared with the alternative hypothesis, providing 
moderate evidence (see Wagenmakers et al., 2018) in favor of the null hypotheses for 
accuracy rates. 
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Table 3.2   
Means and Standard Deviations of the Dependent Variables 
Note. Means that do not share a common subscript within column are statistically different at p < .05.  
 
Verifiability and Verbal Strategies During Alibi Provision 
 The majority of participants (92.31%) indicated that it was important to them 
to provide in their alibi some or only details that could be checked by the interviewer 
(see Table 3.3). Reports about participants’ perception of the truthfulness of their 
alibi, their understanding of the type of information that we asked them to report 
about, the details they reported that could be checked by the interviewer, and their 
freely-reported strategies used to provide a convincing alibi are available in 
Supplemental Materials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alibi Instructions 
Quantity Accuracy Rates 
Entire Alibi 
M (SD) 
Evidence 
Details 
M (SD) 
Entire Alibi 
M (SD) 
Evidence Details 
M (SD) 
Enhanced 191.38 (56.10)a 46.27 (15.35)a .98 (0.01)a   .97 (0.03)a 
Task 192.46 (67.72)a 43.77 (15.52)a .98 (0.01)a .97 (0.03)a 
Control 150.92 (56.55)b 38.42 (13.00)a .98 (0.02)a .97 (0.03)a 
Total 178.26 (62.67) 42.82 (14.85) .98 (0.02) .97 (0.03) 
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Table 3.3 
Participants’ Reports on How Important It Was to Them to Provide Details That 
Could Be Checked by The Interviewer 
Note: Numbers indicate the frequency of choosing each response option by type of pre-alibi 
instructions condition. Parenthesis include percentage of participants per each pre-alibi instructions 
condition who chose each response option.  
 
Discussion 
The present research examined the effects of memory-based reporting 
instructions on innocent mock suspects’ memory output for their actions and 
whereabouts during a critical time as well as evidence that could corroborate their 
statement. Participants who were asked to report accurately and informatively about 
past actions or about past actions and alibi-corroborating evidence provided more 
correct details overall than did participants who were simply asked to report about 
their time while being away. The effect size for the main effect of the pre-alibi 
instructions on number of correct details of entire alibis was medium (f = 0.33; Cohen, 
1988). In addition, the effect sizes of the findings that number of correct details 
provided was larger in both the enhanced instructions condition (d = 0.72) and task 
instructions condition (d = 0.67) compared with control condition were medium-to-
In the alibi which you have provided, how 
important was it to you to include details 
that can be checked by the interviewer? 
Alibi Instructions 
Enhanced Task Control 
It was important to me to provide only 
details that can be checked. 
10 (38.5%) 8 (30.8%) 13 (50.0%) 
It was important to me to provide some 
details that can be checked. 
13 (50.0%) 17 (65.4%) 11 (42.3%) 
I did not give any thought to whether the 
details I have provided can be checked or 
not. 
2 (7.7%) 1 (3.8%) 2 (7.7%) 
It was important to me to provide only 
details that cannot be checked. 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
It was important to me to provide some 
details that cannot be checked. 
1 (3.8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
70 
 
large and medium, respectively (Cohen, 1969). Obtaining effect sizes of these 
magnitudes allows us to suggest that pre-alibi instructions are effective (in this 
research, at least) in terms of increasing innocent suspects’ memory output. However, 
we did not find that asking participants to report about past actions and corroborating 
evidence yielded a larger number of correct details overall compared with asking them 
to report about past actions only. Also in contrast to our prediction, there were no 
differences in the number of correct evidence details provided between pre-alibi 
instructions conditions. Given that these findings are in contrast to our prediction that 
the addition of the evidence instructions would further enhance participants’ memory 
output for the critical time (though it did not compromise it), it is important to 
scrutinize the potential factors that may account for these findings. 
The enhanced performance in terms of number of correct details provided in 
both experimental conditions compared with control condition may be explained by 
the fact that both experimental conditions instructed participants what type of 
information to report about. Additionally, the improved performance in the 
experimental conditions may also be due to the fact that these conditions guided 
participants on how to provide accurate and informative alibis. This finding supports 
the suggestion that providing suspects with memory-based reporting instructions prior 
to alibi provision may enhance innocent suspects’ memory output for the critical time 
of an alleged crime. This finding also replicates Portnoy et al.’s (see Experiment 1) 
finding by demonstrating the increased performance in the task instructions condition 
(i.e., the combined accuracy and informativeness pre-alibi instructions condition in 
Portnoy et al.’s study4) in terms of the number of correct details provided compared 
with simply requesting participants to report about what had happened (the effect size 
                                                          
4 These instructions in Portnoy et al. additionally instructed participants to report about tasks they had 
completed. 
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obtained in Portnoy et al., see Experiment 1, for the main effect of the pre-alibi 
instructions on quantity measure among innocent mock suspects [f = 0.37] was 
medium-to-large; Cohen, 1988). It is yet to be determined whether it was the detailing 
about type of information that participants were required to report about or the 
accuracy and informativeness instructions in the experimental conditions that yielded 
higher quantity measure compared with control condition in the present research. This 
should be examined in future research which includes both experimental conditions 
used in the present research while adding two separate conditions—one instructing 
participants only about the type of the information they should report about and one 
instructing them only about the accuracy and informativeness of their reports. This 
should also be done as an attempt to replicate the present findings.  
Why did the enhanced instructions not encourage participants to report more 
evidence details? Work by Nahari, Vrij, and Fisher (2014b) suggests that the phrasing 
of such instructions may be critical. Innocent mock suspects in Nahari et al. (2014b) 
were asked to provide an alibi to convince an interviewer of their innocence of a 
crime. Critically, prior to providing their alibi, half of all participants were informed 
that the interviewer would check the verifiability of the details they provided (i.e., 
informed condition). In contrast, the second half of all participants were not informed 
of the interviewer’s intention to check the verifiability of their alibi (i.e., uninformed 
condition). Nahari et al. (2014b) found that innocent mock suspects in the informed 
condition provided more verifiable details than did innocent mock suspects in the 
uniformed condition. Nahari et al. (2014b) noted that informing innocent suspects 
regarding the alibi evaluator’s intention to examine the verifiability of their alibi can 
encourage them to provide more verifiable details. In the present research, we did 
inform all participants that the building manager would determine their guilt or 
innocence on the basis of their alibi; and specifically in the enhanced-instructions 
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condition, we instructed participants to ensure that the evidence details reported in 
their alibi were as informative as possible such that the building manager would be 
able to recognize this evidence described in their alibi (see Appendix F). However, 
perhaps these instructions were not sufficient to convey explicitly that the building 
manager would actually check the verifiability of their alibi. Future research should 
examine the effects of the enhanced instructions we used when the explicit 
information that the interviewer would check the verifiability of participants’ alibis is 
added.  
While the increase in the number of correct details provided in both 
experimental conditions for the entire alibis did not compromise the accuracy rates of 
participants’ alibis, accuracy rates were very high across all pre-alibi instructions 
conditions. Although these high accuracy rates are not entirely surprising given that 
free reports tend to result in the reporting of accurate details (see Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1994, 1996), we acknowledge that they may also be due to the short time interval 
between task completion and alibi provision; this short time interval may also account 
for the lack of differences in accuracy rates between instructions conditions for entire 
alibis and evidence details. Nevertheless, using a longer time delay between task 
completion and alibi provision would increase the likelihood of potential memory 
contamination which might increase error variance, consequently potentially making it 
harder to statistically detect effects of pre-alibi instructions (see, e.g., Frenda et al., 
2011; Loftus et al., 1978; Tourangeau, 2000). Future research on the effects of pre-
alibi instructions on innocent suspects’ memory output should apply a longer time 
delay between the critical event and alibi provision.  
It is worth commenting on the evidence items that participants were instructed 
to report about. Participants were asked to actively generate these evidence items so 
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that the coding of evidence details would be cohesive across all participants. However, 
in real life, people do not go shopping specifically to obtain a receipt or to 
communicate with a person who can later provide evidence; these are by-products of 
people’s day-to-day actions. The effects of the pre-alibi instructions we used should 
be tested using a more authentic procedure in which evidence would be a by-product 
of participants’ actions (e.g., a receipt from a shop as object evidence and guard in a 
shop as person evidence). Participants in future research may also be asked to report 
about their past actions and the corroborating evidence one after the other or even in 
separate interviews. 
In conclusion, the finding concerning the larger number of correct details 
provided in both experimental conditions is important in demonstrating that memory-
based reporting instructions can promote complete reports of innocent suspects when 
providing an alibi. The present findings call for further research on what and how pre-
alibi instructions can enhance innocent suspects’ memory output when providing an 
alibi as well as alibi-corroborating evidence details. 
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Chapter 4: Examining the effect of presuming guilt on the verbal output of 
innocent suspects during brief interviews 
Abstract 
Innocent suspects interviewed by a guilt-presumptive (vs. innocence-presumptive or 
neutral) interviewer may appear more nervous and defensive and may ultimately be 
perceived as guilty by neutral judges. We tested the impact of an interviewer 
displaying behaviour consistent with presuming guilt on the content of innocent 
mock-suspects’ alibis. Participants provided an alibi to convince an interviewer of 
their innocence of a theft. At the outset of the interview, the interviewer implied that 
she believed that they were guilty or innocent, or that she had no belief about their 
veracity. Based on existing conflicting findings for suspects’ verbal behaviour during 
accusatory interviews, we predicted that alibis in the guilt-belief condition would 
contain the highest or lowest number of correct details with overall higher or poorer 
accuracy rates, respectively. Although participants perceived the innocent and guilt 
presumptive approach of the interviewer, the number of correct details provided and 
accuracy rates of alibis did not differ significantly between conditions. We offer 
potential explanations to these findings and future lines of research. 
 
 
This chapter has been submitted as a manuscript for publication as:   
Portnoy, S., Hope, L., Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., Ask, K., Eddy, C. & Landström, S. 
(2018). “I think you did it!”: Examining the effect of presuming guilt on the 
verbal output of innocent suspects during brief interviews.  
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Introduction 
In many jurisdictions, investigative interviewers should assume that the 
interviewee is innocent until proved guilty at trial (Naughton, 2011; Stewart, 2014). 
However, interviewers often form beliefs about suspects’ guilt prior to interviewing 
them (Mortimer & Shepherd, 1999; Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992). For 
example, in an examination of 1,067 suspect interviews conducted in the United 
Kingdom (UK), interviewers were certain of the suspect’s guilt prior to the interview 
for 73% (780) of the cases (Moston et al., 1992). Critically, this guilt presumption—
which may be held confidently—is often held in error (Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 
2003). To prevent instances of biased interviews, several interview models (e.g., the 
PEACE model used in the UK) include the recommendation that interviewers should 
avoid assumptions of guilt (Shawyer, Milne, & Bull, 2009). However, a recent survey 
of officers trained in the PEACE model revealed that 97.1% reported to have 
"sometimes" and even "always" already believed that fraud suspects were guilty prior 
to interviewing them (Shawyer & Milne, 2015), suggesting that the recommendation 
to avoid guilt presumption is not necessarily being adhered to. 
Presumed Guilt and Innocent Suspects’ Behaviour 
Previous research has demonstrated the effects of presuming guilt both on 
mock interviewers’ behaviour and the evaluation of interviewed mock suspects by 
neutral perceivers (Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008; Kassin et al., 2003). 
Specifically, Kassin et al. (2003) found that mock interviewers who were led to expect 
that their suspect-participants were guilty of a theft selected from a prepared list of 
questions more guilt-presumptive questions compared with participants who expected 
to encounter an innocent suspect. New participants who listened to parts of the taped 
interviews judged a larger percentage of suspects interviewed by guilt-presumptive 
interviewers as guilty than of those interviewed by innocence-presumptive 
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interviewers. Suspects interviewed with a guilt-presumptive approach were also 
perceived as more defensive than those interviewed with an innocence-presumptive 
approach.  
Extending Kassin et al.’s (2003) work, Hill et al. (2008) found that participants 
led to expect that they would interview a guilty suspect generated a higher proportion 
of guilt-presumptive questions to ask in the interview than did interviewers who 
expected to interview an innocent suspect (cf. choosing the questions from a prepared 
list as in Kassin et al., 2003). In a follow-up study (Hill et al., 2008), guilty and 
innocent mock suspects who were interviewed regarding alleged cheating with guilt-
presumptive questions obtained in the first study reported feeling more pressure to 
confess during the interview than did mock suspects who were asked neutral questions 
obtained in the first study. Finally, Hill et al. (2008) found that new participants who 
listened to recordings of the interviews with the mock suspects rated those who were 
asked guilt-presumptive questions as more nervous, defensive, and guilty than those 
who were asked neutral questions. Critically, these listeners rated innocent mock 
suspects who were asked guilt-presumptive questions as more guilty than guilty mock 
suspects who replied to such questions.  
Presumed Guilt as Part of Social Interactions  
The findings of Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008; see also Narchet, 
Meissner, & Russano, 2011) suggest that guilt-presumptive interviewers unwittingly 
affect the behaviour of suspects such that it confirms the interviewers’ guilt 
presumption. What processes may underlie these findings? The presumption of guilt 
directs the interviewer’s behaviour towards a confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). 
Specifically, the interviewer unintentionally gathers and uses information in a 
selective manner (e.g., selects/formulates guilt-presumptive questions) such that it 
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increases the validity of her/his guilt belief. Then, it is possible that a self-fulfilling 
prophecy interaction sequence takes place (Merton, 1948; see also Darley & Fazio, 
1980; Mortimer & Shepherd, 1999; Nickerson, 1998). In this sequence, the 
interviewer (i.e., the perceiver) forms the guilt belief about the suspect (i.e., the 
target), behaves towards the suspect in accordance with this belief, and this may 
change the suspect’s behaviour such that it complies with the interviewer’s guilt 
belief. The fact that the mock-suspects’ behaviour during the guilt-biased interviews 
in Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008) was perceived by neutral observers (who 
knew nothing about the interviewer’s guilt-presumption manipulation) provided a 
behavioural confirmation of the interviewers’ belief.  
The Present Research 
Regardless of the guilt/innocence presumption with which interviewers 
approach suspect interviews, innocent suspects sometimes fail to provide convincing 
alibis due to the reporting of incomplete and/or inaccurate details (Olson & Charman, 
2012; Olson & Wells, 2004, 2012). During a crime investigation, innocent suspects 
whose alibi turns out to be erroneous or incomplete may be perceived as liars (Burke, 
Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & Charman, 2012), and, 
ultimately, are at increased risk of being falsely convicted (Crozier, Strange, & Loftus, 
2017; Wells et al., 1998). Thus, unintentionally providing inaccurate alibis can be very 
risky for innocent suspects. Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008) demonstrated 
the effects of interviewers’ presumed guilt on suspects’ non-verbal behaviour during 
interviews in terms of increased defensiveness and nervousness. However, the effect 
of presumed guilt on suspects’ verbal behaviour has not been examined—an 
important research avenue given that police interviewers may be the first to ask 
suspects to provide an alibi (Burke et al., 2007) and that interviewers’ presumed guilt 
can affect innocent suspects’ behaviour during interviews in ways which neutral 
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observers consider indicative of guilt. Thus, in the present research, we examined 
whether an interviewer’s presumed guilt affected the completeness and accuracy of 
alibis of innocent suspects. 
Specifically, we examined the quantity and accuracy rates of participants’ alibis. 
According to Koriat and Goldsmith’s (1996) model of strategic regulation of memory 
accuracy, quantity measures pertain to the number of correct details that can be 
remembered, and accuracy measures concern the number of correct details that can be 
correctly remembered out of the total number of details provided (correct and 
incorrect). Analysing the quantity and accuracy rates of details provided is the most 
appropriate approach to examine memory reports in general, and freely-recalled 
information in particular (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; see also Goldsmith, 2017). 
After completing a number of tasks, participants provided an alibi in order to 
convince an interviewer of their innocence of an alleged theft. Critically, at the outset 
of the interview, the interviewer implied to participants that she believed that they 
were guilty or innocent of the theft, or that she had no specific belief regarding their 
responsibility for the theft. We manipulated the behaviour of the interviewer to 
already be in accordance with a guilt/innocence belief (cf. leading mock interviewers 
to believe that they are about to interview a guilty/innocent suspect as in Hill et al., 
2008, and Kassin et al., 2003) because we were only interested in the effects of a guilt 
presumption on mock suspects’ reaction (i.e., the final phase of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy sequence). In addition, although in Hill et al. (2008) the mock suspects were 
asked questions that were generated by guilt-primed naïve participants, the interviews 
with these mock suspects were conducted by a confederate over a telephone. In the 
present research, in contrast, although the interviewers’ words and behaviour were 
scripted, these interviews took place in person. This allowed the interviewer to 
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communicate her belief to participants through her words and tone of voice, and also 
her facial expressions. 
We identified and tested two possible predictions pertaining to the number of 
correct details and accuracy rates of participants’ alibis. On the one hand, Granhag, 
Clemens, and Strömwall (2009) have demonstrated that statements of guilty mock 
suspects interviewed under high levels of suspicion were more informative than were 
statements of guilty mock suspects interviewed under low levels of suspicion, 
presumably because the former mock suspects felt that they had to “work hard” to 
convince the interviewer of their innocence. Accordingly, we predicted that after 
perceiving the treatment of the guilt-presumptive interviewer as a result of a self-
fulfilling prophecy sequence, the alibis of participants in the guilty-belief condition 
(the equivalent to high-level suspicion in Granhag et al., 2009) would include the 
largest number of correct details (i.e., highest quantity measure of correct details; 
Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). The alibis of participants in the innocent-belief condition, 
in contrast, would include the smallest number of correct details. For the same 
rationale of feeling that the burden of convincing the interviewer of their innocence is 
on their shoulders, we additionally predicted that the guilty-belief participants would 
also “work hard” to provide accurate information and thus the accuracy rates of their 
alibis would be the highest whereas accuracy rates of alibis in the innocent-belief 
condition would be the lowest.  
On the other hand, Vrij, Mann, Kristen, and Fisher (2007) have shown that 
when interviewed with accusatory interview styles, guilty and innocent mock suspects 
provided the shortest statements, perhaps because accusatory interviews cause 
suspects to be less forthcoming. Thus, it was also considered possible that presumed-
guilt participants would provide the smallest number of correct details with poorer 
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accuracy rates while alibis of participants in the innocent-belief condition would 
include the largest number of correct details and be the most accurate.  
Method 
Design  
We used a between-subjects design with two conditions in which suspect-
interviewees were led to believe that the interviewer believed they were guilty (guilty-
belief condition [n = 30]) or innocent (innocent-belief condition [n = 30]) of a theft. 
Interviewees in a third condition were treated in a neutral manner by the interviewer 
(neutral-belief condition [n = 30]). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
these three experimental conditions. The dependent variables were the quantity (of 
correct details) and accuracy rates of the information provided in interviewees’ alibis.  
Participants 
Ninety-nine native English-speaking students and employees at a British 
university completed the study. Participants were compensated with course credit or 5 
GBP, with an opportunity to win 20 GBP if their alibi was judged as truthful (all 
participants were entered in this draw). Data for nine participants were removed from 
analyses because these participants did not complete the tasks correctly or because the 
interviewer did not administer the instructions correctly. Thus, data from the 
remaining ninety participants were included in the final analyses (15 males,75 
females, aged 18-39 years [M = 20.84, SD = 3.71 years]). We performed a post-hoc 
sensitivity analysis (using G*Power 3.1.9.2; see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007) to determine the effect size we might detect with reasonable power given our 
sample size. With an alpha of .05, a power of .80, and a total sample size of N = 90, 
we could expect to detect a medium effect size, f = 0.33 (η2 = .10), for a one-way 
ANOVA with three conditions.  
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Materials 
Tasks. The critical event comprised four office-type tasks. During task 
completion, participants performed various actions around the task room involving 
different objects: finding information online and writing it up on a whiteboard; 
matching name-tags with photos according to a written description; sorting two sets of 
memo cards according to colour and size; and, choosing dates for birthdays and 
marking them on a calendar. Participants received the instructions for the tasks in a 
booklet in which the first page included general instructions regarding the completion 
of the tasks (e.g., to complete each task one at a time), followed by the instructions for 
each task on a separate page. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced. 
Interviewer-belief scripts. A script for each interviewer-belief condition 
(guilty, innocent, and neutral) was developed and piloted prior to commencing the 
study. The scripts used in each interviewer-belief condition can be found in the 
Appendix G. 
Post-alibi questionnaire. The post-alibi questionnaire contained 19 questions. 
First, participants were asked to rate the truthfulness of their alibi (0 = Everything I 
said was false, 100 = Everything I said was true). Participants also rated their 
motivation to appear convincing while providing their alibi (1 = Not motivated at all, 
7 = Extremely motivated). As a manipulation check, participants rated how the 
interviewer had treated them before they provided their alibi (1 = The interviewer 
treated me as if I was completely innocent, 7 = The interviewer treated me as if I was 
completely guilty). To gain insight into participants’ perceptions of the effects of the 
interviewer on their alibis, participants rated the extent to which they thought that the 
behaviour and words of the interviewer affected separately (i) the informativeness (ii) 
and accuracy of their alibi (1 = No effect at all on my decision to be 
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informative/accurate [respectively], 7 = Completely affected my decision to be 
informative/ accurate [respectively]).  
Next, participants rated separately how important it was to them to provide 
details that were as informative as possible and as accurate as possible (1 = Not 
important at all, 7 = Extremely important). Participants were also asked to describe 
the strategies they used to provide a convincing alibi. Then, participants rated how 
convincing they thought their alibi was (1 = Not convincing at all, 7 = Extremely 
convincing). Finally, using two separate scales, participants rated the likelihood that 
they would enter the draw for winning 20 GBP as a result of being judged as innocent 
based on their alibi and be asked to handwrite a second alibi as a result of being 
judged as guilty based on their alibi (1 = Not likely at all that I will enter the draw/be 
asked to handwrite another alibi [respectively], 7 = Most likely that I will enter the 
draw/be asked to handwrite another alibi [respectively])5. We used the term 
“informativeness” and not “quantity of correct details” throughout the post-alibi 
questionnaire to prevent participants from confusing the meaning of quantity measure 
with that of accuracy. 
Procedure 
Tasks completion and accusation. Participants, who completed the study 
individually, were not informed of the real aim of the study to prevent them from 
                                                          
5 The remaining eight questions, which were used for exploratory purposes, asked participants to 
describe their experience during the meeting with the interviewer; rate their motivation to complete the 
tasks in line with the instructions; rate their level of preparation for alibi provision; note whether they 
thought during task completion that they would be interviewed regarding their presence in the task 
room; describe what aspects of their alibi may convince the interviewer that they were innocent/guilty 
of the theft; rate the extent to which they thought that the details they provided could be checked, and; 
rate how important it was to them to provide verifiable details. 
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planning an alibi in advance. After receiving the task booklet from the experimenter, 
participants completed the four tasks one at a time in the task room without a time 
limit while being surreptitiously filmed to provide ground truth for later calculation of 
quantity and accuracy measures. In the task room, a wallet was placed on the 
keyboard of a laptop which participants had to use during three tasks, and thus they 
had to move the wallet (which made them aware of its presence in the room). Once all 
tasks were completed, participants exited the task room and followed the experimenter 
to another room (i.e., the interview room). The time taken to complete all four tasks 
was, on average, 26 mins, SD = 5.20. En route, the experimenter stopped and asked 
participants to wait while she “checked something”. On her return after one minute, 
the participants were informed that another researcher had reported a wallet stolen 
from the task room and that they were now suspected of this theft. They were told that 
they would be asked to provide an alibi to account for the time they were in the room 
and that this alibi should cover what they were doing in the room while completing 
the tasks. Drawing on Hill et al.’s (2008) procedure, the accusation and interview took 
place immediately following the critical event (i.e., task completion).  
Alibi provision. In the interview room, the experimenter explained to 
participants that in their alibi they should report truthfully all the details that they 
remembered about each task that they had just completed in the task room, including 
the sequence of actions, objects they had used, and anything that had happened as part 
of completing each task. They were informed that they would first be given 10 
minutes to prepare their alibi, during which they would be left with a list of the names 
of the tasks that they had completed. The experimenter explained to the participants 
that if they succeeded in convincing the interviewer of their innocence, they would 
enter a prize draw in the chance to win 20 GBP. However, if they failed to do so, they 
would have to provide a second, handwritten alibi (see, e.g., Hartwig et al., 2007; Vrij 
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et al., 2009 for use of similar incentives). Finally, the experimenter told participants 
that the interviewer would see them now, and then left the interview room. 
The interviewer (i.e., another experimenter) entered the interview room and sat 
in front of the participants. Depending on the interviewer-belief condition to which 
participants were allocated, she conveyed to the participants her belief regarding their 
alleged responsibility for the theft of the wallet from the task room. In the guilty-belief 
condition, the interviewer told participants that it was a problem that they were in this 
situation and that their alibi would need to be a good one to convince her that they did 
not steal the wallet. In the innocent-belief condition, the interviewer apologised to 
participants that they had to be in this situation and assured them that they just needed 
to provide their alibi to confirm that it could not have been them who have stolen the 
wallet. In the neutral-belief condition, the interviewer told participants that this was a 
standard situation and they needed to provide their alibi to explain why it could not 
have been them who have stolen the wallet. Then, the interviewer exited the room and 
gave participants 10 minutes to prepare their alibi.  
After preparation time, the interviewer re-entered the room and explained to 
participants that she would not communicate with them until they finished providing 
their statement. Just before the participants started to provide their alibi, the 
interviewer reiterated her belief to participants regarding their responsibility for the 
alleged theft: In the guilty-belief condition, she told them that she was not convinced 
that they would succeed in convincing her that they did not steal the wallet, whereas in 
the innocent-belief condition she told them that she was sure they would succeed in 
convincing her that they did not steal it. In the neutral-belief condition, she told them 
that they may or may not convince her that they did not steal the wallet. In addition to 
the words she used, the interviewer also behaved towards participants in a manner that 
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reflected her belief regarding their alleged responsibility for the theft of the wallet. 
Specifically, she maintained a stern facial expression and used a severe tone of voice 
when speaking to participants in the guilty-belief condition. In the innocent-belief 
condition, she appeared and sounded apologetic; and in the neutral-belief condition, 
she maintained a neutral expression and tone. Four experimenters conducted the 
interviews across all conditions to ensure that any effects of interviewer’s belief could 
not be attributed to specific characteristics of the person communicating this belief. 
The first author trained the other three experimenters to administer the belief 
manipulations for all three conditions. One-way ANOVAs revealed that neither the 
number of correct details provided nor the accuracy rates of alibis differed between 
the interviewers, F(3, 78) = 0.95, p = .419, f = 0.18, and F(3, 78) = 0.38, p = .771, f = 
0.13, respectively. Also, no significant interaction effects of the interviewer who 
administrated the interview and interviewer-belief conditions were found for both 
number of correct details provided, F(6, 78) = 1.71, p = .131, f = 0.35, and accuracy 
rates of alibis, F(6, 78) = 0.87, p = .523, f = 0.26. 
The participants then provided their alibi, reporting about the four tasks that 
they had completed. All interviews were audio-recorded and the interviewer typed the 
alibi statement as the interviewees provided it. Finally, participants completed the 
post-alibi questionnaire, were debriefed, and compensated for their participation.  
Alibi Coding 
The alibis were coded into Action, Object, and Settings categories (see Wright 
& Holliday, 2007) by the first author, who was blind to the interviewer-belief 
conditions to which the participants were assigned. To determine the correctness of 
the details provided, each alibi was then compared against the video clips of the 
participants completing the tasks. If a detail was described in the alibi in the same way 
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as it appeared in the video clip, it was coded as “correct”. If a detail was described in 
the alibi incorrectly, or if it was described in the alibi but did not appear in the video 
clip, it was coded as “incorrect”. Finally, for each alibi (i.e., participant), we 
calculated a quantity measure by totalling the number of correct details provided 
across all tasks. Additionally, an accuracy rate was calculated for each participant by 
dividing the total number of correct details provided by the participant by the total 
number of correct and incorrect details provided by the participant across all tasks. 
A second coder, blind to the interviewer-belief conditions to which 
participants were assigned, coded nine alibis (10%). Inter-coder reliability, computed 
using intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), were .98, p < .001 for the quantity 
measure and .86, p < .001 for the accuracy rate.  
Results 
Motivation and Manipulation Checks 
Table 4.1 presents means and standard deviations of participants’ responses to 
the rating questions of the post-alibi questionnaire. The majority of participants 
(81.1%) indicated that their alibi was completely truthful (i.e., marked 95 or higher on 
the response scale; M = 97.27, SD = 4.97, range: 73-100). Additionally, most 
participants (88.9%) were motivated to appear convincing while providing their alibi 
(i.e., marked 5 or higher on the response scale; M = 5.99, SD = 1.24, range: 1-7). One-
way ANOVAs revealed that participants’ ratings of the truthfulness of their alibis and 
their motivation to appear convincing while providing their alibi did not differ 
significantly between the interviewer-belief conditions, F(2, 87) = 0.55, p = .581, f = 
0.11, and, F(2, 87) = 0.96, p = .387, f = 0.15, respectively. Thus, participants complied 
with instructions to provide truthful alibis and were motivated to convince the 
interviewer of their innocence.  
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Next, as a manipulation check, we conducted a one-way ANOVA with 
interviewer’s belief as the independent variable and participants’ ratings of how the 
interviewer had treated them before they provided their alibi as the dependent 
variable. We found that these ratings (see Table 4.1) differed significantly between the 
interviewer-belief conditions, F(2, 87) = 23.79, p < .001, f = 0.74. Post-hoc Tukey 
tests indicated that these ratings of participants in the innocent-belief condition were 
significantly lower (i.e., more towards feeling that the interviewer had treated them as 
if they were completely innocent) than those of participants in both the neutral-belief 
condition, p < .001, d = 1.09, 95% CI [0.55, 1.64], and guilty-belief condition, p < 
.001, d = 1.75, 95% CI [1.15, 2.34]. However, although the ratings of participants in 
the guilty-belief condition were higher (i.e., more towards feeling that the interviewer 
had treated them as if they were completely guilty) than those of participants in the 
neutral-belief condition, this difference was not significant according to the post-hoc 
tests, p = .052, d = 0.65, 95% CI [0.13, 1.17]. Nevertheless, this manipulation check 
confirms that participants in the guilty-belief condition perceived that the interviewer 
had treated them as if she believed they were guilty of the theft, and that participants 
in the innocent-belief condition perceived that the interviewer had treated them as if 
she believed they were innocent of the theft before they provided their alibi.  
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Table 4.1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Responses to Motivation and 
Manipulation Questions in the Post-Alibi Questionnaire  
 
Effects of Interviewer’s Belief on Quantity and Accuracy Rates 
To examine the effects of the interviewer’s belief regarding participants’ 
responsibility for the alleged theft on participants’ alibis, we conducted two one-way 
ANOVAs with interviewer’s belief as the independent variable and quantity (of 
correct details) and accuracy rates as dependent variables. Means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 4.2. In contrast to our predictions, and despite the 
results of the manipulation check, the number of correct details provided did not differ 
 Interviewer’s belief 
Measure Guilty Innocent Neutral 
Self-reported truthfulness 97.00 (4.69) 98.03 (3.48) 96.77 (6.39) 
Motivation to convince 
interviewer of innocence 
6.23 (0.94) 5.93 (1.29) 5.80 (1.45) 
Perceived interviewer’s belief 4.87 (1.14) 2.67 (1.37) 4.10 (1.24) 
Perceived interviewer’s 
influence on: 
   
Informativeness 4.00 (2.32) 4.37 (1.83) 3.70 (1.66) 
Accuracy 3.43 (2.14) 3.53 (1.85) 3.47 (1.59) 
Self-reported importance to be:    
Informative 6.70 (0.60) 6.43 (0.97) 6.43 (0.94) 
Accurate 6.80 (0.48) 6.50 (0.73) 6.47 (1.01) 
Convincing alibi 5.50 (0.97) 5.87 (1.20) 4.90 (1.27) 
Perceived likelihood to:    
Enter prize draw 3.93 (1.48) 4.80 (1.42) 3.83 (1.51) 
Provide second alibi 3.37 (1.22) 2.90 (1.37) 3.83 (1.37) 
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significantly between the interviewer-belief conditions, F(2, 87) = 1.20, p = .306, f = 
0.17. Also in contrast to our predictions, the accuracy rates of the information 
provided by participants did not differ significantly between interviewer-belief 
conditions, F(2, 87) = 0.32, p = .729, f = 0.08.  
Table 4.2 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Dependent Variables  
 
Given these null results, we ran two Bayes Factor analyses with default prior 
scales comparing quantity and accuracy rates between the different interviewer-belief 
conditions. The JZS BF01 = 3.90 for quantity and BF01 = 7.82 for accuracy rates 
indicated that the obtained data were approximately 3.90 and 7.82 (respectively) times 
more likely under the null hypothesis compared with the alternative hypothesis. This 
provides moderate evidence (Wagenmakers et al., 2018) in favor of the null 
hypotheses for quantity and accuracy.  
Perceptions During Interaction with The Interviewer 
We conducted two one-way ANOVAs with interviewer’s belief as the 
independent variable and participants’ ratings of the extent to which they thought the 
behaviour and words of the interviewer affected the informativeness and the accuracy 
of their alibi as the dependent variables. Participants’ ratings (see Table 4.1) of the 
extent to which they thought the interviewer affected the informativeness and the 
Interviewer’s Belief 
Quantity Accuracy Rates 
M SD M SD 
Guilty 238.67 108.50 .96 0.03 
Innocent 214.23 104.81 .96 0.03 
Neutral 201.57 62.73 .97 0.03 
Total 218.16 94.54 .96 0.03 
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accuracy of their alibi did not differ significantly between the interviewer-belief 
conditions, F(2, 87) = 0.87, p = .421,  f = 0.14, and, F(2, 87) = 0.02, p = .978,  f = 
0.02, respectively. 
Perceptions and Verbal Strategies During Alibi Provision 
One-way ANOVAs with interviewer’s belief as the independent variable 
revealed no differences in participants’ ratings of how important it was to them to 
provide details that were as informative as possible (see Table 4.1), F(2, 87) = 0.98, p 
= .379, f = 0.15, and how important it was to them to provide details that were as 
accurate as possible without guessing, F(2, 87) = 1.70, p = .189, f = 0.20.  
The strategies participants reported using to provide a convincing alibi were 
categorised in a data-driven manner (i.e., the categories of strategies were derived 
from the strategies themselves). These strategies are presented in Table 4.3, focusing 
on strategies pertaining to the informativeness and accuracy of the information 
provided. The majority of participants (70%) reported that it was important to them to 
provide an informative alibi to convince the interviewer that they were occupied with 
completing the tasks and hence could not had stolen the wallet. A chi-square test of 
independence reveled that the relation between interviewer-belief condition and 
participants’ tendency to report the informative-alibi strategy was not significant, X2 
(2, N = 90) = 0.95, p = .621. This strategy was also the most common one reported by 
participants within each condition of interviewer’s belief.  
As for the accuracy of details, a chi-square test of independence reveled that 
the relation between interviewer-belief condition and participants’ tendency to report 
that it was important to them to provide an accurate alibi and avoid guessing was also 
not significant, X2 (2, N = 90) = 2.31, p = .315.  
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Table 4.3 
Participants Self-Reported Verbal Strategies Used to Appear Truthful and Convincing 
During Alibi Provision  
Note: Numbers indicate frequency of reporting each strategy by type of interviewer-belief condition. 
Parenthesis present percentage of participants per interviewer-belief condition who reported each 
strategy. Each “suspect” could report a strategy more than once and from more than one category. 
 
A one-way ANOVA with interviewer’s belief as independent variable revealed 
a significant difference in participants’ ratings of how convincing they thought their 
alibi was (see Table 4.1), F(2, 87) = 5.37, p = .006, f = 0.35. Post-hoc Tukey tests 
showed that ratings in the innocent-belief condition were significantly higher than 
those in the neutral-belief condition, p = .005, d = 0.79, 95% CI [0.26, 1.31], meaning 
that the former perceived their alibi as more convincing than did the latter. However, 
no significant differences in these ratings were found between the guilty-belief 
condition and both the innocent-belief condition, p = .438, d = 0.34, 95% CI [-0.17, 
0.85], and neutral-belief condition, p = .115, d = 0.53, 95% CI [0.02, 1.05]. 
Finally, a one-way ANOVA with interviewer’s belief as independent variable 
revealed that participants’ estimations of the likelihood that they would enter the prize 
draw differed significantly between the interviewer-belief conditions (see Table 4.1), 
F(2, 87) = 3.91, p = .024, f = 0.30. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the draw-
Describe the strategy or strategies you used in 
order to appear as truthful and convincing as 
possible while you were providing your alibi 
regarding the disappearance of the wallet 
Interviewer’s Belief 
Guilty Innocent Neutral 
Provide as many details as possible; provide 
specific details 
20 (66.7%) 23 (76.7%) 20 (66.7%) 
Be accurate; avoid guessing and/or making-up 
details; inform the interviewer if unsure about 
details provided 
6 (20%) 2 (6.7%) 4 (13.3%) 
Not to provide too many details (e.g., so to not 
contradict oneself) 
1 (3.3%) 1 (3.3%) 0 (0%) 
Guess details 1 (3.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
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likelihood estimations were significantly higher in the innocent-belief condition than 
in the neutral-belief condition, p = .034, d = 0.66, 95% CI [0.14, 1.18]. However, 
these estimations did not differ significantly between participants in the guilty-belief 
condition and in both the innocent-belief condition, p = .064, d = 0.60, 95% CI [0.08, 
1.12], and neutral-belief condition, p = .963, d = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.44, 0.57]. 
Participants’ estimations of the likelihood that they would be asked to handwrite a 
second alibi also differed significantly between the interviewer-belief conditions, F(2, 
87) = 3.74, p = .028, f = 0.29. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the second-alibi 
likelihood estimations were significantly lower in the innocent-belief condition than in 
the neutral-belief condition, p = .020, d = 0.68, 95% CI [0.16, 1.20]. However, these 
estimations did not differ significantly between participants in the guilty-belief 
condition and in both the innocent-belief condition, p = .362, d = 0.36, 95% CI [-0.15, 
0.87], and neutral-belief condition, p = .362, d = 0.35, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.86]. 
Discussion 
In light of previous findings demonstrating the effects of an interviewer 
implying their belief about the likely guilt of an interviewee on the non-verbal 
behaviour of innocent suspects during interviews (e.g., Hill et al., 2008; Kassin et al., 
2003), we examined whether presumed guilt affected innocent suspects’ verbal 
behaviour during interviews in terms of the quantity of correct details provided and 
accuracy of their alibis. Our manipulation was successful to the extent that 
participants in the guilty-belief and innocent-belief conditions perceived that, before 
they provided their alibi, the interviewer believed they were guilty and innocent 
(respectively) of the theft. However, we did not observe significant differences 
between the interviewer-belief conditions in terms of the quantity of correct details 
and accuracy rates of the alibis provided. Given these null results, it is important to 
explore the factors that might account for these findings.  
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Previous research suggests that behavioural-confirmation effects are larger 
when targets believe that they may interact with the perceiver again (Haugen & 
Snyder, as cited in Snyder & Stukas, 1999). It may be that if participants in the guilty-
belief condition thought that they would interact with the interviewer again, they 
would have provided an alibi that would confirm the interviewer’s guilty belief. 
Nonetheless, only a single interviewer-interviewee interaction took place also in the 
Kassin et al. (2003) and Hill et al. (2008) studies, both of which reported effects of 
presumed guilt on interviewees’ behaviour. One important difference between their 
studies and the present one may lie in the nature of the interaction between interviewer 
and interviewee. Interactions in these previous studies involved back-and-forth 
questioning which generated more opportunities for the interviewers to communicate 
their guilty belief to the participants, reinforce the presumption of guilt and, 
potentially, ratchet up the pressure on the interviewee. In contrast, as we were 
interested in the effects of interviewer’s presumption of guilt on the alibi statement 
provided (cf. responses to continuous questioning), the interviewer conveyed her 
belief to the participants before they provided their alibi only (which was nevertheless 
sufficient for participants in the guilty- and innocent-belief conditions to perceive the 
biased treatment of the interviewer). Future research might examine the effects of an 
interviewer’s presumed guilt on alibi provision across several interactions, as well as 
on different types of statements (e.g., a single alibi statement and answers to a set of 
questions). 
Despite the null findings, it may be that the participants in the guilty-belief 
condition did behave in response to the interviewer’s guilt-led behaviour. It has been 
suggested that when the perceiver’s opinion matters to the target and when the 
perceiver’s impression of the target is inaccurate in the eyes of the target, the target 
will act to prove the perceiver wrong (e.g., Darley & Fazio, 1980; Snyder & Stuaks, 
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1999). Given participants’ high levels of self-reported motivation to appear 
convincingly innocent, it appears that the interviewer’s opinion mattered to all 
participants. Moreover, knowing that they were undoubtedly innocent of the theft, 
participants in the guilty-belief condition likely disagreed with the interviewer’s 
impression of them (i.e., her guilty belief). Consequently, to prove the interviewer 
‘wrong’, these participants opted to provide relatively detailed and informative alibis 
comprising a large number of correct details. Alternatively, as was suggested by 
Granhag et al. (2009) with respect to their participants in the high-suspicion level 
condition, participants in the guilty-belief condition in the present research may have 
felt that it was their responsibility to convince the interviewer that they were innocent.  
However, a difference between the low-suspicion condition in Granhag et al. 
(2009) and the innocent-belief condition in the present research may account for null 
findings in the present research. In Granhag et al. (2009), participants in the low-
suspicion condition did not feel that being informative would benefit them as did 
participants in the high-suspicion condition, resulting in difference in the 
informativeness of statements between suspicion-level conditions. In contrast, in the 
present research, participants in the innocent-belief condition presumably felt that an 
informative statement could convey their innocence (see Hartwig et al., 2007; Kassin 
& Norwick, 2004; Vrij et al., 2010). Consequently, their statements were as 
informative as were those of participants in the guilty-belief condition, resulting in no 
difference in the number of correct details provided between the interviewer-belief 
conditions.  
With respect to the accuracy rates obtained in participants’ alibis, these are high 
across all conditions. This is not entirely surprising, given that free reporting tends to 
produce reports comprised of accurate information (see Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994, 
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1996). However, another possibility is that the short time interval between task 
completion and alibi provision (in accordance with previous methodologies, e.g., Hill 
et al., 2008) may account for the high accuracy rates observed (and, consequently, for 
the lack of difference between conditions in accuracy rates). As memory decays over 
time, innocent suspects may find it difficult to recall an accurate version of past 
events, potentially making them more susceptible to the behaviour of a guilt-
presumptive interviewer. Thus, future research on the effects of interviewer’s 
presumed guilt on the alibis of truthful suspects may employ a longer delay between 
the critical event and the interview. 
It is worth commenting on the perceptions of participants in the neutral-belief 
condition, where responses to the manipulation question (“Before you provided your 
alibi, how did the interviewer [i.e., to whom you provided your alibi] treat you?”) 
were significantly different from those in the innocent-belief condition but not from 
those in the guilty-belief condition. According to Snyder and Stukas (1999), when a 
perceiver acts towards the target in accordance with a neutral expectation, this “might 
give targets about whom nothing is known the benefit of the doubt” (p. 291), and the 
perceiver’s behaviour is likely to be perceived by the target as conveying more of a 
positive expectation. However, it may be that once people are being asked to account 
for their whereabouts in attempts to exonerate themselves as part of a police interview, 
their only perception of the interviewer’s belief about their veracity is that s/he thinks 
they are guilty, even if the interviewer treats them in a neutral (but not innocent) 
manner. For participants in the neutral-belief condition, not receiving cues that the 
interviewer believed they were innocent, combined with being suspected of a crime, 
may have led them to feel fully responsible to convince the interviewer of their 
innocence (i.e., like guilty suspects). Thus, their responses to the manipulation 
question resembled those of participants in the guilty-belief condition. Kassin et al. 
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(2003) and Hill et al. (2008) asked their participants about their experience during the 
meeting with the interviewer only with respect to participants’ perception of how hard 
the interviewer was trying to obtain a confession from them or how the interviewer 
would judge them following the interview. However, this is different from asking 
participants how they felt that the interviewer had treated them, which, in the context 
of research on effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt, was done for the first time 
(to our knowledge) only in this study. Thus, to further establish the personal 
experience of meeting a neutral versus guilt-presumptive interviewer, future research 
on the effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt on suspects’ verbal (and 
nonverbal) behaviour should ask participants about their perception of the 
interviewer’s belief as was perceived by them prior to or during the interview. 
A couple of other limitations are associated with the current research. 
Participants’ potential ‘punishment’ for failing to convince the interviewer of their 
innocence was clearly not as severe as those potentially faced by innocent suspects in 
real-life interviews. Future research on the effects of interviewer’s presumed guilt on 
innocent suspects’ verbal behaviour should manipulate the severity of the outcomes 
presented to participants of their success and failure to convince the interviewer of 
their innocence. Additionally, in common with previous research (e.g., Olson & 
Charman, 2012), and given that being mistakenly believed to be guilty is more 
detrimental to innocent suspects, the present research included only innocent mock 
suspects. However, future research should examine the strategies of guilty-suspects 
under similar circumstances. 
From an applied perspective, the present findings suggest that when it comes 
to their verbal behaviour, innocent suspects may remain informative despite a single 
guilt-presumptive treatment from the interviewer. They may appear defensive (Hill et 
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al., 2008; Kassin et al., 2003), but that is not to say that the information they provide is 
always more likely to be incorrect and/or incomplete. Nevertheless, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that when interviewers approach the interview with the belief that 
the suspect is guilty, this presumption will cause no harm to innocent suspects. It is 
important to consider that once suspects respond to the interviewer’s question/provide 
their alibi, the interviewer interprets this response. Even if the target did not respond 
in accordance with the perceiver’s expectation, the perceiver is unlikely to change 
her/his belief about the target and may instead maintain the mistaken belief by 
attributing the target’s opposite reaction to situational rather than dispositional factors 
(see, e.g., Darley & Fazio, 1980). It may be that, during an investigation, a guilt-
presumptive interviewer learns that a (innocent) suspect was correctly informative 
during a recent interview, but may fail to attribute this verbal behaviour to the 
suspect’s actual innocence. Consequently, the interviewer may continue to believe that 
this suspect is guilty and may thus continue to interview this suspect in manners 
coloured by this belief. Future research could examine whether a disconfirming verbal 
behaviour on the part of the suspect changes or maintains a guilt-presumptive 
interviewer’s initial belief.   
Even with the short interaction used in the present research, participants 
perceived the guilt- and innocence-led behaviour of the interviewer. Thus, the present 
findings demonstrate the importance of examining the effects of an interviewer’s guilt 
presumption on innocent suspects’ alibis even during such short interactions. Such 
examinations, and any examinations of effects of guilt presumptions on innocent 
suspects’ behaviour, are needed as long as there continue to be cases in which police 
interviewers approach interviews with suspects when already believing they are 
guilty, even when trained to avoid such behaviour. 
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Chapter 5: Beliefs about innocent suspects’ alibis: A survey of lay people in the 
United Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden 
Abstract 
When interviewed by a police officer, innocent suspects may fail to provide a 
convincing alibi for a number of reasons, including impaired memory processes 
and/or guilt-presumptive behaviour on behalf of the interviewer. Consequently, an 
innocent suspect may be prosecuted and tried in court, where jury members will 
inevitably asses the credibility of his or her original alibi. Using a questionnaire 
administrated across the United Kingdom (n = 96), Israel (n = 124), and Sweden (n = 
123), the present research examined the beliefs lay people (as prospective jurors) hold 
regarding alibis, and, specifically, the issues of impaired memory processes and 
interviewers’ presumption of guilt in the context of innocent suspects’ alibis. The 
findings suggest that participants did not tend to believe that alibis of innocent 
suspects may include inaccurate details. However, most participants did note that, 
when innocent suspects provide inaccurate alibis, this may be due to memory 
constraints. Additionally, most participants believed that interviewers usually begin to 
form a belief about suspects’ guilt or innocence before or while suspects are providing 
their alibi for the first time, and that a guilt presumption can affect how interviewers 
conduct interviews with suspects. We discuss the findings in relation to relevant 
research. 
 
This chapter has been submitted as a manuscript for publication as:  
Portnoy, S., Hope, L., Vrij, A., Ask, K., & Landström, S. (2018). Beliefs about 
innocent suspects’ alibis: A survey of lay people in the United Kingdom, Israel, and 
Sweden. 
99 
 
Introduction 
 Innocent suspects who fail to provide a convincing alibi when interviewed by 
the police may subsequently be tried in court, where their alibi may be evaluated again 
by lay people who serve jury duty. Are lay people familiar with factors that may lead 
to an innocent suspect providing an inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise unconvincing 
alibi? Using a survey, the current research sought to examine this question. 
Providing a Convincing Alibi 
When providing an alibi to a police interviewer, suspects generally attempt to 
convince the interviewer of their innocence of the crime for which they are being held 
suspects. This process has been identified as the generation domain of alibi provision 
(Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Olson & Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004) which 
comprises two phases—the story phase and the validation phase. During the first, 
story phase, suspects provide their alibi by reporting from memory about their actions 
and whereabouts during the time of the crime. In the subsequent validation phase, 
suspects attempt to corroborate their alibi by offering objects (physical evidence) or 
details about people (person evidence) that may account for their presence in a certain 
place and a certain time during the time frame of the crime (Burke et al., 2007). 
However, during both phases of the generation domain, innocent suspects may 
provide inaccurate information despite being motivated to provide an accurate and, 
ultimately, convincing alibi (see Kassam, Gilbert, Swencionis, & Wilson, 2009). One 
factor that has been found to hamper innocent suspects’ ability to provide accurate 
information is impaired memory processes—a result of the fact that they (as all 
truthful rememberers) must rely on their episodic and autobiographical memory to 
provide their statement (Burke et al., 2007; Culhane, Hosch, & Kehn, 2008; Olson & 
Wells, 2012; Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2014). Impaired memory processes concern, 
for example, the declining accessibility of event details with the passage of time 
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(Pertzov, Manohar, & Husain, 2017; Tourangeau, 2000). Alternatively, innocent 
suspects may wrongly, though unintentionally, integrate details from memories for 
distinctive events into a report about an event that never actually took place (i.e., 
memory-conjunction error; Reinitz, Lammers, & Cochran, 1992; see also Devitt, 
Monk-Fromont, Schacter & Addis, 2016).  
In addition to memory problems that may compromise innocent suspects’ ability 
to provide a convincing alibi, factors emerging in the course of the interview may also 
jeopardise their success with respect to convincing the interviewer of their innocence. 
One such factor is the presumption of guilt with which interviewers sometimes 
approach interviews with suspects. Research has shown that this guilt presumption can 
lead interviewers to conduct more aggressive interviews with suspects and increases 
the probability that the interviewer will judge the suspect as guilty at the end of the 
interview (Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008; Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). 
Research on the effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt on the verbal behaviour 
of suspects during interviews is relatively new. Findings so far have shown no 
correlation between interviewers’ guilt presumption and suspects’ tendency to confess 
or deny involvement in a crime (Hill et al., 2008), and found no evidence that guilt 
presumption affects the informativeness and accuracy of innocent suspects’ alibis 
(Portnoy et al., see Experiment 3). Nevertheless, the findings of Kassin et al. (2003) 
and Hill et al. (2008) suggest that when interviewers approach the interview already 
believing the suspect to be guilty, alibis may become less efficient in suspects’ 
attempts to convince interviewers of their innocence. 
Evaluating the Credibility of Alibis 
The generation domain of alibi provision is followed by the believability domain 
(Burke et al., 2007; Olson & Charman, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2004). This domain also 
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comprises two phases—the evaluation phase and the ultimate evaluation phase. In the 
evaluation phase, the credibility of the alibi provided is evaluated, usually initially by 
the police. Finally, the ultimate credibility of the alibi is determined in court by 
different evaluators, who are exposed to all the facts of the case. When investigating 
an alibi and discovering that the suspect provided incorrect information, the police 
interviewer may fail to attribute such inaccuracies to memory errors (Burke et al., 
2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & Wells, 2012). Instead, unintentional 
inaccuracies in alibis may be perceived by the police as an intentional lying and hence 
guilt (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & Charman, 2012). 
Alternatively, as noted, a guilt presumption alone may be enough for an interviewer to 
decide that the suspect is guilty. If suspects are judged as guilty during initial phases 
of an investigation, this may ultimately lead to the decision that they should be tried in 
court (Crozier, Strange, & Loftus, 2017; Wells et al., 1998).  
In court, jury members may be the most influential evaluators of a suspect’s 
alibi. The task of the jury is challenging, requiring citizens to consider different 
sources of information to reach a verdict despite lacking legal training (Bornstein & 
Greene, 2011; Greene & Bornstein, 2000). To reach a verdict, jurors must assess the 
credibility of the suspect, namely whether s/he is innocent or guilty of a crime (Porter 
& ten Brinke, 2009). When evaluating the credibility of an alibi, jurors may fail to 
consider factors that may have led to the suspect providing an unconceding alibi, such 
as memory errors or a biased interviewer. 
However, jurors may have a sound rationale not to question the circumstances that 
led to the suspect being disbelieved and consequently tried in court. As noted by 
Burke et al. (2007), “the mere fact that the alibi provider has been singled out and 
asked for an alibi is in itself potentially damaging information about that person” (p. 
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168; see also Sommers & Douglass, 2007). Also, the fact that the case made it to court 
may be sufficient to doubt the alibi—a suggestion tested by Sommers and Douglass 
(2007). In their study, across several conditions, the researchers manipulated the 
framing of a report (e.g., title of the report) which provided participants with 
information about the investigation of a vandalism crime and an alibi of a suspect. The 
two framing conditions of most relevance to the present research are those in which 
participants were manipulated to believe that the report they read was (i) a police 
investigation summary or (ii) a criminal trial summary. Participants rated the alibi as 
stronger and more credible in the police investigation condition than in the criminal 
trial condition. Sommers and Douglass (2007) noted that participants in the criminal 
trial condition possibly interpreted the fact that the case had gone to trial as an 
indication that the suspect’s alibi was weak. 
When suspects confess to a crime and this confession is then presented at trial, an 
effort is often made by defence attorneys and expert witnesses to explain the 
conditions that may have led to the confession in order to ensure that jurors can better 
decide whether the confession is reliable (Shaked-Schroer, Costanzo, & Berger 2015). 
However, the conditions under which an alibi was provided may not be explained to 
the jury. During the course of the trial, jurors may assume that there was a justifiable 
reason to prosecute the suspect, and this assumption is likely to guide them in 
deciding that an innocent suspect is guilty (Burke et al., 2007). Thus, it is crucial that 
jurors are informed and educated about the process of alibi provision and the factors 
that may jeopardize this process.  
The Present Research 
 A first step in improving jurors’ decision making in court to prevent 
miscarriages of justice is studying what lay people who may potentially constitute a 
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jury know about legal matters. Such examination is also required because judges 
largely base their decision of whether to allow expert witnesses to testify at trial on 
their assumptions about jurors’ knowledge regarding legal matters (Costanzo, Shaked-
Schroer, & Vinson, 2010).  
To examine the extent to which lay people as prospective jurors are familiar 
with the factors of impaired memory processes and interviewers’ presumption of guilt 
in the context of alibi provision, we asked lay people from the United Kingdom (UK) 
to complete a two-part questionnaire. To increase our sample size and thus improve 
the precision and power of our statistical analyses, and to improve the diversity of our 
sample, we also distributed the questionnaire to community members in Sweden and 
Israel. While the latter two countries do not employ a jury system6, data from these 
countries are still informative with regard to our research question: lay beliefs and 
perceptions about alibis.  
In the first part of the questionnaire we studied participants’ knowledge about 
innocent suspects’ alibi provision in general. This examination was necessary because 
credibility judgments are partly influenced by evaluators’ perceptions and beliefs 
about honest and deceptive behaviour (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). To this end, 
participants indicated their beliefs about the extent to which different types of details 
are provided in suspect alibis, as well as the strategies used by suspects to provide an 
alibi. We also asked participants about their belief regarding the relation between an 
alibi’s truthfulness and its level of informativeness, and the extent to which innocent 
suspects might provide inaccurate information. Critically, to study whether 
participants considered impaired memory processes as potential reasons for 
                                                          
6 In Israel, verdicts are reached by the judge who then also makes the sentencing decisions (Barak, 
1992). In Sweden, a mixed panel of professional judges and lay judges decides on both verdicts and 
sentencing outcomes (Ortwein, 2003). 
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incompleteness and inaccuracies in innocent suspects’ alibis, participants were asked 
to explain their responses to these questions.  
The second part of the questionnaire focused on the issue of interviewers’ 
presumption of guilt. To explore whether lay people consider it likely that 
interviewers conduct suspect interviews under a presumption of guilt, participants 
were asked to estimate when in the investigation interviewers begin to form an 
opinion about the suspect’s guilt or innocence. This question was followed by a more 
direct question about presumptions of guilt, which asked participants to indicate the 
extent to which they believed that an interviewer’s presumption of guilt may affect the 
interviewer’s words and behaviour during the interview. Finally, participants indicated 
their belief about the potential effects of the interviewer’s guilt presumption on the 
behaviour of suspects during interviews. Having no rationale to predict differences in 
responses between participants by country, we collapsed results across the three 
countries. 
Method 
Participants 
Overall, data was collected from 343 members of the general public from three 
countries. Specifically, 96 participants from the UK, 124 participants from Israel, and 
123 participants from Sweden completed the questionnaire. Data from 11 participants 
were removed from analyses because they did not complete the questionnaire 
thoroughly (e.g., provided a one-word reply to all open-ended questions in a manner 
unrelated to the questions) or failed to meet inclusion criteria (i.e., over the age of 18 
years, without previous experience of providing a police alibi). This resulted in data 
from 332 participants (M = 29.85 years; SD = 11.33; 210 females, 108 males; 14 
participants did not indicate their age and gender). Participants were recruited via 
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advertisements on social media. All participants who completed the survey were 
entered into a prize draw for a £20 internet shopping voucher.  
Alibi Questionnaire 
A questionnaire comprising eight questions was created in English (see 
Appendix H). The questionnaire was translated into both Hebrew and Swedish by 
native speakers of both languages using a back-translation procedure. The three 
language versions of the questionnaire were administrated online using the Qualtrics 
platform.  
When opening the link to the questionnaire, participants were informed that 
the questionnaire concerned beliefs that members of the general public hold about 
alibis. Participants completed informed consent procedures and were required to 
confirm that they had never provided an alibi as part of a police investigation. At the 
outset of the questionnaire, participants were presented with definitions of the 
following terms: an alibi, truthful suspects, and lying suspects (see Appendix H). 
Participants were then instructed to work through the eight questions, with each 
question presented on a new screen.  
In the first part of the questionnaire, participants were first asked to indicate, 
for six types of details, the extent to which they thought each type of detail was 
provided in deceptive relative to truthful suspects’ alibis using a 7-point Likert scale 
(1=substantially more in liars’ alibis than in truth-tellers’ alibis, 7=substantially more 
in truth-tellers’ alibis than in liars’ alibis). These six types of details were setting (i.e., 
description of the crime scene and/or any other places described in the alibi); temporal 
(i.e., description of the order in which events took place and/or the specific times and 
dates in which events occurred); object (i.e., details about objects used by the suspect 
and/or by others described in the alibi); person description (i.e., details about the 
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appearance of other people described in the alibi); self-actions (i.e., details about 
actions taken by the suspect); and, others’ actions (i.e. details about actions taken by 
people described in the alibi that are not the suspect).  
Next, participants were asked to freely describe what strategies they thought 
truthful and lying suspects typically use to make their alibi seem credible. Participants 
were then asked what they believed the relation between the amount of details 
provided in an alibi and the truthfulness of the alibi to be by choosing one of three 
response option indicating that more details in an alibi increase or decrease the 
likelihood that it is truthful, or that there is no relation between an alibi’s level of 
detail and its truthfulness. Participants were also asked to explain their belief. Finally, 
participants were asked to indicate and explain their belief regarding the extent to 
which truthful alibis might contain incorrect details (1=truthful alibis contain no 
incorrect details, 7=truthful alibis contain only incorrect details).  
In the second section of the survey which concerned the factor of interviewers’ 
guilt presumption, participants were first asked to indicate the point in the course of 
the investigation in which they believed interviewers begin to form an opinion 
regarding the guilt or innocence of suspects. To indicate their belief, participants were 
asked to choose one of five response options (e.g., usually prior to hearing the 
suspect’s alibi for the first time) or freely report their belief if the options presented 
were not satisfactory. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which they 
thought an interviewer’s guilt presumption affects what the interviewer says and how 
s/he behaves during an interview (1=does not at all affect the interviewer’s words and 
behaviours, 7=significantly affects the interviewer’s words and behaviour). Finally, 
we asked participants about the likelihood that suspects respond to the interviewer’s 
guilt presumption by (a) providing more details in their alibi, (b) providing details 
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even if uncertain of their accuracy, and, (c) confessing to committing the crime 
(1=very unlikely, 7=very likely).  
On completion of the questionnaire, participants were asked to report their age, 
gender, country of residence, and the main language they use in every day 
communications. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
Results 
Innocent Suspects’ Alibi Provision and Effects of Memory Processes 
Table 5.1 presents means and standard deviations of participants’ responses to 
the question concerning the extent to which setting, temporal, object, person, self-
actions, and others’ actions details are provided in alibis of truthful suspects relative to 
lying suspects. On average, participants believed that most types of details are 
provided significantly slightly more in truthful than in deceptive alibis. 
Table 5.1  
Participants’ Belief Regarding the Extent to Which Types of Details Are Provided in 
Suspect Alibis 
Note. * = All df = 331. 
The extent to which each type of detail is 
provided in alibis of lying suspects 
or/and truth-telling suspects  
(1 = substantially more in liars’ alibis, 7 
= substantially more in truth-tellers’ 
alibis) 
M (SD) t* (p value) d, 95% CI 
Person description 4.40 (1.52) 4.78 (< .001) 0.26, [0.15, 0.37] 
Temporal 4.38 (1.63) 4.20 (< .001) 0.23, [0.12, 0.34] 
Object 4.37 (1.45) 4.69 (< .001) 0.26, [0.15, 0.37] 
Setting 4.34 (1.72) 3.63 (< .001) 0.20, [0.09, 0.31] 
Others’ actions 4.10 (1.52) 1.23 (= .221) 0.07, [-0.04, 0.18] 
Self-actions 4.00 (1.65)  0 (= 1.000)  0.0, [0, 0] 
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Next, we categorised the freely-reported strategies that participants thought 
truthful and lying suspects typically use to make their alibi seem truthful and 
convincing to the interviewer. The first author coded all responses in a data-driven 
manner, meaning that the categories were derived from participants’ reports. A second 
coder coded 32 responses (9.8%) of participants for each of the two strategies 
questions (liars and truth tellers). Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the categories of the 
strategies perceived by participants to be used by truthful and lying suspects, 
respectively. The tables also present inter-coder reliability computed using intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC). The three most common strategies of truthful suspects 
during alibi provision reported by participants (Table 5.2) were that truth tellers 
cooperate with the interviewer, express confidence, and provide detailed alibis. With 
respect to liars’ strategies during alibi provision (Table 5.3), the three most commonly 
reported strategies concerned providing detailed alibis, engaging in general impression 
management, and expressing confidence.  
As two of the three most commonly reported strategies were strategies 
reported for both truthful and lying suspects (i.e., providing detailed alibis and 
expressing confidence), we examined whether the proportion to which participants 
reported each of these strategies differed for truthful and lying suspects. Two exact 
McNemar's tests were conducted only among participants whose reports could be 
coded for both truthful and lying suspects’ strategy questions (n = 321). The tests 
showed that participants believed that a detailed alibi occurs more often with respect 
to lying (39.0%) than truthful suspects (26.6%), p = .001. In contrast, participants 
believed that expressing confidence occurs more often among truthful (30.0%) than 
lying suspects (16.6%), p < .001.  
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Table 5.2 
Strategies Used by Innocent Suspects to Provide a Convincing Alibi as Freely 
Reported by Participants 
 Note. N = 327; Data from five participants were removed from analysis because their reports were too 
vague. “Other” = strategies that were individually reported by less than 5.5% of participants (e.g., 
truthful suspects repeat their story; report incorrect information; and, do not describe events 
chronologically). Participants could report a strategy more than once and from more than one category). 
 
 
Strategy Frequency 
(% of total N) 
ICC (p-value) 
Non-verbal behaviour and impression management   
Suspect expresses calmness/confidence and is confident 
in innocence 
98 (30.0) 0.94 (< .001) 
Suspect engages in general impression management to 
appear and sound innocent 
50 (15.3) 0.79 (< .001) 
Open, calm (sometimes expressive) movements and 
voice 
35 (10.7) 0.84 (< .001) 
Suspect is naturally nervous, fidgety 34 (10.4) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect keeps eye contact with interviewer 31 (9.5) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is cooperative and does not use strategies 108 (33.0) 0.94 (< .001) 
Informativeness, accuracy, and evidence details   
Suspect provides detailed alibis 87 (26.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is informative about self-actions, whereabouts, 
and feelings during the critical time 
37 (11.3) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is not too informative 34 (10.4) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is informative about surroundings and objects 28 (8.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect provides person/object evidence details  61 (18.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect provides accurate information  54 (16.5) 1.00 (< .001) 
Statement’s characteristics   
Suspect describes events chronologically; provides exact 
times  
36 (11.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
       Suspect’s statement is coherent, logical 34 (10.4) 1.00 (< .001) 
 Suspect’s statement is consistent 24 (7.3) 1.00 (< .001) 
Other  79 (24.2) 0.80 (< .001) 
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Table 5.3 
Strategies Used by Guilty Suspects to Provide a Convincing Alibi as Freely Reported 
by Participants 
Strategy Frequency (% of 
total N) 
ICC (p-value) 
Non-verbal behaviour and impression management   
Suspect expresses calmness/confidence  54 (16.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect engages in general impression management to 
appear and sound innocent; denies guilt  
84 (25.8) 1.00 (< .001) 
Open, calm (sometimes expressive) movements and voice 
(naturally or faked) 
28 (8.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is naturally nervous, fidgety 41 (12.6) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect keeps eye contact with interviewer  25 (7.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect prepares an alibi; memorises details  53 (16.2) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect makes up details 26 (8.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect appeals to interviewer’s feelings 25 (7.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Informativeness, accuracy, and evidence details   
Suspect provides detailed alibis 127 (39.0) .88 (< .001) 
Suspect is informative about self-actions, whereabouts, and 
feelings during the critical time 
18 (5.5) .79 (< .001) 
Suspect is not too informative 46 (14.1) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect is informative about surroundings and objects 23 (7.1) -* 
Statement’s characteristics   
Suspect describes events chronologically; provides exact 
times  
33 (10.1) 1.00 (< .001) 
Suspect’s statement is coherent, logical (naturally or with 
effort) 
36 (11.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
 Suspect’s statement is vague, not coherent (naturally or on 
purpose)  
22 (6.7) 1.00 (< .001) 
Other  127 (39.0) 1.00 (< .001) 
Note: N = 326; Data from six participants were removed from analysis due to being vague. “Other” = 
strategies that were individually reported by 4.9% of participants, or less (e.g., liars provide verifiable/ 
unverifiable information; feign forgetting/not knowing details; name another person as the culprit; and, do 
not speak). Participants could report a strategy more than once and from more than one category. * = inter-
coder reliability cannot be computed because of lack of variance in item coding between coders (i.e., perfect 
agreement). 
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Table 5.4 presents the frequencies with which participants chose each response 
option to the question concerning the relation between the amount of details provided 
in an alibi and its truthfulness. A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit revealed that the 
preference for the three response options was not equally distributed, X2 (2, N = 332) 
= 8.32, p = .015. Post-hoc analyses of standardized (Pearson) residuals showed that 
the belief that more details indicate a less truthful alibi was reported more often than 
would be expected by chance, p = .021. However, this test just barely failed to reach 
statistical significance when compared against the Bonferroni-corrected alpha ( = 
.05/3 = .017). None of the other two response options approached statistical 
significance, ps  .112.  
Also presented in Table 5.4 are participants’ reasons for their belief regarding 
the relation between the amount of details provided in an alibi and its truthfulness. 
Most participants who believed that a detailed alibi is less likely to be truthful 
explained their belief by reporting that liars may believe that a detailed alibi is 
perceived as truthful and convincing. With respect to participants who believed that a 
detailed alibi is more likely to be truthful, most of them explained their belief by 
reporting that the truth is easy to keep track of and thus being informative is not 
difficult. Finally, most participants who believed that the amount of details provided 
in an alibi is not related to its truthfulness reported that the truthfulness of an alibi 
depends on different factors, such as the verifiability of the details provided, how 
central the details are to the main event, and the suspect’s personal strategy to appear 
truthful (which may or may not be to provide many details).  
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Table 5.4 
Participants’ Belief About the Relation Between Amount of Details Provided in an 
Alibi and Its Truthfulness and Their Explanations for Their Beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanation 
The relation between amount of details provided in an alibi 
and its truthfulness 
 
The more details 
provided in the 
alibi, the less 
likely the alibi is 
truthful 
135* (40.7%) 
The more details 
provided in the 
alibi, the more 
likely the alibi is 
truthful 
94 (28.3%) 
The amount of details 
provided in the alibi is 
not related to its 
truthfulness 
 
103 (31.0%) 
Liars believe that a detailed 
alibi is perceived as truthful 
80** (59.3%) 0 (0.0%) 20 (19.4%) 
The truth is easy to keep 
track of; many details can 
corroborate the suspect’s 
story  
2 (1.5%) 43 (45.7%) 7 (6.8%) 
Depends on different factors 3 (2.2%) 3 (3.2%) 57 (55.4%) 
Truth tellers have memory 
for the critical time  
0 (0.0%) 40 (42.6%) 10 (9.7%) 
Truth tellers do not 
remember everything  
52 (38.5%) 0 (0.0%) 26 (25.2%) 
A detailed alibi seems 
planned  
49 (36.3%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (10.7%) 
Few details lower the risk of 
providing incriminating 
information 
2 (1.5%) 33 (35.1%) 4 (3.9%) 
Note. * = number of participants from total sample (N = 332) who chose this response option (brackets 
include percentage of participants who chose this response option out of the total sample). ** = 
frequency of participants who provided this explanation out of total number of participants who chose 
the response option (brackets include percentage of participants who provided this explanation out of 
the total number of participants who chose the response option). Participants could provide an 
explanation of more than one type.  
 
We then examined participants’ belief regarding the extent to which truthful 
alibis might contain incorrect details. On average, participants believed to a relatively 
low extent that truthful alibis might contain incorrect details (M = 3.41, SD = 1.15). 
Participants’ beliefs about the accuracy of truthful alibis and the reasons underpinning 
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these beliefs (as reported by participants who chose response option 2 or higher) are 
presented in Table 5.5. Most participants explained that truthful alibis may contain 
incorrect details due to impaired memory processes. 
Table 5.5 
Participants’ Explanations for Their Belief About the Extent to Which Truthful Alibis 
May Contain Incorrect Details 
Explanation The extent to which truthful alibis might contain incorrect 
details  
(1=truthful alibis contain no incorrect details, 7=truthful alibis 
contain only incorrect details) 
1 
9  
(2.7%) 
2 
67*  
(20.2%)  
3 
113 
(34.0%) 
4 
75  
(22.6%) 
5 
59 
(17.8%) 
6 
9  
(2.7%) 
Impaired memory processes 
 
 52** 
(77.6%)  
103 
(91.2%) 
66 
(88.0%) 
51 
(86.4%) 
6 
(66.7%) 
Pressure/excitement from being 
interviewed 
 
 27 
(40.3%) 
40 
(35.4%) 
23 
(30.7%) 
18 
(30.5%) 
3 
(33.3%) 
On purpose (e.g., to end the 
interview; to cover for another 
truth) 
 
 15 
(22.4%) 
12 
(10.6%) 
6 
(8.0%) 
5 
(8.5%)  
2 
(22.2%) 
Confusion  11 
(16.4%) 
8 
(7.1%) 
4 
(5.3%) 
4 
(6.8%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Other   2 
(3.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(1.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Note. Label 7 is not included because no participant chose this response option. * = number of 
participants from total sample (N = 332) who chose this response option (brackets include percentage of 
participants who chose this response option out of the total sample). ** = frequency of participants who 
provided this explanation out of total number of participants who chose the response option (brackets 
include percentage of participants who provided this explanation out of the total number of participants 
who chose the response option). “Other” = explanations that truthful alibis might contain incorrect 
information so that the alibi will not be perfect; due difficulty to communicate thoughts because of 
culture or language; and, because suspects do not put an effort because they are innocent. Participants 
could provide an explanation of more than one type.  
Interviewers’ Presumption of Guilt 
 The point of the investigation at which participants believed an interviewer 
likely begins to form an opinion about the guilt/innocence of the suspect is presented 
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in Table 5.6. A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit revealed that participants’ preference 
of the six possible response options was not equally distributed, X2 (5, N = 332) = 
170.37, p < .001. Post-hoc tests of standardized (Pearson) residuals, using a 
Bonferroni-corrected alpha ( = .05/6 = 0.008), indicated that participants tended to 
believe significantly more often than would be expected by chance that interviewers 
usually begin to form an opinion regarding the guilt/innocence of suspects prior to 
hearing their alibi for the first time (p < .001) or while suspects are providing their  
alibi for the first time (p < .001). The post-hoc tests also indicated that the beliefs that 
interviewers never form a belief regarding suspects’ involvement in a crime and that 
there may be another option for the timing of the formation of this belief (“other” 
response option) were both significantly underrepresented, both ps < .001. The 
remaining two response options were not statistically significant, ps  .074. 
Table 5.6 
Participants’ Belief About the Point in the Investigation at Which the Interviewer 
Begins to Form an Opinion Regarding the Guilt/Innocence of the Suspect 
Response Option 
Frequency (% of 
total N) 
Usually while the suspect is providing the alibi for the first time 118 (35.5%) 
Usually prior to hearing the suspect’s alibi for the first time 93 (28.0%) 
Usually after there is evidence to corroborate/refute the alibi 56 (16.9%) 
Usually after interviewing the suspect several times 42 (12.7%) 
Other   17 (5.1%) 
The interviewer never forms a belief regarding the suspect’s 
involvement in the crime 
6 (1.8%) 
Note. N = 332. “Other” category included reports that the point in the investigation at which the 
interviewer begins to form an opinion regarding the guilt/innocence of the suspect varies from one 
interviewer to another, that it depends on factors such as the suspects’ behaviour, and that it may be a 
combination of several of the response options provided.  
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Then, we found that, on average (M = 5.61, SD = 1.23), participants believed 
that interviewers’ guilt presumption can largely affect what interviewers say and how 
they behave during an interview. The explanations underpinning these beliefs are 
presented in Table 5.7. The most common explanation provided by participants who 
strongly believed this to be true (i.e., chose 5 or higher on the response scale) was that 
guilt presumptions make interviewers conduct harsher interviews, ask leading 
questions, and pressure the suspect to confess. 
Finally, on average, participants believed to a large extent that when suspects 
get the impression that the interviewer thinks they are guilty, they will provide more 
details in their alibi (M = 5.47, SD = 1.45) and provide details even if they are 
uncertain of their accuracy (M = 5.27, SD = 1.33). However, they believed that the 
extent to which suspects will confess to committing the crime is low (M = 2.98, SD = 
1.45).  
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Table 5.7 
Participants’ Explanation for Their Belief About the Extent to Which Interviewer’s Presumed Guilt Might Affect What This Interviewer Says and How 
S/He Behaves During This Interview   
Note. Label 1 is not included because no participant chose this response option. * = number of participants from total sample (N = 332) who chose this response option (brackets 
include percentage of participants who chose this response option out of the total sample). ** = frequency of participants who provided this explanation out of total number of 
participants who chose the response option (brackets include percentage of participants who provided this explanation out of the total number of participants who chose the response 
option). Participants could provide an explanation of more than one type.  
Explanation 
 
The extent to which interviewer’s presumed guilt might affect what 
this interviewer says and how s/he behaves during this interview 
(1=does not at all affect the interviewer’s words and behaviours, 7=significantly 
affects the interviewer’s words and behaviour) 
2 
7* (2.1%)  
3 
13 (3.9%) 
4 
33 (9.9%) 
5 
94 (28.3%) 
6 
88 (26.5%) 
7 
97 (29.2%) 
The interviewer will conduct harsher interviews  
 
1** (14.3%) 4 (30.8%) 6 (18.2%) 50 (53.2%) 55 (62.5%) 44 (45.4%) 
General reports that bias affects the interviewer’s behaviour without 
explaining how  
 
3 (42.9%) 7 (53.8%) 10 (30.3%) 26 (27.7%) 19 (21.6%) 33 (34.0%) 
The interviewer will focus on and/or interpret suspects’ alibi and/or 
behaviour in accordance with the belief and/or ignore contradicting 
information 
 
2 (28.6%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (18.2%) 22 (23.4%) 17 (19.3%) 24 (24.7%) 
Depends on different factors (e.g., the interviewer; existing evidence) 
 
0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 11 (33.3%) 3 (3.2%) 1 (1.1%) 2 (2.1%) 
Interviewers are trained to avoid biased interviews and will not communicate 
the suspicion to the suspect  
 
2 (28.6%) 5 (38.5%) 9 (27.3%) 9 (9.6%) 2 (2.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
Report is about effects on suspect, not the interviewer 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.3%) 6 (6.2%) 
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Discussion 
 Using a questionnaire administrated in three countries, the present research 
examined lay people’s beliefs about factors that may hinder innocent suspects’ ability 
to provide convincing alibis. In general, participants’ responses indicated that they did 
not believe that innocent suspects may provide inaccurate alibis, but that when this 
happens, impaired memory processes are likely to be the reason. With respect to the 
factor of interviewers’ presumption of guilt, participants mostly believed that 
interviewers usually begin to form an opinion regarding the veracity of suspects 
before or while suspects are providing their alibi for the first time. Also, participants 
tended to believe that a presumption of guilt can affect how interviewers conduct an 
interview with suspects. Finally, while participants tended to believe that a 
presumption of guilt would make suspects provide more details even if they are 
uncertain about their accuracy, they did not tend to believe that a guilt presumption 
would make suspects confess to the crime. Below we discuss these findings in depth 
and review how they fit with existing research.  
Innocent Suspects’ Alibi Provision and Impaired Memory Processes 
The most noteworthy finding concerning participants’ beliefs about the 
qualities of suspect alibis was that participants believed that while innocent suspects 
are more informative with respect to specific details, guilty suspects more often try to 
be informative in general. Specifically, participants tended to believe that, on average, 
setting, temporal, object, and person-description details are provided only slightly 
more in alibis of innocent suspects than guilty suspects. Research has shown that, 
compared with statements of guilty suspects, statements of innocent suspects do 
contain more temporal and setting details, as well as details concerning people and 
objects (Vrij, 2008a; see also DePaulo et al., 2003). However, when participants freely 
reported that suspects provide a generally detailed alibi to appear convincing, this was 
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reported more often with respect to guilty suspects than innocent suspects. Most 
participants also believed that the more details provided in the alibi, the less likely it is 
to be truthful. This belief contrasts with existing findings, according to which innocent 
suspects’ statements are more informative than those of guilty suspects (e.g. DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008a), and innocent suspects tend more than guilty ones to employ 
an alibi-provision strategy of providing a detailed statement (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Strömwall, 
Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). Why would participants think that liars prefer to provide 
many details to appear truthful and that they may even succeed in doing so? It may be 
that participants believed that with the use of two strategies they mentioned—making 
up details and preparing an alibi—liars can make their lie “work”. However, although 
participants mentioned that a lie is difficult to keep up with, they may not fully realise 
how difficult it is, and that even when planning a lie, it is easier for liars to keep their 
deceptive statement short (Strömwall et al., 2006; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010).  
Participants’ responses indicated that they were reluctant to acknowledge that 
innocent suspects’ alibis may unintentionally include incorrect details. However, 
when examining the explanations of participants as to why they believed that innocent 
suspects’ alibis may contain inaccurate details, a more encouraging picture emerged. 
Specifically, participants acknowledged that memory processes may fail innocent 
suspects when attempting to report accurately from memory. Participants correctly 
(see Burke et al., 2007; Tourangeau, 2000) acknowledged that innocent suspects may 
not encode relevant event details because of not realising the importance of 
remembering the event for a later reporting. Participants also mentioned that event 
details may be forgotten over time (see Pertzov et al., 2017; Tourangeau, 2000), and 
that innocent suspects may provide inaccurate details as a result of interviewing 
techniques (see Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; see Frenda, Nichols & Loftus, 2011 for 
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a review). Similar explanations were provided by participants when explaining why 
they believed that a detailed alibi may indicate that the suspect is guilty (that is, 
because memory failures may prevent innocent suspects from being informative).  
Altogether, findings from the first part of the survey suggest that participants 
generally failed to acknowledge that innocent suspects may unintentionally provide 
inaccurate alibis. Nevertheless, participants did demonstrate an understanding that 
innocent suspects may provide inaccurate details due to impaired memory processes.  
Beliefs about Interviewers’ Presumption of Guilt 
Participants’ belief that interviewers’ guilt presumption may lead them to conduct 
harsher interviews, use leading questions, and pressure the suspect to confess aligns 
with findings of existing research (e.g., Hill et al., 2008; Kassin et al., 2003). This 
finding suggests that lay people may not disregard suspects’ claim that the interviewer 
to whom they provided their alibi had treated them in accordance with a guilt belief 
before they provided their alibi. Although we did not examine differences in responses 
by country, it is worth mentioning Sweden as an exception in the matter of 
presumption of guilt in the legal system. In accordance with the Swedish Code of 
Judicial Procedure, police officers in Sweden must inform suspects at the outset of the 
interview of the degree of suspicion (see Granhag, Clemens, & Strömwall, 2009). This 
procedure is different from the implicit communication of guilt presumption that we 
asked participants for their beliefs about. Future research may specifically examine 
beliefs of the Swedish public about the effects of the formal practice of informing 
suspects of level of suspicion versus effects of more subjective, implicit presumption 
of guilt on innocent suspects’ alibis.  
Participants additionally tended to believe that when suspects feel that they are 
being interviewed by a guilt-presumptive interviewer, they would be more 
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forthcoming and not confess to a crime. On the one hand, existing research has not 
found evidence of effects of interviewers’ guilt presumption on the completeness and 
accuracy of alibis of innocent suspects (Portnoy et al., see Experiment 3). On the other 
hand, findings demonstrated lack of correlation between guilt presumption and 
suspects’ tendency to confess to committing a crime or deny involvement in a crime 
(Hill et al., 2008). Thus, participants’ beliefs about suspects’ reaction to a guilt-
presumptive interviewer partly align with existing research. 
Altogether, results from the second part of the survey suggest that participants 
realised that interviewers may form a belief about suspects’ guilt prior to hearing their 
alibi for the first time and that this belief may affect how interviews conduct suspect 
interviews. As a more general future line of research, it may be interesting to compare 
beliefs of police interviewers with those of members of the general public about the 
topics of memory limitations and presumption of guilt in the context of innocent 
suspects’ alibis. 
Implications, Limitations and Future Directions 
The present findings suggest that when evaluating the credibility of suspect 
alibis, prospective jurors may acknowledge that alibis are sometimes provided in a 
harmful environment. However, the factors examined in the present research may not 
be the first factors to come to their mind when evaluating alibis, especially not the 
factor of impaired memory processes in the context of innocent suspects’ alibis. 
Accordingly, for the sake of innocent suspects who fail to provide a convincing alibi, 
judges must not prevent memory and interview experts from discussing relevant 
research findings in court on the grounds that “such research would tell jurors little 
that they did not already know” (Kassam et al., 2009, p. 552).  
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Such implications are relevant only for countries whereby verdicts are reached 
by jurors. Nonetheless, the present findings are also relevant to any country whereby 
information gathering from suspects is necessary, as these findings can inform the 
development of interviewing techniques. For example, assuming that participants’ 
beliefs about the behaviour of suspects reflect how they would behave as suspects 
during police interviews (as was also suggested by some responses), the finding that 
they believed that a detailed statement is more likely to be deceptive suggests that, as 
truth-tellers during interviews, they would not try to provide a detailed statement. 
Accordingly, when interviewing suspects and instructing them to provide a detailed 
statement, it may be crucial to also explain to them the importance of being 
informative, for example, for the course of the investigation and the possibility of 
exonerating them as suspects by having more details to verify. 
Several limitations are associated with the present research. Firstly, although 
our findings demonstrate what lay people believe and know about the factors of 
memory failures and guilt presumption in the context of alibis, we did not ask 
participants whether they would consider these factors when evaluating alibis’ 
credibility. Future research may focus on this specific question. Secondly, it may be 
that the response options for some questions limited the range of responses, even 
though participants were provided with free space throughout and at the end of the 
questionnaire to express any thoughts they may have had. Future similar 
questionnaires may include additional response options to those used in the present 
research while allowing participants to freely express their beliefs.  
The present research was the first to examine the extent to which lay members 
of the public are familiar with factors that may hamper suspects’ ability to provide a 
convincing alibi, ultimately leading to innocent suspects being tried in court. 
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Alongside developing interviewing techniques that would maximise innocent 
suspects’ alibi provision, further research should be devoted to examining the extent 
to which (prospective) jury members are informed of the potentially harmful 
atmosphere in which suspects provide their initial alibi.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
The aim of the current programme of work was to contribute to the neglected 
yet growing body of research on alibi provision by innocent suspects by exploring 
how this process of provision of alibis may be improved for both innocent suspects as 
well as police interviewers. The present research explored the effects of memory-
based reporting instructions on the memory output of innocent suspects when 
providing an alibi to convince police interviewers of their innocence as well as when 
reporting about alibi-corroborating evidence. In addition, the present thesis examined 
the effects of one aspect of suspect interviewing that may hamper innocent suspects’ 
memory output during alibi provision, namely an interviewer’s presumption of guilt. 
Specifically, in three experimental studies and one exploratory survey, I examined the 
effects of pre-alibi instructions on memory output by innocent mock suspects 
providing an alibi about their past actions (Chapter 2: Experiment 1) as well as 
evidence that may corroborate their alibi (Chapter 3: Experiment 2). Next, I examined 
how a presumption of guilt communicated to innocent mock suspects affected their 
memory output during alibi provision (Chapter 4: Experiment 3). Finally, I examined 
the beliefs and knowledge of members of the general public regarding alibi generation 
and provision by suspects, memory failures as a reason for inaccuracies in innocent 
suspects’ alibis, and the issue of interviewers’ presumption of guilt (Chapter 5: 
Survey). In the General Discussion chapter, I summarise and discuss the key findings 
in terms of theoretical and practical implications, and examine the contribution of the 
findings with respect to the wider literature. In addition, I discuss the limitations of the 
present thesis and suggest routes for further research.  
Summary of Findings 
In Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), the effects of memory-based pre-alibi 
instructions on innocent mock suspects’ memory output when reporting about past 
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actions were examined. Drawing on memory literature, these instructions were 
specifically designed to affect the informativeness and accuracy of innocent mock 
suspects’ memory output during alibi provision. Experiment 1 demonstrated the 
effects of instructions emphasising the importance of accuracy and informativeness of 
the provided information. Specifically, the findings showed that pre-alibi instructions 
that guided innocent mock suspects to provide an accurate and informative alibi 
yielded the largest number of correct details (i.e., quantity measure) compared with 
control condition, without compromising accuracy rates. In contrast, the quantity of 
information provided and accuracy rates of alibis of guilty mock suspects did not 
differ between the pre-alibi instructions conditions; this was also true when the 
examination was only of parts of the alibis that, to report, guilty mock suspects could 
rely solely on their memory (i.e., reports about first three tasks completed). In 
Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), I sought to expand Experiment 1 by examining whether 
memory-based pre-alibi instructions enhanced innocent mock suspects’ memory 
output when reporting about past actions but also about alibi-corroborating evidence. 
Innocent mock suspects who were asked to report accurately and informatively about 
their past actions (task instructions condition) or about their past actions and alibi-
corroborating evidence (enhanced instructions condition) provided a larger number of 
correct details for their entire alibis than did control participants. However, we did not 
find that the enhanced instructions led to an increase in the reporting of correct details 
for the entire alibis compared with participants in the task instructions condition. With 
respect to accuracy rates, these did not differ between the pre-alibi instructions 
conditions. Additionally, the number of correct of evidence details provided and their 
accuracy did not differ between the pre-alibi instructions conditions. Experiment 2 
thus replicated Experiment 1 by demonstrating the enhanced performance in the task 
instructions condition (i.e., the combined accuracy and informativeness pre-alibi 
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instructions condition in Experiment 1) in terms of number of correct details provided 
compared with simply requesting participants to report about what had happened. 
Additionally, Experiment 2 provided support for the enhancing effects of the 
enhanced instructions with respect to number of correct details provided overall 
compared with control condition.  
In Experiment 3 (Chapter 4), I explored the effects of interviewers’ 
presumption of guilt communicated to innocent mock suspects via the interviewer’s 
words and behaviour on participants’ memory output during alibi provision. Neither 
the quantity of correct details provided nor accuracy rates of alibis differed between 
the interviewer-belief conditions. Thus, in Experiment 3, no evidence was found that 
interviewers’ guilt presumption affects innocent suspects’ memory output when 
providing an alibi during short interactions.  
 Chapter 5 presented the findings of a survey administrated among lay people 
in the United Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden. In this survey, we examined participants’ 
beliefs and knowledge about impaired memory processes as a possible reason for 
inaccurate alibis of innocent suspects and the issue of interviewers’ presumption of 
guilt. Participants did not tend to believe that innocent suspects may unintentionally 
provide inaccurate details, but they did acknowledge that if they do, this may be due 
to impaired memory processes. With respect to interviewers’ guilt presumption, 
participants tended to believe that interviewers usually begin to form an opinion 
regarding the guilt/innocence of suspects prior to hearing their alibi for the first time 
but also while suspects are providing their alibi for the first time. A majority of 
participants also believed that if interviewers approach a suspect interview already 
presuming guilt, this presumption could affect how interviewers conduct the 
interview. Finally, while participants tended to believe that interviewers’ presumption 
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of guilt would make suspects more talkative, they did not tend to believe that this 
would make them confess to a crime.  
Theoretical Implications in Context of Existing Literature  
The first step that may lead to the prosecution of suspects is an investigative 
interview conducted with them to discover their potential knowledge about and 
involvement in an alleged crime. It is thus surprising how little research has been 
conducted specifically on the process of alibi provision. Even less research has been 
dedicated to developing interview protocols and testing whether they may improve the 
process of alibi provision. Most research on the generation and provision of 
statements by people who might have been involved in a crime has concerned 
eyewitnesses and victims (e.g., Fisher, 1995; Fisher & Geiselman, 2010; Gabbert, 
Hope, & Fisher, 2009). However, while providing inaccurate information by an 
eyewitness or a crime victim may not be harmful to them, the provision of inaccurate 
information by suspects may be perceived by the interviewer as indicative of 
deception (Burke, Turtle, & Olson, 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; Olson & Charman, 
2012). Ultimately, the unintentional provision of inaccurate or incomplete information 
by suspects may contribute to the wrongful conviction of innocent people (Crozier et 
al., 2017; Wells et al., 1998). 
It is important to discuss the statistical power of the experiments of the current 
thesis to evaluate the reliability of the findings obtained. In Experiment 1, the effect 
size obtained for the main effect of the pre-alibi instructions on quantity measure 
among innocent mock suspects (f = 0.37) was medium-to-large (Cohen, 1988). 
Moreover, the effect size for the finding that quantity measure was higher in the 
combined pre-alibi instructions condition than in control condition was very large (d = 
0.99; Cohen, 1969). With respect to the main effect of the pre-alibi instructions on 
number of overall correct details provided in Experiment 2, the effect size (f = 0.33) 
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was medium (Cohen, 1988). Finally, the effect sizes of the finding of Experiment 2 
whereby quantity measure was higher in both the enhanced instructions condition (d = 
0.72) and task instructions condition (d = 0.67) compared with control condition were 
of medium-to-large and medium magnitude, respectively (Cohen, 1969). Obtaining 
effect sizes of this magnitude allows us to suggest that pre-alibi instructions are 
effective (in this research, at least) in terms of increasing suspects’ memory output. 
Nevertheless, Experiment 1 was clearly underpowered for obtaining the interaction 
between the pre-alibi instructions and participants’ veracity. Specifically, the actual 
effect sizes observed for the non-significant interaction between the pre-alibi 
instructions and veracity for the quantity measure (f = 0.16) and for the accuracy rates 
(f = 0.03) were both lower than the effect size we could expect to detect according to 
the post-hoc sensitivity analysis (f = 0.24), and the sample size required to detect 
interaction effects such as those that we predicted is typically larger than that required 
to detect main effects (see, e.g., Durand, 2013).. Given the low power of Experiment 1 
(as a result of the small sample size), the obtained effect size estimates are less reliable 
than what might be obtained with bigger sample sizes.  
In contrast to Experiment 1, although the sample size of Experiment 2 was not 
particularly large, the Experiment was likely not underpowered since the JZS BF10 
was 2.36, indicating that the obtained data were approximately 2.36 times more likely 
under the alternative hypotheses compared with the null hypotheses, providing 
anecdotal (Wagenmakers et al., 2018) evidence in favor of the alternative hypotheses 
for number of overall correct details provided. In addition, the findings of 
Experiments 2 that the number of correct evidence details provided did not differ 
between the pre-alibi instructions condition and of Experiment 3 that number of total 
correct details provided did not differ between interviewer-belief conditions were 
likely not due to (substantial) low power. This notion is supported by the analyses 
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according to which the JZS BF01 were 2.02 and 3.90 (Experiment 2 and 3, 
respectively), indicating that the obtained data were approximately 2.02 and 3.90 
(respectively) times more likely under the null hypotheses compared with the 
alternative hypotheses, providing anecdotal and moderate (respectively; Wagenmakers 
et al., 2018) evidence in favor of the null hypotheses for quantity of correct 
evidence/overall details provided, respectively. Thus, in general, the findings of the 
present research are informative and reliable, but all experiments conducted as part of 
the present thesis should be replicated using larger sample sizes.  
The present research is the first to develop and test memory-based reporting 
instructions (cf. retrieval cues; Leins & Charman, 2016) tailored specifically to be 
used during interviews with suspects. The findings of Experiments 1 and 2 are 
important as they suggest that innocent suspects’ memory output may be enhanced by 
guiding them to provide an accurate and informative alibi. The findings of Experiment 
1 that the alibis of guilty mock suspects were not affected by the pre-alibi instructions 
are specifically important as they suggest that memory-based reporting instructions 
may not assist guilty suspects to improve their accounts. With respect to the findings 
of Experiment 2 that the enhanced instructions did not result with the largest number 
of correct evidence details or of entire alibis, these suggest that the nuances of pre-
alibi instructions presented to innocent suspects are important. Indeed, asking innocent 
suspects to report accurately and informatively about alibi-corroborating evidence was 
just not enough to encourage them to provide more details of this type. These findings 
stress the need to continue and study interviewing techniques that may actively 
improve innocent suspects’ memory output. 
Across Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the present research is also the first to study 
suspect alibis in terms of the quantity and accuracy rates of the discrete details 
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provided. Previous research on alibi provision has estimated alibi accuracy by testing 
whether participants reported in their alibi that, during the critical time, they 
participated in the critical event (vs. engaged in another activity; Leins & Charman, 
2016). Alternatively, alibi accuracy was estimated by examining whether participants 
changed details across two alibis provided during two separate occasions about the 
same time frame (Olson & Charman, 2012). While the examination of memory reports 
in terms of the quantity of the provided information and accuracy rates of details has 
been conducted previously in the context of eyewitness statements (e.g., Hope, Mullis, 
& Gabbert, 2013; Pansky & Nemets, 2012), no such examination has been conducted 
in the context of suspect alibis. When examining memory reports, and specifically, 
freely-recalled information, analysing the quantity and accuracy rates of details 
provided is the most appropriate approach (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; see also 
Goldsmith, 2017). Specifically in the context of suspect alibis, when an alibi is 
investigated, its details are compared against the ground truth available to the 
interviewer. Studying alibis’ completeness and quality by directly comparing between 
the suspect’s report about this event and event details provides a more naturalistic 
examination of alibis. While the ground truth may be difficult to establish in real-life 
investigation, a more complete and accurate alibi provided as a result of pre-alibi 
instructions nevertheless decreases the danger of including incorrect information that 
may be perceived by alibi evaluators as indication of lying.  
Despite the differences between previous research and the present thesis in the 
manner by which memory accuracy was examined, all of these examinations of alibi 
provision are important to develop the understudied body of research concerning alibi 
generation and provision by innocent suspects. Especially relevant to the present 
thesis is Leins and Charman’s (2016) research, in which they demonstrated that 
memory-based interview prompts (i.e., cued retrieval) may enhance alibi accuracy. 
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The interview prompts used in Leins and Charman (2016) were intended to affect the 
memory search of participants such that it would be in accordance with the specific 
cue presented. However, the pre-alibi instructions used in Experiments 1 and 2 in the 
current thesis were intended to affect innocent suspects’ memory reporting, namely 
participants’ decision of what and how much information to report after this 
information has been retrieved. Future research may combine the two interview 
techniques to examine the effects of pre-alibi instructions with the use of specific cued 
retrieval of different types on suspects’ memory output. Despite the difference 
between the interview prompts used in the present research and in Leins and Charman 
(2016), all of these interview prompts were designed based on memory theory—an 
important approach when aiming to improve innocent suspects’ memory output during 
interviews.  
Some deception detection methods may lead innocent suspects to provide 
more information in their statements. For example, before interviewees provide their 
statement, presenting them with a model statement—a truthful account about an event 
unrelated to that they are interviewed about—should inform them of the level of detail 
that interviewers expect them to provide (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 
2015). Research has shown that providing innocent and guilty mock suspects with a 
model statement before providing their statement can lead them to provide more 
information compared with not providing them with such an interview prompt (e.g., 
Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij, 2014; Leal, et al., 2015; Porter et al., 2018). In addition, 
Nahari, Vrij, and Fisher (2014b) demonstrated that to encourage innocent suspects to 
provide more verifiable details, they should be explicitly informed that the alibi 
evaluator intends to examine the verifiability of their alibi. However, because these 
deception detection methods were designed primarily to elicit cues to deception (cf. to 
enhance innocent suspects’ memory output), the quality of the increased amount of 
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information resulting from the use of these methods was not examined. Such 
examination is mandatory to discover whether these deception detection methods can 
be used as a memory-enhancing interview technique. In fact, in Experiment 2 in the 
present thesis, it may be that informing participants in the enhanced instructions 
condition that their alibi would be verified would have caused them to provide more 
(complete and accurate) evidence details compared with participants in the remaining 
conditions. This should be examined in future research which includes an enhanced 
instructions condition in which participants are additionally informed that the alibi 
evaluator intends to check the verifiability of their alibis.  
While some deception detection methods may potentially be used as a 
memory-enhancing interview technique, it may not be feasible to rely on cues to 
deception when memory-based reporting instructions are used. This notion is 
demonstrated by the findings of Experiment 1 whereby the pre-alibi instructions did 
not affect guilty mock suspects’ memory output, suggesting that when such 
instructions are used, guilty suspects may not provide more detailed alibis that include 
more cues to deception (see Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). Yet, while not 
increasing the memory output of the guilty mock suspects, none of the pre-alibi 
instructions used in Experiment 1 compromised the quantity of correct details 
provided by them (nor the accuracy of the details they provided). Using memory 
enhancing interview techniques and deception detection methods may both lead to the 
same desired goal of determining whether or not the suspect was involved in the 
crime.  However, a subtle yet important difference between interview techniques 
aimed to increase innocent suspects’ memory output and those aimed to detect 
deception suggests that memory-based interview techniques may need to undergo 
some changes for these techniques to be potentially used as a means to detect 
deception. Specifically, memory-enhancing interview techniques focus more on 
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guiding innocent suspects to provide an accurate and informative statement that may 
promote their exoneration. In contrast, deception detection methods focus more on 
eliciting cues to deception that may assist interviewers with deciding whether a 
suspect is lying when denying involvement in a crime (Vrij, 2008b). Nevertheless, if 
changes are made in memory-based interview techniques so that these can be used to 
elicit cues to deception, the purpose of eliciting accurate and complete information 
must not be compromised by the purpose of detecting deception. More specifically, as 
evident from findings of the current thesis (i.e., Experiments 1 and 2), the nuances of 
the instructions provided to suspects are crucial when attempting to increase innocent 
suspects’ memory output. Thus, when formulating and using deception detection 
methods, these nuances must not be neglected. 
The present research is also the first to examine the effects of interviewers’ 
guilt presumption on the completeness and accuracy of suspect alibis. Previous 
research has examined and demonstrated the effects of this guilt presumption on the 
behaviour of the interviewer during suspect interviews, and, consequently, on the 
judgment made by neutral perceivers of the veracity of the interviewed mock suspects 
(Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008; Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). The present 
research expands these previous findings by showing that, when it comes to short 
interactions with a guilt-presumptive interviewer, innocent suspects succeed in 
remaining accurate and informative when providing their alibi. These findings are not 
surprising when considering that innocent suspects typically believe that their 
innocence can set them free (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Kassin & 
Norwick, 2004; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010), and this belief likely led participants 
in the guilty-belief condition to be as informative as participants in the innocent-belief 
condition. Thus, the findings of Experiment 2 embody yet another demonstration of 
the confidence innocent suspects have in the power of their innocence.  
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Finally, previous surveys conducted among lay people on suspect interviews 
examined participants’ beliefs regarding cues that may differentiate truthful from 
deceptive suspects (e.g., Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Masip & Herrero, 
2015). The survey conducted in the present research is the first to examine lay 
people’s knowledge and beliefs regarding factors concerning the interview process 
itself with respect to how these factors might have prevented innocent suspects from 
providing a convincing alibi to begin with.  
Combined, the findings reported in the present thesis suggest that further 
efforts should be dedicated to studying the process of alibi provision by innocent (and 
guilty) suspects. In particular, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that when the goal of 
using interview techniques is enhancing the memory output of innocent suspects (cf. 
deception detection), pre-alibi instructions should be developed with memory theory 
taken into consideration.  
Practical Implications 
The introduction of the PEACE interview model (Central Planning and 
Training Unit, 1992a, 1992b) was undoubtedly a crucial first step in improving the 
interview process of suspects in the UK. The change from the confession-seeking 
interrogation to the ethical interview in order to gather information was a positive step 
in attempting to decrease instances of miscarriages of justice. Combined with allowing 
suspects to present their version of events and asking them to tell the interviewer 
everything they did on the critical time frame of the alleged crime, this change likely 
improved the process of case investigation (Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Shawyer, Milne, 
& Bull, 2009). However, the findings of the present thesis (Experiments 1 and 2) 
suggest that merely asking suspects to describe events in their own words is not 
enough, and that interviewers may need to present suspects with specific memory-
based reporting instructions to guide and enhance their memory output. Yet, it is too 
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early to determine based on the present thesis what might be the optimal way to ask 
suspects to report about their past actions and whereabouts when providing an alibi. 
Further research is needed to structure the best memory-based pre-alibi instructions. 
The present findings do suggest that asking innocent suspects to provide an accurate 
and informative alibi should benefit them compared with not asking them to do so. 
Such pre-alibi instructions do not require specific training and should not facilitate 
guilty suspects’ alibi provision. 
At a first glance, Experiment 3 may seem to suggest that if a guilt-presumptive 
interviewer conducts interviews with suspects, this may have no effect on innocent 
suspects’ memory output in terms of the completeness and accuracy of their alibis. 
However, it would be a mistake to conclude from these findings that interviewers do 
not have to follow the recommendation to avoid guilt presumptions. Interviewers are 
unlikely to change their initial guilt belief even if an innocent suspect behaved in 
contrast to an interviewer’s guilt expectation (see Darley & Fazio, 1980), and the 
persistence of this guilt belief may affect further interactions with this suspect. For 
example, after a guilt-presumptive interviewer obtained the suspect’s alibi, s/he is 
likely to investigate the suspect’s story. The interviewer may discover during the 
investigation that the information that the (innocent) suspect provided during the 
interview was correct. However, instead of attributing the suspect’s verbal behaviour 
to the suspect’s actual innocence (see, e.g., Darley & Fazio, 1980), the interviewer 
may continue to believe that this suspect is guilty and continue to interview him/her 
with the belief that s/he is guilty when further interacting with this suspect. Therefore, 
when it comes to short interactions with a guilt-presumptive interviewer, the findings 
of Experiment 3 should be seen as strictly exploratory in revealing the nature of 
innocent suspects’ behaviour when interviewed by a guilt-presumptive interviewer.  
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The findings of Experiment 3 provide some indirect support for the long-
existing notion that interviewers should use more open-ended than close-ended 
interview prompts (Fisher Milne, & Bull, 2011; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & 
Holland, 1985, 1986). Close-ended interview prompts are usually suggestive, confine 
the rememberer to choose between a limited number of response options presented by 
the interviewer and to reply to each question, and encourage guessing (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996; see also Lamb et al., 2003). In contrast, when open-ended interview 
prompts are used, rememberers are free to produce their own answers and report only 
the information they are confident that they remember (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
Consequently, open-ended interview prompts encourage the provision of a narrative 
response which is more complete and accurate compared with yes/no or forced-choice 
questions (Fisher et al., 2011; Geiselman et al., 1985; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; 
Lamb et al., 2003). In Experiment 3, although some participants provided their alibi to 
a guilt-presumptive interviewer, they were given the opportunity to freely provide 
their account, ultimately providing an alibi as informative and accurate as that of rest 
of participants. Thus, while a guilt presumption may be difficult to avoid even with 
training (see, e.g., Shawyer & Milne, 2015), Experiment 3 suggests that using open-
ended interview techniques may protect innocent people from the effects of 
interviewers communicating their guilt presumption (although this was not directly 
tested in the current thesis). Future research may examine how pre-alibi instructions 
and interviewers’ guilt presumption affect innocent suspects’ memory output when 
these factors are manipulated together. Also, participants in the present thesis were 
only asked to provide specific information in the form of an alibi. Thus, the effects of 
the pre-alibi instructions and guilt presumption should be examined together (and 
separately) as part of a fuller interview, whereby suspects are asked to provide an alibi 
and then reply to subsequent questions.   
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The findings of Experiment 3 are more relevant for real-life interviews in which 
interviewers unintentionally communicate a guilt belief to suspects. However, in some 
cases, even if interviewers do not use accusatory interview techniques, they may be 
required by law to inform suspects of the degree of suspicion they are under. Such is 
the case in Sweden, where in accordance with the Swedish Code of Judicial 
Procedure, police officers must inform suspects at the outset of the interview of the 
degree of suspicion (see Granhag, Clemens, & Strömwall, 2009). This procedure is 
different from the implicit communication of guilt presumption examined in the 
current thesis. It is first necessary to determine whether the fact that interviewers 
inform suspects of the degree of suspicion they are under affects the behaviour of the 
interviewers. Additionally, it could be examined how informing suspects of level of 
suspicion affects their memory output when the interviewer who provides this 
information is behaving in an innocence-presumptive, guilt-presumptive, or neutral 
manner.  
Turning to the findings of the survey, these are important in light of the complex 
nature of jury service, whereby citizens unfamiliar with legal matters are expected to 
assess the credibility of suspects’ alibis while exposed to a variety of other 
information (Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Greene & Bornstein, 2000; Porter & ten 
Brinke, 2009). The finding that participants did not believe that innocent suspects may 
provide inaccurate alibis embodies another demonstration of prospective jurors’ lack 
of understanding of issues concerning psychology and law and is consistent with 
previous findings that demonstrated this poor knowledge by lay people (e.g., Benton, 
Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006; Simons & Chabris, 2011, 2012). For 
example, Benton et al. (2006) found that agreement between 111 jurors from the 
United States and 64 eyewitness experts regarding items concerning eyewitness issues 
(e.g., memory, weapon focus, and elderly witnesses) was obtained only on four (13%) 
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of 30 items. This finding suggests that eyewitness experts’ testimony may be required 
in court to educate jurors regarding correct information concerning eyewitness 
testimony. Because incorrect information provided by suspects may be perceived as 
an indication that the suspect is lying (Burke et al., 2007; Dysart & Strange, 2012; 
Olson & Charman, 2012), the findings of the survey conducted in the present thesis 
add to this existing body of research by demonstrating that jurors may also benefit 
from being explicitly informed that innocent suspects may provide inaccurate details 
despite being motivated to be accurate. The finding that participants believed that 
interviewers form a belief regarding suspects’ guilt/innocence prior to meeting them 
but at the same time believed that interviewers may form this belief during the 
interview suggests that jurors may also need to be explicitly informed that suspects 
sometimes provide their alibi to a guilt-presumptive interviewer; this should be done 
especially when suspects complain that their interviewer treated them as if they had 
already decided that they were guilty, just as was the case with Ronald Cotton (see 
Chapter 1).  
 In sum, the findings reported in the current thesis are encouraging in 
demonstrating that some types of pre-alibi instructions may assist innocent suspects 
with providing accurate and informative alibis and interviewers with obtaining 
complete and accurate reports from suspects. However, the need for further research 
prevents us from providing direct recommendations of how to apply the present 
findings into real-life suspect interviews. At present, it may be suggested that 
interviewers continue to allow suspects to provide a free account of events, in their 
own words, without being interrupted and without giving them feedback on the details 
as they provide them. Such open-ended prompts may also act as a safeguard when the 
interviewer approaches the interview already believing that the suspect is guilty. For 
the sake of innocent suspects who fail to provide a convincing alibi, judges must not 
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prevent memory and interview experts from discussing relevant research findings in 
court on the grounds that “such research would tell jurors little that they did not 
already know” (Kassam, Gilbert, Swencionis, & Wilson, 2009, p. 552). As jurors play 
a crucial role in determining the fate of innocent people, they should be educated as 
much as possible prior to fulfilling their duty.   
Methodological Considerations and Future Directions 
Although the findings of the current thesis are generally reliable, due to several 
limitations outlined below these findings should be treated with caution.  
 In Experiments 1 and 2, calculating and analysing the quantity and accuracy 
rates of participants’ alibis enabled us to conclude regarding the effects of the pre-alibi 
instructions on participants’ memory output. However, the present findings do not 
inform us regarding why the pre-alibi instructions produced the effects they did. For 
example, since we did not calculate participants report criterion, we cannot conclude 
whether monitoring and control processes produced the obtained results. 
Alternatively, it may be that the higher quantity measure obtained among innocent 
mock suspects in the accuracy and informativeness instructions condition (Experiment 
1) resulted from these participants engaging in a more thorough memory search 
compared with control innocent mock suspects. Not knowing how the underlying 
mechanisms operated to produce participants’ alibis does not limit our conclusions. 
Yet, a better understanding of the process of alibi generation and provision may be 
obtained by learning about the operation of mechanisms that produce suspects’ 
memory output. To this end, future research on alibi generation should, for example, 
develop a paradigm that would allow the calculation of innocent (and guilty) suspects’ 
report criterion to further examine the metacognitive monitoring and control processes 
underlying alibi provision. This would require asking participants to report (i) their 
confidence in the correctness of the details reported; (ii) the details they retrieved but 
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withheld (i.e., chose not to report), and; (iii) their confidence in the correctness of 
these withheld details (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). 
The present findings demonstrate the importance of including several 
experimental and control conditions to discover what aspects of a manipulation lead to 
the enhancement of participants’ memory output. For example, it is yet to be 
determined whether the enhanced performance in both experimental conditions in 
Experiment 2 compared with the control condition was due to the fact that these 
experimental conditions instructed participants to report about certain types of details 
(i.e., past actions and corroborating evidence), the fact that they guided participants 
how to provide accurate and informative alibis, or both. In hindsight, we should have 
included in Experiment 2 a condition in which participants would only be asked to 
report accurately and informatively about alibi-corroborating evidence, just as there 
was a condition in which participants were only asked to report accurately and 
informatively about their past actions. Including this individual evidence instructions 
condition would align with the procedure of Experiment 1, in which there were a 
combined accuracy and informativeness pre-alibi instructions condition as well as 
individual accuracy and informativeness instructions conditions. It would also align 
with the procedure of Leins and Charman (2016), who included three conditions of 
recall cue to examine their effects on alibi accuracy: a time-only cue, a location-only 
cue, and a combined time-and-location cue. The inclusion of several experimental and 
control conditions is important when attempting to develop the most effective 
interviewing techniques in the hope of enhancing innocent suspects’ memory output., 
as well as when seeking to discover effects of other aspects of the interview (e.g., 
interviewers’ guilt presumption) on suspects’ verbal behaviour.   
In Experiment 1, despite obtaining non-significant interaction effects between pre-
alibi instructions and participants’ veracity on both quantity of correct details and 
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accuracy rates, we conducted further analyses to examine the effects of the pre-alibi 
instructions on the dependent measures among each veracity condition separately. 
Conducting these additional analyses was based on existing findings concerning liars’ 
and truth-tellers’ verbal behaviour during alibi provision (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2010; 
Olson & Charman, 2012; for a meta-analysis, see DePaulo et al., 2003), and was done 
following previous research that used a similar analysis strategy despite a null 
interaction (Nahari & Ben-Shakhar, 2011; Porter et al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2015). 
Although these additional analyses showed a medium-to-large (f = 0.37; Cohen, 1988) 
effect size for the pre-alibi instructions on the quantity measure among the innocent 
participants and a lack of effect of the instructions among the guilty participants, 
future research should use a larger sample size in an attempt to demonstrate the 
interaction effects that we predicted between pre-alibi instructions and veracity for the 
quantity measure. 
With respect to the survey we conducted, it cannot be determined from its findings 
whether participants would consider the factors of impaired memory processes and 
interviewers’ guilt presumption if asked to evaluate the credibility of a suspect’s alibi 
in court. Future research on lay people’s beliefs regarding issues concerning alibi 
provision may include additional questions concerning this process while examining 
participants’ decision-making process during an evaluation of a mock alibi. 
A key element of the procedures used in the experimental studies of this thesis 
(i.e., Experiments 1, 2, and 3) was that participants completed tasks under specific 
task instructions. This served our aim of comparing participants’ alibi with the critical 
event for the calculation and analyses of quantity of correct details provided and 
accuracy rates of alibis. Although the non-criminal tasks that comprised the critical 
event in each study required participants to perform day-to-day actions, the nature of 
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these actions may not represent the nature of participants’ day-to-day activities, and 
thus critical events of more realistic nature might be used to study the quantity and 
accuracy of alibis and to replicate the findings of Experiment 1. In addition, such 
research could examine the effects of the enhanced instructions used in Experiment 2 
with the inclusion of informing participants of the alibi evaluator’s intention to verify 
their alibi.  
Another aspect of the critical event (i.e., task completion) we applied in 
Experiments 1 and 3 concerns the location of the “crime”. Participants in both 
Experiments were asked to report about task completion to explain why they could not 
have committed a crime that was committed in the same location as the one in which 
they had completed the tasks. It could then be claimed that the statement that 
participants provided was not an alibi according to its common definition, that is, “A 
defense that places the defendant at the relevant time of crime in a different place than 
the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be 
the guilty party” (Black, 1990, p. 71). Although a legitimate critique, it does not 
undermine the conclusions derived from these Experiments. Importantly, in the three 
Experiments in which participants were asked to report about their past actions or/and 
corroborating evidence (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), participants provided their 
statement to exonerate themselves, and this made this statement their alibi (see Burke 
et al., 2007). Moreover, when it was crucial that participants could report about 
evidence that supported their presence in a location different from that of the “crime 
scene” (Experiment 2), we designed the procedure such that the location of task 
completion and that of the “crime” were different.  
More generally with respect to the procedures used in the present thesis, the time 
interval between the critical event and alibi provision was relatively short across all 
three experimental studies, and likely shorter than time intervals between real-life 
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crimes and interviews. In the present thesis, concluding reliable conclusions on any 
effects of the pre-alibi instructions and interviewers’ guilt presumption on 
participants’ memory output required that we eliminated any factors that could 
potentially intervene with the effects of these manipulations. The most likely factor to 
intervene would be memory contamination (see, e.g., Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 
2011; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Tourangeau, 2000), which would make it 
difficult to statistically detect effects of the different manipulations. In fact, by 
administrating the time interval we did in Experiment 3, we followed previous 
research in which the effects of interviewers’ presumption of guilt were tested (e.g., 
Hill et al., 2008). There are applied contexts in which possible suspects might be 
initially questioned at the crime scene or nearby very soon after an incident has 
occurred. Nevertheless, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 should be replicated in future research 
with longer time intervals. It may be that larger effects of the pre-alibi instructions 
would be observed then, as these instructions are intended to guide the retrieval of 
truthful rememberers.  
Due to ethical constraints, in procedures that include mock suspects, participants 
are never asked to commit a real crime, and the crimes they are accused of are not 
particularly serious (typically thefts or minor infractions of rules; e.g., Hartwig et al., 
2007; Vrij et al., 2009). For the same reasons, the present research also included 
accusations of relatively minor crimes (e.g., theft of a wallet). Due to the same ethical 
constraints, and also in accordance with previous research (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2007; 
Vrij et al., 2009), participants were told that if they succeeded or failed in convincing 
the interviewer of their innocence, they would have a chance to receive a monetary 
prize or be asked to hand-write a second alibi, respectively. Clearly, these implications 
of the interviewer’s veracity judgment of participants’ alibi are incomparable with the 
positive outcome of being exonerated or negative outcome of being imprisoned (or 
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worse) in real-life cases. With such real-life outcomes, the manipulations used in the 
three experimental studies of this thesis may result with different behaviours of 
innocent suspects than those observed in the present thesis. For example, consider an 
innocent suspect being interviewed by a guilt-presumptive interviewer who may be 
sentenced to 15 years in prison for allegedly physically harming a person. 
Experiencing the guilt-led behaviour of the interviewer and fearing the severe 
potential punishment may stun the suspect and make him less talkative compared with 
participants in the guilt-belief condition in Experiment 3, ultimately supporting the 
interviewer’s belief. Future research may examine whether the level of 
“attractiveness” of potential prizes and punishments interacts with interviewers’ 
belief-led behaviour or pre-alibi instructions in affecting innocent suspects’ memory 
output. 
Because the guilty participants in Experiment 1 were not asked to commit a real 
and serious crime, and because the implications of the interviewer’s judgment of their 
alibi were incomparable with those faced by real-life suspects, it may be that these 
participants did not believe the cover story that they told the interviewer when 
providing their alibi. However, what was more important was that participants would 
be motivated to make the interviewer believe their cover story. In real life police 
interviews, it is likely that guilty suspects often do not believe their cover story; 
instead, they are likely more occupied with making the interviewer believe their story 
and are motivated to do so to the same extent as innocent suspects (hence the findings 
showing that verbal and nonverbal strategies are used during police interviews to a 
larger extent by liars than truth-tellers; see, e.g., Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). 
Indeed, in Experiment 1, the guilty participants were motivated to convince the 
interviewer of their innocence to the same level as were the innocent participants, 
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which suggest that participants in both conditions put effort into providing a 
convincing alibi.  
Finally, prior to commencing data collection, a favourable ethical opinion was 
obtained from the Department’s Ethics Committee for all of the studies included in the 
current thesis (see Appendices and Supplemental Materials). Nevertheless, it may be 
that, in the three experimental studies, participants became anxious by being 
(surprisingly) accused of committing a crime, followed by meeting an interviewer 
(and even an accusatory one in Experiment 3) in order to provide her an alibi, and in 
Experiment 1 – by being asked to lie. However, several steps were being followed by 
me and my research assistants to ensure participants’ wellbeing during study sessions. 
Firstly, during each study session, we followed the ethical protocol which was 
reviewed by the Ethics Committee prior to data collection. This protocol detailed the 
different phases of the study and how we were to behave with participants. In 
addition, if a participant displayed any signs of discomfort during any phase of the 
study, we ensured to ask the participant if they felt comfortable to continue with the 
study session (or, we ended it immediately when the discomfort displayed by the 
participant was clear); such instances were nonetheless very rare. Finally, at the end of 
each study session, participants were thoroughly debriefed and were given all the time 
needed to ask any questions, and were provided with contact details for any later 
queries.  
To conclude, future research on alibi generation should apply more naturalistic 
procedures than those used in the present research. Nevertheless, this should not be 
done at the expense of the ability to conclude directly regarding the effects of the 
manipulations on the examined measures. Drawing more accurate conclusions on 
effects of manipulations on suspect-participants’ memory output may be achieved by 
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ensuring experimental control by eliminating factors that may intervene with effects 
of the examined manipulations.  
Conclusions 
In three experimental studies and one survey, the present thesis examined the 
process of alibi provision by innocent suspects to further understand this process and 
discover means to improve it. The findings of the present research demonstrate that 
specific memory-based reporting instructions presented to innocent suspects prior to 
alibi provision may increase their memory output. These findings suggest that such 
instructions should be designed carefully to encourage innocent suspects to provide 
information of the required type and level of completeness and quality. The present 
research also demonstrates that innocent suspects’ memory output may not be 
sensitive to a guilt-driven behaviour of the interviewer during short interviews, but 
warrants that guilt presumptions must still be avoided. Lastly, the findings of the 
survey demonstrate that lay people hold some mistaken beliefs regarding factors that 
may hamper innocent suspects’ ability to provide accurate alibis. Future research 
should establish whether lay people actually consider these factors when serving their 
jury duty. Despite the limitations outlined, the procedures used in the present thesis 
were designed to ensure that the conclusions drawn from the obtained results would 
be reliable and accurate. The current thesis paves the way to further theoretical and 
practical research on alibi provision by innocent suspects in general, and on factors 
that can improve (and might challenge) this process in particular. The future of alibi 
research is exciting yet challenging, as much additional research is required to reveal 
more factors that are involved in and underlie the provision of suspect alibis. 
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Appendix C: Favourable Ethical Opinion for Experiment 3, Chapter 4 
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Appendix D: Favourable Ethical Opinion for Survey, Chapter 5 
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Appendix E 
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Appendix F: Verbatim of the Pre-Alibi Instructions (Experiment 2) 
Task Instructions condition 
Report in a truthful manner all the details that you can remember about each 
task separately, including the sequence of actions, objects you used and anything that 
happened as part of completing each task. It is very important that the information you 
provide in your alibi is as accurate and informative as possible. 
To achieve an accurate report, make sure that every piece of information you 
report about each task is as accurate as possible. Avoid guessing about details you 
cannot remember. To achieve an informative report, make sure that every piece of 
information you report in your alibi about each task that you have just completed is as 
informative as possible, such that the Building Manager, who has not completed those 
tasks, would be able to complete them perfectly just by reading your alibi. 
Enhanced Instructions Condition 
Report in a truthful manner all the details that you can remember about each 
task separately, including the sequence of actions, objects you used and anything that 
happened as part of completing each task, as well as any evidence that supports your 
alibi. This evidence you include could be any object or person that can confirm that 
you were in a specific place at a specific time while completing the tasks. It is very 
important that the information you provide in your alibi is as accurate and informative 
as possible. 
To achieve an accurate report, make sure that every piece of information you 
report about each task, and the supporting evidence, is as accurate as possible. Avoid 
guessing about details you cannot remember. To achieve an informative report, make 
sure that every piece of information you report in your alibi about each task that you 
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have just completed is as informative as possible, such that the Building Manager, 
who has not completed those tasks, would be able to complete them perfectly just by 
reading your alibi, and would also be able to recognize the evidence just by reading 
your alibi. 
Control Condition 
When providing your alibi, report in a truthful manner all the details that you 
can remember about your time away from the lab. 
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Appendix G: Scripts Used in Each Interviewer-Belief Condition 
(Experiment 3) 
Guilty-Belief Condition 
Providing this alibi is part of our formal procedure in instances involving a theft. 
It’s a problem that we have to be in this situation. 
You will need to provide this alibi. 
But let me tell you this—your alibi will need to be a good one to convince me that you 
did not steal the wallet. 
*After preparation time* 
With this alibi you could convince me that you did not steal this wallet. 
I am not sure whether you will succeed. 
Innocent-Belief Condition 
Providing this alibi is part of our formal procedure in instances involving a theft. 
I apologize that I have to put you in this situation. 
I have to ask you to provide this alibi. 
But let me calm you down—you just need to provide your alibi to confirm that it could 
not have been you who has stolen the wallet. 
*After preparation time* 
With this alibi you can convince me that you did not steal this wallet. 
I am sure you will succeed.  
Neutral-Belief Condition 
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Providing this alibi is part of our formal procedure in instances involving a theft. 
This is a standard situation in which you are asked to provide your alibi. 
You need to provide your alibi to explain why it could not have been you who has 
stolen the wallet. 
*After preparation time* 
With this alibi you may or may not convince me that you did not steal this wallet.  
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Appendix H: English Version of The Questionnaire  
 
Perceptions and beliefs regarding suspects’ alibis 
 Participant Information Sheet 
     
Ethics Committee Reference Number:  SFEC 2017-054  
 Principal Investigator: Shiri Portnoy                                       
 Telephone:       023 9284 6317                         
 Email: shiri.portnoy@port.ac.uk  
 Supervisor: Prof Lorraine Hope 
  Telephone:       023 9284 6329 
 Email:  Lorraine.Hope@port.ac.uk                                                                                             
    
Invitation 
 We would like to invite you to take part in our research. Before you decide if you wish to 
participate, please read the information below regarding why the research is being done and 
what it would involve for you. Do contact us if anything is unclear.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
In this study, we are investigating the beliefs that members of general public, such as yourself, 
hold regarding alibis. For the purposes of the current study, an alibi is a report that suspects 
(who may be innocent or guilty) provide to an interviewer who is seeking to find out whether 
they committed a crime or not. Suspects might report things they have done, people they have 
met, and other details that relate to the time period of the alleged crime in their alibi. 
  
We are interested in your beliefs regarding the differences between alibis that are provided by 
suspects who, during an investigative interview, are being truthful while providing their alibi 
regarding their alleged involvement in a crime as opposed to suspects who are being deceitful 
during such interviews. 
 More specifically, this study is investigating the perceptions of the general public of what 
information is included in a truthful alibi as opposed to the information that is included in a 
deceptive alibi. 
  
Do I have to take part? 
No, taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide if you want to 
volunteer for the study. We will describe the study in this information sheet. If you agree to 
take part, we will then ask you to complete a consent form in the next screen. 
  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will complete one online questionnaire which is comprised of eight open- and close-
ended questions. It will take approximately 10 minutes to complete the questionnaire. There 
are no wrong or right answers – we are only interested in your beliefs. 
   
Expenses and payments  
Upon completing the questionnaire, your name will be entered to a raffle in the chance to win 
an Amazon shopping voucher worth £20. Nevertheless, your name will be kept separately 
from your responses and other details you provide in the survey to ensure anonymization. 
  
What are the possible disadvantages, burdens and risks of taking part?  
There are no foreseeable risks or disadvantages associated with participating in this study.  
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Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
The raw data (i.e., your responses to the questions in the questionnaire), which does not 
identify you, will be kept securely by the Principal. Hard copy data will be stored in a locked 
filing cabinet in a locked office (when not occupied by the Principal Investigator). Raw data 
and informed consent forms will be retained for at least 10 and 30 years respectively.  
 The data may be presented to others at academic conferences, or published as a project report, 
academic dissertation or in academic journals or book. 
 The raw data will not be passed to anyone outside the study team without your express 
written permission. The exception to this will be any regulatory authority which may have the 
legal right to access the data for the purposes of conducting an audit or enquiry, in exceptional 
cases. These agencies treat your personal data in confidence. 
We will ask you for some biographical details to produce summary statistics, but we do not 
require you to provide any information that will identify you. Data Management principles 
encourage researchers to share information they collect in the course of research, and that 
information can be held for 10 years or more, but we will never share anything that identifies 
you, as your data will be kept anonymously once collected. 
  
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
You can stop completing the questionnaire at any time without giving a reason if you do not 
wish to. If you do withdraw from the study after answering even one question, this will be 
treated as your request not to continue with your participation in the study, and we will not 
use of this data. However, if you choose to complete the entire questionnaire and submit your 
responses, it will not be possible to withdraw your data, because once collected, all data is 
kept anonymously. 
  
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a query, concern or complaint about any aspect of this study, in the first instance 
you should contact the Principle Investigator, or her supervisor. The contact details for both of 
them are detailed on page 1. 
If your concern or complaint is not resolved by the Principle Investigator or her supervisor, 
you should contact the Head of Department:   The Head of Department of Psychology, 
University of Portsmouth: Dr. James Ost, james.ost@port.ac.uk, 023 9284 6311; King Henry 
Building, King Henry 1st Street, Portsmouth, Hampshire, PO1 2DY  The University 
Complaints Officer ; 023 9284 3642; complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk  Who is funding the 
research?  
 This research is being funded by a PhD bursary to the lead researcher, Shiri Portnoy from the 
Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctorate programme – The House of Legal Psychology. None of the 
researchers or study staff will receive any financial reward by conducting this study, other 
than their normal salary / bursary as a student / staff member of the University. 
   
Who has reviewed the study? 
Research involving human participants is reviewed by an ethics committee to ensure that the 
dignity and well-being of participants is respected. This study has been reviewed by the 
Science Faculty Ethics Committee and been given favourable ethical opinion. 
  Thank you 
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for considering volunteering for 
this research. If you do agree to participate your consent will be sought; please see the consent 
form in the following screen. 
   
 
174 
 
Informed Consent Form   
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the attached information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason.  
3. I understand that data collected during this study could be requested by regulatory 
authorities. I give my permission for any authority, with a legal right of access, to view data 
which might identify me. Any promises of confidentiality provided by the researcher will be 
respected. 
4. I understand that the results of this study may be published and / or presented at meetings or 
academic conferences, and may be provided to research sponsors (Erasmus Mundus – The 
House of Legal Psychology). I give my permission for my anonymous data, which does not 
identify me, to be disseminated in this way. 
5. I agree to the data I contribute being retained for any future research that has been approved 
by a Research Ethics Committee. 
6. I confirm that I have never had to provide an alibi as part of a police interviewing.  
7. (Optional) This is my email address and by providing it I agree that it will be entered to the 
prize draw of a £20 Amazon voucher.  
I confirm that I understand that my email address will not be used for any purpose other than 
contacting me in case I win the voucher, and that I will enter the prize draw only if I complete 
the entire questionnaire. 
Please enter here your email address: 
8. I agree to take part in this study. 
Please complete the following details  
Name of Participant:       Date:                  
Please read the following information carefully.   
    
> What do we mean when we use the term “alibi” in this survey? 
   For the purposes of the current study, an alibi is a report that suspects (who may be innocent 
or guilty) provide to an interviewer who is seeking to find out whether they committed a 
crime or not. 
 In their alibis, suspects might report things they have done, people they have met, and other 
details that relate to the time period of the alleged crime.   
    
> In the questions to follow, you will encounter the terms "truth-telling suspects" and 
"lie-telling suspects".   
  
  By truth-telling suspects, we mean people who are suspected of a crime who tell the truth 
in their alibi.   
  
  In contrast: 
   By lying suspects, we mean people who are suspected of a crime who lie in their alibi. 
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The Questions 
 
1) In their alibis, suspects can report different types of details.  
  
 Below is a list of the different types of details that could be reported in alibis of any suspect. 
  
 Using the rating scale below, indicate the extent to which you think each type of detail is 
provided in alibis of lying suspects or/and truth-telling suspects. 
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This type of detail is provided...  
 
 
1 
 substantially 
more in liars’ 
alibis than in truth-
tellers' alibis 
  
  
  
 
2 
 much more 
in liars' 
alibis than in 
truth-tellers' 
alibis 
 
3 
 somewhat 
more in liars' 
alibis than in 
truth-tellers' 
alibis 
4 
 to the same 
extent in liars' 
and truth-
tellers' alibis  
5 
 somewhat 
more in 
truth-tellers' 
alibis than in 
liars' alibis 
    
6 
 much more 
in truth-
tellers' 
alibis than in 
liars' alibis 
 
7 
 substantially 
more 
in truth-
tellers' 
alibis than in 
liars' alibis 
  
 
Setting details (i.e., description of the crime 
scene and/or any other places described in the 
alibi)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Temporal details (i.e., description of the order in 
which events took place and/or the specific times 
and dates in which events occurred)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Object details (i.e., details about objects used by 
the suspect and/or by others described in the alibi)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Person description details (i.e., details about the 
appearance of other people described in the alibi) o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Self-action details (i.e., details about actions 
taken by the suspect)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Others' action details (i.e., details about actions 
taken by people described in the alibi that are not 
the suspect)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
177 
 
2) When truth-telling suspects provide an alibi, what strategies do you think they typically 
use to make their alibi seem truthful and convincing to the interviewer?  
 (Strategies may relate to how they behave during the interview, their line of reasoning and 
thinking, what they choose to say, etc.) 
 
3) When lying suspects provide an alibi, what strategies do you think they typically use to 
make their alibi seem truthful and convincing to the interviewer?   
 (Strategies may relate to how they behave during the interview, their line of reasoning and 
thinking, what they choose to say, etc.) 
 
4) In your opinion, how is the amount of details provided in an alibi related to the 
truthfulness of the alibi?  
o The more details provided in the alibi, the more likely the alibi is truthful.   
o The more details provided in the alibi, the less likely the alibi is truthful.   
o The amount of details provided in the alibi is not related to its truthfulness.    
On the basis of the answer you have just chosen, why do you think that this is the case? Please 
explain your answer.  
 
5) In your opinion, to what extent do truthful alibis contain incorrect details (i.e., incorrect 
information the suspect provides unintentionally about the critical time)? 
 
1 
 Truthful 
alibis 
contain no 
incorrect 
details   
2 
  
  
  
  
 
3 
  
  
  
  
 
4 
  
  
  
  
 
5 
  
  
  
  
 
6 
  
  
  
  
 
7 
 Truthful 
alibis 
contain 
only 
incorrect 
details  
 o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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(This question was presented to participants who chose response option 2 in the previous 
question, or higher) In your opinion, why might truthful alibis contain incorrect details? 
 
6) At what point in the course of the investigation do you think the interviewer begins to form 
an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the suspect? 
o Usually prior to hearing the suspect’s alibi for the first time.    
o Usually while the suspect is providing their alibi for the first time.   
o Usually after interviewing the suspect several times.   
o Usually after there is evidence to corroborate or refute the suspect’s alibi (regardless 
of number of times s/he has been interviewed).    
o The interviewer never forms a belief regarding the suspect’s involvement in the 
crime.  
o Other:   
 
7) If, at the beginning of the interview, the interviewer believes that the suspect is guilty, to 
what extent might this belief affect what this interviewer says and how s/he behaves during 
this interview?  
 
1 
 Does not at 
all affect the 
interviewer’s 
words and 
behaviour   
2 
  
  
  
  
 
3 
  
  
  
  
 
4 
  
  
  
  
    
5 
  
  
  
  
 
6 
  
  
  
  
 
7 
 
Significantly 
affects the 
interviewer’s 
words and 
behaviour   
 o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 Please explain your answer.  
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8) If the suspect gets the impression that the interviewer thinks that s/he is guilty, how likely 
do you think it is that: 
 
1 
 Very unlikely  
2 
  
 
3 
  
    
4 
  
 
5 
  
 
6 
  
    
7 
Very 
likely  
 
The suspect will provide more 
details in their alibi   o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
The suspect will provide details 
in their alibi even if s/he is not 
certain about their accuracy o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
The suspect will confess to 
committing the crime (regardless 
of whether s/he has committed 
the crime or not)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Please complete the following details: 
  
o My age is:  
o I prefer not to answer  
 
o My gender is:  
o I prefer not to answer   
 
My country of residence: 
 
The main language I use every day: 
 
Please feel free to add any further thoughts or comments regarding the topic of alibis, or the 
questions we have just asked you in this questionnaire. 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire! 
Debriefing Sheet   
The purpose of this questionnaire was to understand how people from the general public 
perceive the difference between truthful and deceptive alibis. 
  
Research thus far has shown that truth-telling suspects tend to provide more information in 
their alibis as opposed to lie-telling suspects, and that the information provided by the former 
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is more accurate than that provided by the latter. 
 We hope that by using responses of respondents such as yourself we will be able to develop 
interviewing techniques that utilize more realistically the verbal strategies used during 
interviews, and assist with improving real life interviews conducted with suspects. 
  
 Finally, we should inform you that, as part of this research, we have also been asking police 
officers to complete the questionnaire (the police officers have also been answering additional 
questions regarding their personal experience with suspects interviewing). We could not 
inform you before you completed the questionnaire that we were also collecting data from this 
group of respondents because we had to make sure that nothing would bias your responses to 
the questionnaire and/or lead you to make incorrect inferences about the aims of the study. 
  
 If you have any further concerns or questions please do not hesitate to get in touch with either 
myself, or my supervisor. Our contact details are as follows:         
  Shiri Portnoy 
    Department of Psychology, 
    King Henry Building, 
    King Henry I Street, 
    Portsmouth, 
    Hampshire, 
    PO1 2DY 
    Tel: 023 9284 6317 
    Email: shiri.portnoy@port.ac.uk     
Prof Lorraine Hope 
    Department of Psychology, 
    King Henry Building, 
    King Henry I Street, 
    Portsmouth, 
    Hampshire, 
    PO1 2DY 
    Tel: 023 9284 6329 
    Email: Lorraine.hope@part.ac.uk           
If you have any concerns about the way this study was conducted please contact the Interim 
Head of Department of Psychology: 
 Dr James Ost 
 King Henry Building, King Henry I st. 
 PORTSMOUTH 
  PO1 2DY 
 Tel: 023 9284 6311 
 Email: james.ost@port.ac.uk 
 and/or 
 Chair of the Science Faculty Ethics Committee at: 
 University of Portsmouth 
 James Watson Building 
 2 King Richard 1st Road 
 Portsmouth 
 PO12FR 
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Appendix I: Supplemental Materials 
Table I.1 
Chapter 2, Experiment 1: Participants’ Self-Reported Strategies Used to Appear Truthful and Convincing During Alibi Provision  
Note: Numbers indicate frequency of reporting each strategy by type of veracity and pre-alibi instructions. Parenthesis include percentage of participants per each instructions and 
veracity condition who reported each strategy. Each “suspect” could report a strategy more than once and from more than one category. 
 
Strategies 
Truth Tellers Liars 
Pre-Alibi Instructions 
Accuracy and 
Informativene
ss 
Accuracy Informativeness Control 
Accuracy and 
Informativene
ss 
Accuracy Informativeness Control 
Be informative 19 (79%) 15 (62%) 16 (67%) 14 (58%) 9 (38%) 7 (29%) 9 (38%) 10 
(42%) 
Be accurate; avoid guessing and/or 
making-up details 
1 (4%) 7 (29%) 7 (29%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 
Not to be too specific/too informative 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 2 (8%) 4 (17%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 
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Chapter 3, Experiment 2: Quantity of Incorrect Details Provided 
 The number of incorrect details provided for the entire alibis as well as 
evidence details was calculated in the same way as were the quantity of correct details 
for each detail type. We ran two one-way ANOVAs with pre-alibi instructions as the 
independent variable and the number of incorrect details provided by participants as 
the dependent variable separately for the entire alibis and evidence details. The 
number of incorrect details provided did not differ significantly between the pre-alibi 
instructions conditions for the entire alibis, F(2, 75) = 0.11, p = .899, f = 0.05, nor for 
evidence details, F(2, 75) = 0.23, p = .792, f = 0.08.  
Chapter 3, Experiment 2: Additional Reports from Post-Alibi Questionnaire 
The majority of participants (85.9%) described their alibi as almost or 
completely truthful (i.e., marked 90 or higher on the response scale; M = 94.64, SD = 
8.75, range: 50-100). A one-way ANOVA with pre-alibi instructions as independent 
variable showed a significant difference between pre-alibi instruction conditions in 
participants’ rating of the truthfulness of their alibi, F(2, 75) = 3.28, p = .043, f = 0.30. 
However, a Tukey post-hoc test revealed that all comparisons were not statistically 
significant (comparison of task [M = 91.15, SD = 13.16] and control [M = 96.46, SD = 
4.83] instructions conditions: p = .069, d = 0.54, 95% CI [-0.02, 1.09] ; comparison of 
enhanced [M = 96.31, SD = 4.51] and control instructions conditions: p = .998, d = 
0.03, 95% CI [-0.51, 0.58]; and, comparison of task and enhanced instructions 
conditions: p = .080, d = 0.52, 95% CI [-0.03, 1.08]). 
We additionally examined the mode of participants’ responses to the question 
“Before providing the alibi, the experimenter gave you instructions regarding the alibi 
provision. From those instructions, what type of information did you understand that 
you were asked to report about?”. In the control condition, most participants (50.0%) 
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indicated that they understood that they were asked to report “only about the tasks I 
had completed (actions I completed, objects I used, places I visited during tasks 
completion)”. In both the task instructions condition and the enhanced instructions 
conditions, most participants (76.9% and 88.5%, respectively) indicated that they 
understood that they were asked to report “about both the tasks I completed and the 
evidence that could support it”.  
We coded participants freely-reported answers to the question “What details of 
your alibi can be checked?”. Since participants commonly reported that the details of 
their alibis that could be checked were the fact they completed the tasks, the locations 
they had occupied while doing so, and the times of when they were occupying 
different locations during task completion, we categorised participants’ reports 
according to the source of each of these three details. Three main categories emerged. 
Firstly, 60.3% of participants indicated that we could check objects related to the tasks 
they had completed; these included the tasks inside the tasks package, as seeing that 
those were completed could support that participants indeed were occupied with 
completing the tasks. Also, the browsing history on the laptop used for the “finding 
information” task was mentioned by participants as a detail that could account for the 
time they had occupied the specific task room. Secondly, 73.1% of participants noted 
that we could approach the people they had asked for directions, noting that we could 
turn to them to verify when and where the participants had talked with them. Lastly, 
80.8% of participants reported that we could check the slips that they were asked to 
sign and/or time stamp, which could account for when they had visited certain 
locations in the building while completing the tasks. Table I.2 presents the frequencies 
to which each category was mentioned in each pre-alibi instructions condition. We 
also coded participants’ reports on other details that could prove their alibis, such as 
people other than those that participants were asked to communicate with or CCTV 
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cameras. We do not report here the frequency to which participants reported these 
details because we did not control for participants’ attention to them.   
Table I.2 
Categories of Details Reported by Participants as Those That Could Be Checked by 
The Interviewer 
 
Note: Numbers indicate the frequency of reporting each category by type of pre-alibi instructions 
conditions. Parenthesis include percentage of participants per each pre-alibi instructions condition who 
reported each category. Each participant could report a category more than once and from more than 
one type. 
 
 The strategies participants freely reported to have used to provide their most 
truthful and convincing alibi were coded in a data-driven manner (i.e., the categories 
of the strategies were derived from participants’ reports and not pre-determined). 
These strategies are presented in Table I.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What details of your 
alibi can be checked? 
Alibi Instructions 
Enhanced Task Control 
Tasks completed 16 (61.5%) 15 (57.7%) 16 (61.5%) 
Person evidence 20 (76.9%) 21 (80.8%) 16 (61.5%) 
Object evidence 21 (80.8%) 21 (80.8%) 21 (80.8%) 
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Table I.3 
Participants’ Self-Reported Strategies Used to Provide a Convincing Alibi 
Note: Numbers indicate the frequency of reporting each strategy by type of pre-alibi instructions 
conditions. Parenthesis include percentage of participants per each pre-alibi instructions condition who 
reported each strategy. Each participant could report a strategy more than once and from more than one 
category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describe the strategy or strategies you used in 
order to appear as truthful and convincing as 
possible while you were providing your alibi 
regarding the disappearance of the wallet 
Alibi Instructions 
Enhanced Task Control 
Provide as many details as possible  17 (65.4%) 20 (76.9%) 17 (65.4%) 
Be accurate 5 (19.2%) 4 (15.4%) 1 (3.8%) 
Not to provide too many details 1 (3.8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Provide information in chronological order 7 (26.9%) 8 (30.8%) 6 (23.1%) 
Be honest/truthful 10 (38.5%) 6 (23.1%) 7 (26.9%) 
Provide details about person evidence 2 (7.7%) 7 (26.9%) 6 (23.1%) 
Provide details about object evidence 3 (11.5%) 5 (19.2%) 1 (3.8%) 
Provide details that can be checked about the 
tasks or other people (i.e., not person evidence) 
5 (19.2%) 2 (7.7%) 7 (26.9%) 
